The U.S.-Ukraine Drone Deal: How Ukrainian Tech Can Force-Multiply U.S. SOF

A great development and opportunity has opened as a result of the tragic and barbaric Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is something that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) must take advantage of immediately. On July 1, Ukraine opened up the export of defense technologies to partner countries. This decision will allow Ukraine to scale up production, open new markets, and attract international investment. Drone Deal partner countries, with which Ukraine has relevant intergovernmental agreements, will be able to purchase Ukrainian weapons and technologies and work directly with Ukrainian manufacturers.

The military of Ukraine are an obvious and natural partner for U.S. SOF. Both groups are agile, imaginative, and incredibly innovative. While the technologies the Ukrainians have developed can be used effectively (as the creators have proven, much to the great detriment of the hapless Russian forces) by any conventional forces across the board, its adoption by U.S. SOF is even more essential. SOF’s main strength in a conventional fight is as a force multiplier. They are really effective in that role. These technologies would put that aspect on steroids.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will compile the list of partner countries, while the Ministry of Defense, together with other authorized agencies, will compile the list of critical goods that cannot be transferred. Re-export or transfer to third parties is permitted only with Ukraine’s written consent. If products manufactured using Ukrainian technologies are exported to third countries, 20% of their value will go to the state budget.

On April 28, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that “Drone Deals” will be the key format for the export of Ukrainian weapons. They will include production and supply of drones and defense systems, technology exchange, and the transfer of combat expertise. Such formats are already in place or under development with countries in the Middle East and Europe. A separate proposal is on the table for American partners.

David Aloyan, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, states that Ukraine aims to establish a common security architecture and work with partners over the long term. The goal is to conclude long-term agreements that will allow the Ukrainian defense sector to have a clear understanding of the future volume of resources that can be allocated to the procurement of Ukrainian weapons and the utilization of Ukrainian expertise. 

Currently, the production capacity of the Ukrainian defense industry amounts to approximately $55-60 billion annually. According to the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry, the sector is operating at 30–40% of its capacity because the government is unable to provide a higher volume of orders.

Andriy Hrytsenyuk, CEO of the Ukrainian defense and technology cluster BRAVE1, is convinced that Ukraine is capable of selling not just a specific drone, but a “Defense as a Service” model. Ukraine is capable of selling not only equipment but also the know-how on how to effectively use and integrate various systems.

Ukraine and the United States have been negotiating a cooperation agreement on unmanned systems for some time. Washington is interested in gaining access to Ukrainian military technologies and learning from Ukraine’s experience, particularly in the areas of FPV drones, maritime unmanned vehicles, and autonomous control systems.
Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Olha Stefanishyna states that “as a result of work with the State Department and the Pentagon, a draft framework document has been developed, which is currently being reviewed by both sides at various institutional levels.”

Since the start of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, Ukraine has been sharing its military expertise and interceptor drones with the U.S. and its allies in the Persian Gulf. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a recent interview to Fox called Ukraine’s armed forces the “strongest, most powerful” military in Europe because of the experience they gained and added that “Ukrainians developed new tactics, new techniques, new equipment, new technology, that is creating a sort of hybrid asymmetrical warfare”. This is the natural realm of U.S. SOF.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hagset stated that the Pentagon has deployed additional personnel to Ukraine to study drone operations on the battlefield — both in offensive and defensive contexts — in order to draw lessons from the conflict and implement them in real time within its own military. America must now move from observation to adaptation and utilization.

The U.S. Department of Defense has already requested to test a range of Ukrainian defense products, including unmanned systems and electronic warfare systems. The U.S. appears interested in gaining access to the technologies and intellectual property rights that would allow it to replicate these systems. The headquarters of American SOF, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should be utilized in the leading role of this effort.

Ukraine currently possesses the world’s most extensive practical experience in the use of drones in a full-scale war. The U.S. urgently needs to adapt its own military to the new reality of combat operations — marked by the widespread use of FPV drones, automated reconnaissance networks, and the mass deployment of UAVs — and to update its military doctrines.

Secretary of the Army Driscoll at a hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee stated that: “Ukraine’s Delta common operating system, their modular open system architecture, C2 system is absolutely incredible. It fully integrates every single drone, sensor, and shooting platform into just one single network. Ours does not.”

Ukrainian drone manufacturers such as F-Drones are already winning contracts under the U.S. Drone Dominance Program, which is run by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) at the Pentagon and has a budget of $1 billion, which provides for the purchase of more than 200,000 low-cost drones for the U.S. Army by 2027. For the U.S., this is an attempt to quickly adopt Ukraine’s experience with the mass use of drones.

The Ukrainian defense company F-Drones will also open its first assembly and manufacturing center in the U.S. after securing a Pentagon contract. This was announced in a press release from the office of U.S. Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur. F-Drones will invest $18.4 million in a manufacturing project in Holland, Ohio, which will create at least 300 jobs.

The new assembly and manufacturing center will meet the needs of the U.S. and its allies for FPV drones, other unmanned systems, as well as training and testing. The project also includes production development, personnel training, supply chain localization, and the long-term expansion of the company’s operations in the U.S. F-Drones CEO Stas Khutor states that the company supports the concept of the future US-Ukraine Drone Deal and aims to contribute to strengthening the security and technological leadership of Ukraine and the United States.

In April 2026, the U.S. military deployed Ukrainian Magura unmanned surface vehicles for the first time during military exercises in the Philippines, according to Bloomberg. Oleg Roginsky, CEO of Uforce, the company that manufactures Magura maritime drones, stated that international interest in unmanned surface vehicles is growing. The company is in talks with countries in the Indo-Pacific region regarding these systems and is considering the possibility of building at least two manufacturing facilities in the region. This is an aspect that few on the U.S. side even think about.

U.S. interest is growing, given the revolution in the use of unmanned systems that Ukraine has achieved over the past four years. It is also driven by Kyiv’s successes throughout 2026. The Ukrainian Defense Forces have stabilized the front line thanks to the rapid development of drones and, at the same time, have significantly increased the number of long-range strikes on Russian territory. The Russian army’s rate of advance has slowed to a crawl, reaching its lowest level since 2023. The Ukrainian Defense Forces have managed to carry out several successful counteroffensive operations.

In the first four months of 2026, there were 123,000 verified drone-inflicted Russian casualties according to data from Unmanned Systems Forces. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi claims that during the first half of 2026, the Armed Forces of Ukraine killed or seriously wounded 183,500 Russian soldiers. During that time, Russia recruited 180,500 people. 

The casualty ratio on the front lines is estimated to have averaged eight to one in Ukraine’s favor, and the Russian army’s offensive capabilities have been significantly reduced because monthly manpower losses have begun to exceed the rate of replenishment.

The strikes carried out by Ukrainian drone specialists in recent months have expanded from primarily targeting assault infantry to actively hunting down UAV crews, artillerymen, and other specialists. The shooting down of enemy drones is intensifying, the effects of the Starlink shutdown are being felt, and Wi-Fi bridges are being systematically destroyed.

The Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are expanding — a separate branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine dedicated to the use of aerial, naval surface and submarine, as well as ground-based unmanned and robotic systems. This unit accounts for about 2.5% of the total strength of the Defense Forces, yet inflicts 35% of the enemy’s losses. According to confirmed reports, the unit has surpassed the 10,000 mark of enemy military personnel killed or wounded per month, with an overall rate of approximately 35,000–40,000 enemy targets per month.

During the spring of 2026, the FPV kill zone had reached 20–30 kilometers according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Oleksandr Syrskyi and other military figures, meaning that the area of constant risk for infantry, logistics, and evacuation had significantly increased. All movement within this zone is monitored, which severely restricts it. As technical capabilities (drones) and tactics for their use improve, the continuous kill zone could reach 50 km.

FPV drones, kamikaze drones, and loitering munitions are completely transforming the very foundations of tactics and outdated doctrines. The only forces systematically improving their capabilities and expertise today are the Ukrainian and Russian armies.

Drones have disrupted the main foundation of classical military thought — the concentration of forces in specific areas. The battlefield is becoming completely transparent, which eliminates the element of surprise, makes it impossible to assemble large formations, and prevents rapid breakthroughs deep into enemy territory.

Drones provide a unique opportunity to concentrate firepower while maintaining the decentralization of one’s own forces. Any offensive actions now rely on the concentration of fire and weapons (airpower, artillery, and FPV), rather than on the concentration of armored forces and maneuver.

In recent years, most large-scale mechanized assaults in the Russian-Ukrainian war have ended in the attacking force’s defeat. As a result, the attacking force advances extremely slowly, as it relies on small units. Large logistics hubs are now obsolete; logistics have been decentralized as much as possible.

The Ukrainian defense forces have effectively developed new tactics in which drones, infantry, artillery, armored vehicles, ground-based robotic systems, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare are integrated into a single framework for offensive and defensive operations. The drone is no longer merely a supporting tool for the infantry. On April 15, 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced the deployment of drone-assault units that integrate aerial and ground-based drones with infantry into a single system. 

In the kill zone, Ukraine gradually seeks to minimize its military presence by deploying drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in greater numbers. According to Ihor Fedirko, CEO of the Ukrainian Council of the Defense Industry, roughly 15,000 UGVs were delivered to the army by the end of last year. In a recent speech, 3rd Corps Commander Andriy Biletsky noted that by the end of the year, he plans to replace one-third of the infantry with unmanned ground vehicles. 

However, there is currently a shortage of UGVs on the front lines. In the first half of 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense planned to procure 25,000 UGVs. Overall, the annual goal is to supply the military with over 50,000 ground drones, according to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In early April 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that one of its priorities was to transition 100% of frontline logistics to UGV-s in order to reduce risks to troops. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, since the beginning of 2026, the number of units using ground robots has increased from 117 to 230. Since the beginning of the year, the Ukrainian military has carried out more than 50,000 logistics and evacuation missions using ground-based robotic systems, according to Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Germany has funded the delivery of 2,000 Ukrainian TerMIT UGVs to Ukraine over the course of the year. According to plans, production will be handled by Quantum Tencore Industries, a joint venture between Quantum Systems and the Ukrainian company Tencore, which will manufacture the Ukrainian systems using German industrial facilities. According to Tencore, more than 3,000 platforms have already been deployed in Ukraine and are being used by more than 50 brigades of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.

In April 2026, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov noted that the UGV-s segment had become one of the most dynamic areas of defense tech in Ukraine. After the outbreak of full-scale war, the industry effectively had to be built from scratch, and it has now evolved into a fully-fledged market with more than 280 companies and over 550 solutions.

Meanwhile, logistics missions and the evacuation of the wounded remain among the most common tasks assigned to UGVs. Other common tasks include mining and mine clearance. Engineering, reconnaissance and strike missions follow. There have also been documented cases of these platforms being used as kamikaze drones and as a platform for launching FPV-drones and as a platform for electronic warfare systems (EWS).

UGVs are currently absolutely essential for carrying out logistical tasks — specifically, the delivery of ammunition, fuel, and provisions. Due to the intense surveillance by drones, any movement of troops on the front lines carries enormous risk. On average, a single logistics platform makes only a few trips. However, this is precisely the essence of robotic logistics: instead of people, machines are sent into harm’s way.

Reconnaissance drones detect enemy positions, firing points, logistical assets, and UAV operators’ positions. Attack drones and unmanned ground systems suppress enemy fire and limit the enemy’s ability to mount an organized response. The role of the infantry is shifting toward mopping-up operations, physical control, and securing positions. This change allows for a significant reduction in the time personnel spend under direct enemy fire.

At the same time, the new reality of the battlefield does not mean abandoning infantry, artillery, armored vehicles, or other systems. The presence of infantry in the most dangerous areas is reduced, yet control over the territory is secured by the infantry. Artillery remains critical for firepower, armored vehicles for maneuver and support, and electronic warfare systems for the infantry’s survival.

Ukraine is actively developing remote control systems for reconnaissance and strike platforms. Systems for remotely controlling interceptor drones (air defense), frontline drones, and unmanned ground vehicles have been tested and are being scaled up. Mother drones and heavy relay copters are being developed and disseminated, extending the operational range of FPV to 30–50 km.

Terminal autopilot is being implemented and is already in active use — when approaching a target where electronic warfare is at its peak, if communication is lost, some of the drones fly autonomously using optical guidance. Work is also actively underway to create semi-automatic weapons systems controlled by AI.

Ukraine is also actively developing interceptor drones — specialized military unmanned aerial vehicles designed to destroy aerial targets (enemy kamikaze drones, reconnaissance drones, etc.). Some of the most used are Sting, P1-SUN, LITAVR, Bullet, Octopus, STRILA. 
There are now so many drones that anti-aircraft systems don’t have enough ammunition to shoot them all down. Ukrainian troops have learned to intercept drones using other drones. Starting in mid-2024, the Ukrainian Defense Forces began using modified FPV drones to intercept Russian reconnaissance UAVs.

Over time, the Ukrainian Defense Forces acquired specialized models designed to combat “Shaheds.” In May 2026, Ukraine was attacked by a record number of Shaheds and decoys — 8,150, averaging 263 drones per day. But the shoot-down rate was also a record — 92% of the drones.

According to various estimates, these systems are already shooting down 40% to 50% of “Shaheds.” The cost of interceptor drones starts at $1,000, which is significantly cheaper than anti-aircraft guided missiles. There are already about 50 companies in Ukraine that manufacture interceptor drones.

Russia has begun to use the “Shahed” (Geran-3) jet drones more actively. But they, too, soon proved vulnerable to Ukrainian interceptor drones. Ukrainian interceptor drones have not yet been able to catch up with the “Geran-5” jet-powered “drone missile,” as its speed reaches 600 km/h; however, a solution is expected in the coming months. 

Interceptor drones often feature automatic target detection and engagement systems. Electronic reconnaissance systems detect signals from enemy UAVs. Low-profile radars determine their range, altitude, and speed. The operator observes the targets’ movements in real time, selects a target, and issues a strike command. The system then automatically guides the drone to the target, autonomously identifies it, and locks onto it.

Interceptor drones that can be controlled remotely and are capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometers away have also been developed and are being deployed. Operators can now operate at a considerable distance from the ground control station while maintaining control over vast areas. The first such system is HORNET VISION Ctrl, paired with the Sting drone. Using this solution, Ukrainian operators have already destroyed “Shahed” drones while located 500 km from the launch site. According to Mykhailo Fedorov, more than ten manufacturers have already integrated this innovation into their systems.

Air defense systems, which have historically relied on expensive anti-aircraft missiles to destroy large enemy aerial targets, are undergoing significant changes. Given the global shortage of anti-aircraft missiles, the focus is shifting toward developing affordable alternatives, such as interceptor drones. This trend was further confirmed during the war between the U.S. and Iran. 
Electronic warfare systems are losing their effectiveness due to drones switching to non-standard frequencies, the adoption of machine vision for terminal guidance, and the use of fiber-optic UAVs that operate outside the range of electronic warfare systems.

A critical need at present is a hard-kill system for close-range engagements. Short-range military air defense systems are unsuitable for countering micro-UAVs. This gap is intended to be filled by remotely controlled weapon stations (RCWS) with small AESA and EOTS for detection, machine vision and Fire Control System.

Ukraine is starting to deploy AI-powered turrets on the front lines to intercept enemy UAVs. The first prototypes have already been tested in combat. The systems autonomously detect, track, and calculate the trajectory of enemy UAVs. Currently, those turrets are already in use in more than ten units across the front line.

Ukrainian drones are gradually shifting away from GPS toward inertial navigation systems and map-matching, thereby reducing the impact of Russian electronic warfare systems. The use of “modernized” FPV drones — which have a range of 50 kilometers and are not affected by Russian electronic warfare — is also expanding.

The next stage of development will be the emergence of autonomous drone swarms that do not require operators for remote control. Several companies within the Brave1 cluster are already working on projects to implement drone swarms. 

The emergence of interceptor drones has also reduced the operational lifespan of reconnaissance UAVs on the battlefield. Modern reconnaissance UAVs are high-tech and expensive systems equipped with secure communications and powerful optics with thermal imaging capabilities, capable of flying long distances and conducting reconnaissance in the face of electronic warfare.

Now, such drones may be limited to one or a few missions before being shot down. Only the elite units of Russia’s “Rubicon,” which specialize in the use of FPV drones, reported over 2,500 downed reconnaissance drones in a single year.

Under these conditions, demand is growing for mass-produced, low-cost reconnaissance UAVs that can be sacrificed without regret. Ukrainian companies began offering such alternatives in the fall of 2025. They are primarily launched by hand or from a catapult and can operate at medium ranges (primarily up to 50 km) for several hours.

The cost ranges from just $3,000 to $5,000. This makes it possible to conduct reconnaissance without fear of losing the drone. In fact, the military can conduct reconnaissance for as long as the battery and communication range last, sending these inexpensive drones on “one-way” missions. Expensive reconnaissance UAVs continue to be used for long-range flights, searching for high-value targets, and operations in environments that require aircraft with superior optics and communication capabilities.

Ukraine is rapidly expanding its use of middle-strike (mostly 50-200 kilometers, some up to 500 kilometers) and deep-strike (up to 3,400 kilometers) drones. One of the first units to launch these operations was the “Prymary” unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Over time, the Special Operations Forces (SSO), the Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS), and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) joined in the strikes.

Dozens of models are currently in widespread use, including the FP-1 and FP-2, Lyuty, Rubaka, Bulava, RAM-2X, Anubis, Seth-X, Morok, Behemoth, Sichen, B-2, Darts and others. Such drones now have a payload of up to 200 kilograms. 

There are various models of middle-strike drones designed for different missions. The smaller, more maneuverable ones, with a smaller warhead, hunt down Russian military vehicles, while the larger ones, with a larger warhead, attack stationary targets. Some of them are equipped with AI target recognition and terminal autoguidance, which increases the likelihood of hitting the target even if communication is lost. 

The Ukrainian military is actively destroying enemy air defense systems and radars in the occupied territories and within Russia itself. All elements of the layered air defense system are being neutralized — long-range (capable of shooting down ballistic missiles), medium-range, and short-range systems. Radars, illumination and guidance radars, and long-range surveillance radars are being systematically knocked out.

Strikes are systematically delivered against oil refineries, pipelines, ports, defense industry enterprises, and chemical industry facilities. The geographic scope and effectiveness of the strikes are expanding. Whereas previously most Ukrainian strikes focused on the border areas, now drones are striking nearly all regions of the European part of Russia.

According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, 11 Russian oil refineries, seven fuel logistics facilities, and eight enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex were struck by deep-strike weapons in June. In particular, strikes were carried out against an oil refinery in Moscow and an oil terminal in St. Petersburg.

According to Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Ukraine plans to extend the range of its drones to over 3,000 kilometers. This will open up unique opportunities to strike the Russian Federation’s fuel and energy sector, including the Omsk Oil Refinery — the most powerful in Russia — as well as to target critical oil extraction facilities in Western Siberia, which accounts for about 87% of crude oil output.

Not only specialized units, intelligence agencies, or special operations forces — such as the SBS, GUR, SBU, and SSO — are beginning to develop their middle-strike capabilities, but also army corps for use along their own sections of the front line. In particular, the Azov Corps has begun numerous strikes against Russian logistics in the Mariupol area — up to 150 kilometers deep into occupied territory. The 3rd Army Corps’ attack UAVs are covering key Russian logistics routes in the Luhansk region — up to 200 kilometers deep. Both and other military units are increasing strikes on logistics in the Donetsk region. 

At the same time, Ukrainian forces are carrying out numerous strikes on the bridges connecting occupied Crimea with southern Ukraine, thereby imposing a logistical blockade on the peninsula. After damaging the bridges, Ukrainian forces are also destroying the pontoon crossings that are being set up. Russian forces are facing a severe shortage of air defense systems to counter Ukrainian drones.

Systematic strikes deep into Russia are forcing the redeployment of scarce systems, radars, and missiles to defend the rear, thereby leaving entire sections of the front line unprotected. After hundreds of strikes on radars and launchers, Ukrainian drones are hunting down Russian military transport and fuel tankers. At the same time railways — which the occupiers actively use to transport large quantities of military cargo — are also coming under attack.

Increasing the number of strikes leads to the destruction of the enemy’s logistics and rear infrastructure — trucks, ammunition depots, repair bases, troop deployment sites, command posts, and other facilities. The Ukrainian offensive campaign is creating serious problems for Russian logistics at both the tactical and operational levels. The strike zone of middle-strike assets covers all occupied territories, which effectively become a new kill zone for the Russians.

Russian troops in the occupied south of Ukraine are at risk of becoming undersupplied. Significant fuel shortages resulting from Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries are also being felt throughout all of Ukraine’s occupied territories and in many regions of Russia. 

Ukraine is expanding the use of Small Cruise Missiles such as Areion (UAV-290), Bars, and Ruta — with a payload ranging from 100 to 250 kilograms; cruise missiles such as the FP-5 Flamingo with a range of over 3,000 km and a payload of 1150 kilograms; the R-360 Neptune with a range of up to 280 km; the R-360M (Middle) with a range of approximately 500 km; and the R-360L (Long) with a range of about 1,000 km — with a payload ranging from 150 to 260 kilograms.

Kyiv is preparing to launch mass production of Sapsan ballistic missiles with a range of up to 500 kilometers and a payload of 480 kilograms, and is developing the FP-7 with a range of up to 200 km and a payload of 150 kilograms and the FP-9 with a range of up to 850 kilometers and a payload of 800 kilograms.

Ukraine is also developing a low-cost alternative to Patriot missiles — the FP-7.x missile — designed to counter ballistic missiles. Mass production of the missile could begin in August, according to statements by Fire Point. The target price is no more than 700,000 dollars per missile and 150,000 dollars per launcher capable of carrying four missiles. A Patriot PAC-3 missile costs $3.8 million, according to the U.S. Army’s budget estimates for 2026. Several systems designed to counter cruise missiles are also being tested. 

Currently, global demand for air defense systems far exceeds global production capacity. Only about 60 PAC-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system are produced each month. If Ukraine successfully deploys such a system against Russian ballistic missiles, it will become battle-proof and a key component of Ukrainian exports. 

It is a fact that Ukraine is now overtaking Russia in terms of technology. However, this advantage is not static — there is a constant race between new technologies and countermeasures. Every technology has its own development cycle: concept, prototype, validation, production, combat deployment, feedback, and modernization. Under normal circumstances, this cycle can take years. In times of war the time between upgrades is measured in weeks. Ukraine continues to invent and implement new technologies faster than Russia or anyone else. And all of them are battle-tested against the “second army in the world”, unlike most technologies developed elsewhere.

Ukrainian and European defense companies are rapidly expanding their cooperation. In recent months, a number of memorandums of understanding have been signed: SkyFall and Airbus Defence and Space; KB Luch and MBDA; Ukrainian Armor and MBDA; TAF Industries and PGZ; TAF Industries and Recas; DevDroid and Kongsberg; Frontline Robotics and Dropla; Roboneers and ARX Robotics; Ukrainian Unmanned Technologies and Haulotte; Fire Point and Hensoldt; Ukrainian Armor and AviaNera Technologies; AIDronesUA and Njord Technology; Rovertech and STRONGHOLD AI; Frontline Robotics and Milrem Robotics; MAC HUB and Paramount Greece; and many others.

The U.S. is facing several challenges, such as the growing cost of maintaining conventional forces and means sufficient to deter and defeat its enemies, and increasing numbers of potential adversaries spread geographically across the world. An answer to all of these lies in the growing technology explosion tied to Ukrainian expertise and innovation. Again, these tools should and will (one hopes) soon be proliferating in all western forces and especially across the American military. That is a very positive development but will take time to manifest as capabilities.

If decision makers can prioritize the adoption and flow of these innovative methods and devices to U.S. SOF the process could be accelerated. SOF is arguably the most adaptive and (no pun intended) unconventional forces America has and exactly who will be used in efforts against numerically superior foes. They could add speed and near-term effectiveness to the effort of adoption. This is a rare opportunity of gigantic proportion.

It’s time to expand cooperation between US and Ukrainian companies. It’s time for a Drone Deal between the USA and Ukraine.