During the war, Ukraine significantly increased its production of artillery ammunition through domestic achievements and international cooperation. Despite significant progress, including the development of Western calibers, the “shell famine” and other critical challenges, including the inability to ensure a closed production cycle, remain. Read this article to learn more about the current state of domestic production of artillery rounds, prospects and key challenges.
For any military conflict, including the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, possessing sufficient artillery and ammunition is a paramount condition for success. De facto, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have faced artillery shell shortages since the initial months of the Russian invasion. While older stockpiles were used quite extensively during the first two months, subsequent artillery needs were primarily met by partner deliveries, with domestic production serving as a secondary source.
Currently, the Ukrainian army’s primary artillery calibers include 105mm, 122mm, 152mm, and 155mm, though other calibers such as 203mm are also utilized. According to government officials, a minimum of 200,000 shells per month is required to maintain current defensive lines and deter enemy offensives. However, this volume is insufficient for sustaining offensive operations at either the strategic or even tactical level. Furthermore, the number of shells expended by the UDF was approximately 50% of Russian rates during peak periods, but dropped to roughly 10-15% during the most challenging times. Initially, Ukraine’s military predominantly utilized Soviet-era 122mm and 152mm calibers. By 2023, Soviet-standard shells were used by the UDF at a 1:1 ratio compared to Western counterparts. Presently, however, Western-standard artillery ammunition comprises the overwhelming majority of munitions employed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Зараз українська армія застосовує такі основні калібри: 105, 122, 152 та 155-мм, хоч є і інші, такі як 203 мм. Мінімальний рівень забезпечення снарядами, достатній для стримування наступу ворога на дійсних рубежах, за словами представників уряду, становить 200 тисяч на місяць. Однак цей рівень недостатній для забезпечення потреб наступальних операцій на стратегічному чи навіть тактичному рівні. При цьому, кількість випущених СОУ снарядів у найкращі періоди становила близько 50% від російських, у найгірші же коливалася довкола 10-15%. На початку вторгнення Україна застосовувала переважно радянські калібри 122 і 152 мм, у 2023 році снаряди радянського зразку за обсягом використання в СОУ співвідносились із західними як 1:1, зараз же артилерійські боєприпаси західного зразку складають переважаючу більшість серед тих, які застосовує українське військо.
Following the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine still maintained limited production capacities for Soviet-caliber rounds at Kyiv’s State Joint Stock Company “Artem.” However, attempts to expand production failed, as an American company contracted to supply equipment did not fulfill its obligations. It later emerged that Gray Fox Logistics had ties to Russian security agencies, indicating deliberate sabotage of the agreement. Besides, the “Impulse” factory in Shostka continued to produce shell detonators, even expanding its production capacities in 2019. Nevertheless, this marked the sole significant improvement in ammunition production capabilities during the 2014-2022 period.
The reasons for these frankly modest achievements stemmed from both Russian countermeasures against Ukrainian efforts and systemic issues within Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (MIC). These included a lack of substantial state contracts for shells, as the needs of the Anti-Terrorist Operation/Joint Forces Operation (ATO/JFO) were entirely met by existing Soviet stockpiles, even following a series of explosions at storage bases; insufficient funding for the expansion of both production and the technological base or research; corruption; degradation of Soviet-era production facilities; and the absence of domestic explosives production for artillery rounds, as the state-owned “Zirka” plant in Shostka remains non-operational and is currently in a state of bankruptcy.
Another potential producer of explosives is the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant, which previously manufactured such substances and continues to produce solid rocket fuel. While this plant is indeed a crucial component of the domestic MIC, its capacities are specifically dedicated to Ukraine’s missile program, particularly the “Vilkha” and “Neptune” systems.
Consequently, at the onset of the Russian invasion, despite stated intentions in 2019 to establish closed-cycle 155mm shell production, Ukraine possessed the capacity to produce only a limited number of 152mm and 122mm rounds. This production was not serial, however, and even by the most optimistic estimates, amounted to merely up to 10,000 rounds per year, all while remaining dependent on imported components and gunpowder.
Ukraine’s Defense Forces’ reliance on dwindling Soviet-era stockpiles and limited foreign procurement quickly escalated into an existential threat for the nation, as the intensity of hostilities rapidly depleted existing arsenals. Revitalizing the domestic military-industrial complex (MIC) in the realm of artillery ammunition and systems became a matter of national survival and defense capability.
By late 2022, Ukroboronprom had already announced the establishment of its own 122mm and 152mm shell production. LLC “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika” is also involved in manufacturing these rounds. While a positive development, its long-term significance diminishes as stockpiles and the operational lifespan of artillery systems for these calibers eventually deplete. This is because Ukraine does not domestically produce artillery systems of these calibers, and among its international partners, only the Czech Republic manufactures them (e.g., 152mm Dana-M2 SPG). Also, 203mm shells are not currently produced domestically.
Since the full-scale invasion began, the inevitable transition of most artillery units to 105mm and 155mm calibers became apparent. Despite that, information on the commencement of 155mm shell production only emerged in autumn 2023. Production volumes remained limited until summer 2024, when Ukroboronprom (UOP) initially received a production line from the Norwegian defense company Nammo, enabling a tenfold increase in output. Subsequently, in August, UOP finalized a licensing agreement to manufacture 155mm artillery rounds using Norwegian technology. To further accelerate production, Ukraine also placed an order with France’s Forges de Tarbes for 60,000 shell bodies in 2024, with plans to scale up deliveries to 120,000 in both 2025 and 2026.
Another Western-standard caliber employed by Ukrainian artillery is 105mm. Currently, there is no public data available regarding the domestic production of these shells. While official reasons have not been disclosed, it can be presumed that this is due to the fact that prior to the invasion, Ukraine had plans and developments for launching 155mm shell production (at least for its domestic Bohdana self-propelled howitzer), whereas no similar work was underway for 105mm rounds. Their production is anticipated to commence in 2026 as a joint venture between the Czech Czechoslovak Group (CSG) and “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika.” The latter currently stands as Ukraine’s largest private supplier of artillery ammunition to the Defense Forces. In collaboration with its Czech partner, it also plans to establish the production of various types of 155mm rounds and 120mm tank rounds. The production of these calibers is currently absent in Ukraine, with a planned start in 2026, where an initial 50% of capacities will be located in Ukraine, gradually increasing to 80%. The anticipated capacity of the joint “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika” and CSG production is 100,000 155mm rounds for 2025, with an annual output projected to grow to 300,000 by 2026. This latter figure will also include 105mm artillery and 120mm tank rounds.
The most ambitious project in artillery shell production to date is the Rheinmetall shell plant. Its planned production capacity increased from 150,000 to 350,000 rounds per year even during the planning stage. Launch is anticipated in 2026.
Apart from the modern 120mm NATO caliber, the Soviet-era 125mm has remained the most prevalent tank gun caliber within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since the invasion began. Consequently, initial efforts for tank ammunition production were concentrated on this caliber. In March 2023, JSC “Ukrainian Defense Industry” (UDI, formerly “Ukroboronprom”) officially announced the commencement of joint serial production of 125mm shells with another European state. The production facilities for this endeavor were established outside Ukraine, on the territory of the aforementioned unnamed country. Immediately following this, in April 2023, a cooperation agreement for the production of 125mm tank shells was signed between UDI and the Polish company Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ). This fueled speculation that Poland was the unnamed country where shell production had been previously established, though no official confirmation was provided. Among the shell types, only High Explosive Fragmentation (HEF) rounds have been mentioned, with no information available regarding High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), Armor-Piercing (AP), or other varieties. Concurrently with the launch of 125mm production, the initiation of 73mm shell manufacturing for the BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle was also reported.
Ukrainian tank units also operate vehicles that utilize older tank ammunition calibers, including 105mm. However, their proportion is significantly smaller and trending downwards. So that, no production of these shells has been established, nor is it anticipated in the future, as their needs are met through existing domestic and partner stockpiles.
Similar to tank ammunition, Ukraine did not manufacture mortar rounds prior to the full-scale invasion. As of now, domestic or cooperative production of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortar rounds has been confirmed, with volumes reaching “millions per year.” The primary manufacturers include UDI, which in 2023 initially established domestic production of 82mm mortar rounds, followed by 120mm, and then added 60mm rounds to its nomenclature in 2024. Also among the key manufacturers is the aforementioned “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika,” whose current capacities allow for the production of over 20,000 rounds monthly. Notably, both companies launched the production of 120mm mortar rounds in cooperation with European partners, likely with at least partial production facilities located outside Ukraine.
Despite the impressive pace of ramping up production almost from scratch, a negative side effect emerged: the inability to ensure stable quality of the manufactured products. In 2024, as the first large-scale batches of 120mm mortar rounds began arriving at the UDF, numerous reports from soldiers immediately appeared in the media concerning malfunctions and a high percentage of defects among the delivered rounds. The state recalled all defective batches, totaling 54,000 120mm mortar rounds. In most cases, these batches were withdrawn from units without immediate replacement, which adversely affected combat readiness.
To date, no official reason has been provided for this widespread defect issue. Existing theories, varying in their degree of speculation, attribute blame to both objective factors – given that defects can be considered an unpleasant yet somewhat unavoidable side effect of a production volume increase by tens of thousands of percent amidst a significant global gunpowder deficit – and subjective factors, including ineffective management, deliberate misleading, and, naturally, corruption.
A defining characteristic of the current development of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex is the extensive involvement of Western, predominantly European, partners and the establishment of joint ventures. This collaboration aims to compensate for the lack of domestic funding and technology, as well as to simplify raw material procurement. The highest degree of cooperation for Ukraine’s MIC in artillery and mortar ammunition production has been established with the Czech Republic (CSG, also involving Slovak enterprises) and Germany (Rheinmetall). Other significant partners include Poland, Norway, Denmark, and France. Despite retaining a substantial military-industrial complex since the Cold War era and producing a wide range of ammunition suitable for Ukraine’s needs, Bulgaria has not engaged in significant (at least publicly announced) cooperation projects with Ukraine. This is apart from speculations that a joint Ukrainian-Bulgarian production facility for Soviet-standard artillery shells has been established on its territory.
For the 2025-2026 period, new capacities are slated for activation within these outlined cooperation frameworks, with the majority of known projects to be located within Ukraine itself.
While the current potential of existing and planned production facilities is designated to meet the needs of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, it is reasonable to assume that amidst the militarization of Europe, Ukraine’s domestic industry could also fulfill foreign contracts. In the mid-term, this would allow for the organic integration of Ukraine’s MIC into the broader European complex, representing a crucial step given ongoing EU integration and geopolitical tensions across the Atlantic. In the long-term, it would enable the diversification of Ukraine’s export structure, which has historically been exclusively raw material-based. After the significant loss of its metallurgy sector since 2022, Ukrainian exports have become even more heavily agricultural. Conversely, arms exports would improve the trade balance and inject foreign currency into the economy.
A significant factor influencing current and planned ammunition production is Ukraine’s lack of domestic raw material production for artillery explosives. Although there were historical attempts to cultivate cotton (a raw material for gunpowder) in the Kherson and Crimea regions, and even successful varieties were developed for these territories, the USSR ultimately concentrated gunpowder raw material production in Central Asia, where climatic conditions were more suitable. So, even if the “Zirka” facility in Shostka were to resume operations, Ukraine would not be able to eliminate its dependence on raw material imports. This situation presents another potential negative effect: as production expands, Ukraine will face increasing competition with European manufacturers for gunpowder procurement. The expansion of gunpowder production (particularly in France, its largest EU producer, and Germany) is currently not keeping pace with demand. Beyond domestic production, the issue of importing gunpowder raw materials remains, with the lion’s share procured from China and, to a lesser extent, from Central Asia. Furthermore, Rheinmetall has also announced plans to construct a gunpowder plant in Ukraine.
| Calibre | Implementation |
|---|---|
|
203mm |
SPG: 2S7 Pion. Production is absent and not anticipated. Needs are met via existing stockpiles and external deliveries.
|
|
155mm |
SPGs: 2S22 Bohdana, CAESAR, PzH 2000, Archer, M109, Krab, Zuzana 2, AS-90 . Towed Howitzers: Bohdana-B, M777, TRF1, FH-70. New main UDF caliber. Large-scale domestic production has been deployed in Ukraine. |
|
152mm
|
SPGs: DANA-M2, 2S3 Akatsiya, 2S5 Giatsint-S, 2S19 Msta-S . Towed Howitzers: 2A65 Msta-B, 2A36 Giatsint-B, D-20. Former main UDF caliber. Domestic production has been deployed in Ukraine. |
|
130mm |
Towed Howitzer: M-46. Production is not being established.
|
|
122mm |
SPGs: 2S1 Gvozdika. Towed Howitzer: D-30. Domestic production established. |
|
105mm |
Towed Howitzers: L119, OTO Melara 105mm. Domestic production is absent; launch expected in 2026. |
|
100mm
|
Anti-tank guns: MT-12 Rapira, MT-12R Ruta. Shell production is not being deployed. |
|
73mm |
IFV: BMP-1. Domestic production established.
|
|
125mm
|
Tanks T-64, T-72, T-80, PT-91 Twardy, Captured T-90 tanks. Domestic and foreign production has been established. |
|
120mm
|
Tanks Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Challenger 2, Strv 122. Domestic and foreign production has been established. |
|
105mm |
Tanks Leopard 1, M-55S. Shell production is not being established. |
Ukraine has exponentially increased its domestic production of artillery rounds and mortar shells, from a de facto absent level to a significant figure of approximately 2.5 million by the end of 2024. This output has the potential for further growth as new production capacities come online. According to official sources, this volume has enabled the fulfillment of 30% of the Defense Forces’ requirements. However, it should be noted that mortar shells constitute the lion’s share of this figure, given their simpler and faster production. Therefore, meeting the specific artillery needs for 2025-2026 through domestic production should be conservatively estimated, in the absence of more precise figures, to range from a pessimistic 300,000 to an optimistic 800,000 rounds per year. These figures, however, depend not only on existing production capacities but also on order volumes, as capacities at companies like JSC “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika” are not currently utilized at 100%.
For convenience, a table of rounds and shells used by the UDF is provided below. The left column indicates the munition, and the right details the equipment that uses it, along with its production or supply status.
A critical factor is also the persistent state of shell scarcity faced by troops. Naturally, fully satisfying the needs of combat units during a full-scale war is an impossible scenario for any army. While the UAF partially compensates for this through the quality of its utilized systems, this factor cannot entirely offset the quantitative deficit. Given this, we must assume that the 30% fulfillment of Defense Forces’ requirements represents the proportion of Ukrainian-produced rounds among all those used in 2024. However, this percentage does not reflect the army’s actual needs, which are demonstrably higher.
The limiting factors hindering the expansion of this MIC sub-sector include insufficient funding, a lack of state orders, technology gaps, and raw material shortages, with the issue of explosives being particularly acute. Ukrainian MIC enterprises require foreign orders to ensure growth in scale and efficiency.
Growth prospects lie in establishing joint Ukrainian-European ventures; the bilateral cooperation format has proven most effective. Currently, Ukraine has already established relations with major arms manufacturers on the continent, with the exception of Bulgaria. Future growth hinges on the political climate within the EU and the ability to eliminate the production bottleneck: explosives.
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