To become a middle power, Ukraine must learn to project strength beyond its own region. In the second part of this article, KINI team analyzes the opportunities opening up for Kyiv in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa—regions where Russia’s influence is waning, but competition from China, Turkey, and the Gulf countries is growing. What is the potential of these regions? What economic areas can Ukraine tap into right now? How can it protect its interests? Read the second part of the editorial article to find out how we see it.
In the first part of this text, our team concluded that amid the transformation of the global system of international relations — characterized by growing multipolarity and intensified competition among great powers — Ukraine has an opportunity to redefine its place in the world and become an influential middle power. Achieving this requires a systemic, long-term strategy that combines the development of its own economic and defense capabilities with flexible cooperation with global and regional actors.
For middle powers, perhaps the most significant characteristics are the ability to effectively implement their power potential at least on a regional scale, the possession of cumulative resources (those that have added value at a specific moment in time and can be directly converted into strong positions), and a clear understanding of their own foreign policy goals and ambitions.
Ukraine’s immediate geopolitical environment includes the Black Sea region, Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe serve as a strategic rear for the Ukrainian army and its defense-industrial complex, upon which our state’s defense capability largely depends. Ukraine’s presence in the Middle East is limited to agricultural exports, and significant opportunities for expanding this influence in the medium term are unlikely to arise. However, there is considerable potential for cooperation with the sovereign wealth funds of the rich Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait.
This leaves the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa. In the first, the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia continues, against which Turkey’s influence is growing. However, it is difficult to talk about interaction and power projection amid the war at sea and the lack of clarity regarding Ukraine’s control over its territorial waters in the event of a peace agreement. In the Caucasus, the key actors are Russia, Turkey, and Iran; in Central Asia — China, Russia, and Turkey; while in Africa, the interests of virtually all global powers intersect — the USA, the EU, China, and a number of other major and middle powers like Japan, India, the UK, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Canada, and Australia.
All these regions are united by the significant influence of Russia, which perceives them as its traditional sphere of influence. In recent years, Moscow has faced growing difficulties as the war with Ukraine, economic sanctions, and isolation limit its economic and political capabilities. This has resulted in a weakening of its ability to project power into these regions. However, the beneficiaries of this weakening are not Western countries, but China and Turkey.
The inability (or unwillingness) of Russia to protect its CSTO ally Armenia from armed conflict with Azerbaijan has led to a crisis of trust in relations between Russia and Armenia, as well as with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus in general. Russia’s economic isolation has opened up opportunities for the economies of these countries to engage in gray re-exports to Russia. At the same time, such interaction with Moscow jeopardizes cooperation with the EU, the US, and other Western countries due to secondary sanctions. Significant Russian influence remains in both regions, but China now plays the leading role.
By 2023, China had already become the largest trading partner of Kazakhstan, the largest economy in Central Asia. Beijing’s economic and political influence is growing in every country in the region. Infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative have integrated Central Asia into the broader picture of the Chinese economic empire. The countries of Central Asia have decided to pursue multi-vector cooperation strategies to avoid relying solely on one isolated and unstable partner. Nevertheless, Russia remains a key partner, especially in matters of military and security cooperation.
The EU and individual European states also engage extensively with Central Asia and try to compete with China in the economic sphere, but they do not have the same level of political influence as Beijing. France and Italy have significant economic interests in the region and are key initiators of expanded engagement with Central Asia. The recent visit of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Paris demonstrated the seriousness of France’s intentions to mine uranium in Uzbekistan to compensate for the loss of access to the resource in Niger after the coup in Niamey. The oil and gas potential of Central Asia is also very significant, with the Italian company Eni actively involved in its development.
The diversification of energy supply routes to the EU following Russia’s attack on Ukraine has spurred an expansion of energy exports from Central Asian countries to European markets, giving Brussels leverage over the region. Attempts to supplant Chinese influence in Central Asia are taking place within the framework of the Global Gateway initiative, which focuses on infrastructure projects, particularly the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, one of whose branches will pass through the ports of Odesa and Chornomorsk.
In the Caucasus, Armenia has suspended its cooperation with the CSTO and embarked on a path of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and engaging in dialogue with the European Union. Despite all the turmoil, Russia has maintained a military presence in the region (the 102nd military base in Gyumri, with an estimated 3,500 to 5,000 troops), retains influence over the peace process, and has a say in the dialogue regarding the Zangezur corridor, which is intended to connect Turkey with Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. Georgia, under the control of the pro-Russian “Georgian Dream” party, helps Russia circumvent sanctions by re-exporting sanctioned goods, has entered into a strategic partnership with China, and has “suspended” negotiations on EU accession.
The understanding between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey fits into the general trend of the Caucasus drifting towards West Asia. Turkey plans to implement a number of infrastructure projects in Caucasus, including Zangezur and Middle (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) corridors, as well as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Southern Gas Corridor. Ankara is also interested in changing the security landscape of the region by forming its own sphere of influence. For example, last year Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan signed a trilateral memorandum on security and political cooperation in the Caucasus.
The West Asian drift of the Caucasus is not limited to Turkey. The deepening economic ties between Azerbaijan and Georgia with the UAE and Saudi Arabia are promising. Saudi Arabia is directing significant investments into Azerbaijan’s energy projects (for example, the Garadagh Solar Power Plant), while the UAE is investing in Georgia’s infrastructure, including the port of Poti, which was acquired in 2008 by an investment agency from Ras Al Khaimah (UAE), and plans to develop Tbilisi as a transport hub.
Iran is promoting the idea of a logistics corridor through Azerbaijan and Georgia as part of the TRACECA program and is intensifying cooperation with Baku on the North-South transport corridor from Iran to Russia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. At the same time, it continues to engage with Armenia on the development of logistics routes from Iran to the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. Azerbaijan has also become the main supplier of oil to Israel, meeting up to half of the country’s needs for the resource. The states of the South Caucasus are gradually capitalizing on their strategic location and changing the structure of their partnerships. Russia’s exclusive influence in the Caucasus is becoming a thing of the past.
Central Asia and the Caucasus are important regions in the overall geopolitical picture of Eurasia, playing the role of logistics hubs and suppliers of fossil fuels. With this in mind, Ukraine should present itself as a partner and an important part of the overall West-East route that connects Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The ports of Greater Odesa and Mykolaiv can become important logistics hubs on this route. By achieving synergy with existing initiatives from the EU, Turkey, China, and India, Ukraine will also be able to attract significant investment to expand its logistics capabilities after the war or its active phase ends.
It is unlikely that one can hope for the complete displacement of Russia’s political and economic influence from Central Asia and Caucasus, particularly due to the significant military presence of the Moscow in these regions, its role as a security guarantor for Central Asian countries against the Taliban and Islamist movements, and Georgia’s traumatic experience of war followed by the establishment of a de facto pro-Russian puppet regime. Despite this, opportunities for interaction with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus exist for Ukraine, as they mostly remain neutral regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war, even while helping Russia circumvent sanctions. The countries of both regions try to interact with all possible actors if it is beneficial to them. Therefore, in its relations with these countries, Ukraine should not appeal to international law or call for a change in their position on the war, but rather come with mutually beneficial economic proposals.
The dependence of these regions on Russia is also based on imports of agricultural products (given population growth and local soil degradation), metallurgical products, chemical products, and machinery industries products. While Ukraine can displace Russia in agricultural export sphere even now, in the medium term, the markets of Central Asia and the Caucasus (totaling ~100 million consumers) could become key in restoring Ukraine’s industrial potential and exports.
Over the past decades, Africa has turned into a highly competitive environment. In addition to the historical influence of France, the US, the UK, and Russia, in recent decades China, India, Japan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have begun to actively invest and fight for market share here. The continent is undergoing dynamic urbanization, infrastructure is being built, and trade regimes are being liberalized. The total GDP of African countries is almost $3 trillion, and in terms of purchasing power parity, it is nearly $11 trillion. The development of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which covers the entire continent, will allow for the formation of a common market for goods and services and simplify trade.
According to a forecast by the McKinsey Global Institute, Africa’s population will reach 2.5 billion by 2050, the workforce will double, and the continent will be home to 1.5 billion people of working age. This process will create the prerequisites for Africa’s market and its GDP to at least double by 2050. More than 250 million Africans will join the consumer class (spending at least $12 a day at purchasing power parity) by 2030. As consumer spending grows, new market niches will appear, and the demand for value-added products will increase.
Ukrainian companies should manage to establish a foothold on the continent before this social transition occurs, because once this consumer class is formed, the competition to meet its needs will be much more serious. Expanding exports of Ukrainian goods and services to Africa could significantly alleviate the post-war economic crisis and become an important factor for future growth. Therefore, it is necessary to increase diplomatic presence in Africa and support the activity of Ukrainian companies on the continent.
In Ukraine’s 2021 “Foreign Policy Strategy,” Africa as a separate region was not even mentioned — only together with the Middle East. The full-scale war has stimulated the intensification of diplomatic activity on the continent — President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has held talks, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and parliamentary delegations have visited dozens of African countries. Ukraine has opened 7 new embassies, bringing the total on the continent to 17. However, until Kyiv offers Africa mutually beneficial economic (and possibly security) cooperation, and not just public diplomacy, the countries of the continent will not consider Ukraine a serious partner.
Ukraine’s trade volume with Africa in 2021 was $6.8 billion, of which exports amounted to over $4 billion. More than 70% of Ukraine’s exports to the continent went to North Africa, particularly Egypt—approximately 45%. The 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about $1 billion, which is a tiny fraction in this huge market. Ukraine should now initiate free trade agreements with the continent’s largest markets: South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Angola. And then there are Rwanda, Guinea, Mauritania, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Senegal, and Namibia, which are demonstrating rapid economic progress and are ready to import a lot. Ukraine should prepare for the entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area in order to be among the first to conclude an agreement on a preferential trade regime with the African Union.
To strengthen its economic positions in Africa, Ukraine needs to diversify the structure of its exports of goods and services, adding goods and services with a high share of added value to its agricultural exports. Given Africa’s significant demand, which is not yet fully met by major actors, Ukraine can carve out certain markets for itself for the export of agriculture products, products of the pharmaceutical industry, metallurgy, and services from the IT sector.
In the event of the end of the war with Russia, or at least its active phase, opportunities will also open up for the export of products from the Ukrainian defense industry, aircraft industry and shipbuilding (including river transport, which is poorly developed on the continent). This will also pave the way for the return of thousands of students from Africa to Ukrainian universities, who before the full-scale invasion studied mainly in medical and technical specialties. Expanding interaction with African countries in the field of education and attracting more students from the continent could save Ukrainian higher education institutions in the face of a declining number of Ukrainian youth living and studying in Ukraine.
Ukraine is not capable of competing on an equal footing with superpowers or major powers that have interests in Africa, but it is quite capable of displacing Russian exports in a number of the previously mentioned spheres. Amid economic sanctions and rising war costs, Russia is forced to reduce support for other sectors of the economy, and in some cases, even to siphon money from them. Russia maintains influence in a number of African countries, such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the CAR, Libya, and Sudan, thanks to mercenaries from the “Wagner” PMC and the “Africa Corps,” who protect local dictators or junta leaders. Russia also mines gold there, which it uses to replenish its own reserves. The Kremlin effectively uses military coups and political instability in African countries to realize its interests.
At the same time, Russia’s economic influence in countries whose governments are not dependent on it for security and international legitimization is actually insignificant. Only the presence of “Rosatom” is relatively significant, as it is building the El-Dabaa NPP, which is planned to be commissioned in 2028 and will cost Egypt $30 billion, and presence of “RUSAL”, which mines about 60% of bauxite and 10% of alumina in Guinea for its own aluminum production. Russian energy companies are generally not involved in significant projects on the continent, losing out to their European and Chinese counterparts. “ALROSA”, which mines diamonds in Angola, is being “asked to leave” by the local government due to the threat of sanctions. Since 2023, Russia has sharply reduced its arms supplies to Africa, selling almost three times less in 2023 and 2024 than in previous years.
Ukraine is already inflicting certain losses on Russian PMCs in Africa, particularly by carrying out successful special operations in Sudan and Mali. After the end of the war or its active phase, a logical step for Kyiv would be to form private military companies of a hybrid control type — whose employees would serve as a kind of operational reserve for the Ukrainian army. In peacetime, Ukrainian PMCs, whose personnel will have colossal combat experience in modern warfare, could become the force that “squeezes out” Russian mercenaries from the continent and stabilizes countries with high levels of terrorism. These organizations will protect and promote the economic interests of Ukrainian and Western companies, paying taxes from their activities to the state budget of Ukraine.
Throughout its independence, Ukraine has had a number of attributes of a middle power and has retained them even during the full-scale invasion by Russia. In the event of the war ending with a “frozen” front line, the absence of any domestic or foreign policy restrictions under a potential peace treaty, further integration of Ukraine into the EU, and the union’s assistance in restoring, or rather, forming a new industrial potential for Ukraine, the state and the private sector will be able to accumulate resources to promote their economic interests in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Africa—regions that our state has long neglected in its foreign policy and which could become key markets for post-war Ukraine. The final element for success remains a clear understanding of our own foreign policy goals and ambitions and a systemic policy for their implementation. And here, the state must rely not only on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which frankly lacks personnel specializing in these regions and new ideas in its approaches to them, but also on the non-governmental sector, particularly think tanks, which in their assessments, ideas, and recommendations are not limited by the framework and responsibility of the civil service.
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