This article outlines the current state and developmental trajectory of tube artillery and mortar production within Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (MIC). It primarily focuses on the capability to produce new self-propelled and towed artillery systems, alongside maintaining existing ones. The article highlights critical vulnerability factors, such as chassis supply and financial constraints, and explores pathways for the sustainable expansion of the defense sector’s capabilities.
Take a look at our new article to find out more about the prospects and challenges of developing the production of tube artillery and mortars in Ukraine.
In conventional symmetrical conflicts of the past and present centuries, artillery has consistently accounted for the lion’s share, often even the majority, of battlefield casualties. Figures range from approximately 50-70% in both World Wars, the Korean War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Iran-Iraq War. Given the evident scarcity and classified nature of data, it is impossible to provide a precise figure for the Russian-Ukrainian War. Nevertheless, preliminary estimates for 2022-2023 suggest that this proportion has ranged from 60% to as high as 80%. Although Russian Armed Forces currently incur the most significant losses from Ukrainian drones, artillery firmly retains its position as the second-leading cause of casualties.
The Russian invasion abruptly confronted Ukraine with the urgent need to replenish and replace its aging tube artillery fleet. The inevitable exhaustion of Soviet-era gun barrels — a legacy inherited from the Ukrainian SSR — under conditions of intense full-scale warfare, coupled with combat losses of the artillery systems themselves, almost immediately compelled the Ukrainian leadership to appeal to Western partners for the supply of artillery systems. Consequently, as early as April 2022, Ukraine’s Defense Forces began receiving their first Western deliveries, notably six 155mm M777 towed howitzers provided by Australia. Later, assistance also arrived from other partners. As of today, the UDF employs an exceptionally diverse “zoo” of artillery systems, encompassing both Western and Soviet calibers. However, the proportion of the latter is gradually declining due to losses and the absence of domestic production for replacement, leaving procurement of existing systems or components globally as the sole source of replenishment. Concurrently with these initial Western artillery deliveries, the unannounced serial production of Ukraine’s domestic 2S22 “Bohdana” self-propelled howitzer also commenced.
The decision for the Ukrainian army to gradually transition to Western-standard calibers (primarily 155mm) was de facto made during the fifth president’s term 2014-2019. This shift was necessitated by Ukraine confronting the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas while lacking its own production of tube artillery. Existing military-industrial complex enterprises, since Ukraine’s independence, had not received orders for developing new systems, focusing instead on repairing, restoring, and modernizing the already extensive Soviet artillery legacy.
Development of the 2S22 system commenced in 2016, with the first unit ready by 2018. The manufacturer was the Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Tool Building Plant (KZVV). However, the subsequent development process effectively stalled due to a range of negative factors: bureaucratic hurdles, disputes between the Ministry of Defense and KZVV, issues with the procurement of 155mm shells, and in 2021, the bankruptcy of the self-propelled howitzer’s (SPH) chassis manufacturer, PJSC “AutoKrAZ.” Concurrently with the development and testing of the “Bohdana,” public discourse unfolded regarding the overall expediency of developing a domestic artillery system. The Czech Dana-M2 system was most frequently proposed as an alternative, and a decision to procure it was made in 2018. Initially, the order was for 66 units, though this number was later reduced to 26.
The exact date of serial production launch remains undisclosed, but it commenced in the first half of 2022. The 2S22 “Bohdana” SPH was adopted by the UDF through a simplified procedure. This suggests that some trials, which had not been conducted by the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, were likely bypassed to significantly reduce development time. While the issue of shell procurement was resolved due to Western deliveries, the question of the SPH’s chassis remained unaddressed. AutoKrAZ could not supply KZVV with chassis, and furthermore, the KrAZ-63221 chassis used in the initial 2S22 prototype had drawn criticism for its insufficient reliability.
A temporary solution involved utilizing available MAZ-6317 chassis, which feature the same 6×6 wheel formula. However, given MAZ’s Belarusian origin, this was not a long-term solution, not even a mid-term one; rather, it was a compromise dictated by the urgent need to launch serial production without delay. Subsequently, the SPH was equipped with its current Tatra T815-7 chassis — an 8×8 all-wheel-drive, high-mobility chassis that has proven highly reliable within armed forces.
While KZVV serves as the key link in 2S22 production, other domestic and international enterprises are also involved in the process. Details regarding this involvement are not publicly available. However, in April 2025, A. Zhumadilov, Director of the Defense Procurement Agency, stated that 85% of the system’s components are manufactured in Ukraine, with this figure projected to rise to 95% by the end of the current year. Furthermore, it is known that one of the gun’s most complex components — the barrel — is being produced in Ukraine by KZVV.
Despite these advancements, critical dependencies persist. The most obvious is the reliance on imported Tatra chassis, which has already become a production bottleneck. Further scaling up is impossible unless expanded and stable future deliveries are guaranteed, or a domestic alternative is developed. The Tatra T815-7 8×8 trucks, used for the most recently observed SPH units, were sourced from Ministry of Defense stockpiles. This particular chassis model is being phased out of production in 2025, compelling the industry to transition to the Tatra Phoenix 8×8 moving forward. While this transition should not pose a significant technical challenge — as the artillery system itself is designed for integration onto various chassis — questions remain regarding the pace and volume of production, and consequently, the delivery of these new trucks.
The option of developing a domestic chassis is theoretically more desirable, as it would increase localization and potentially reduce costs. However, in practice, this is a more complex undertaking, given the uncertain future of AutoKrAZ, the potential domestic manufacturer. This uncertainty persists despite the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) imposing a moratorium on bankruptcies for strategic infrastructure enterprises, including AutoKrAZ, until the end of martial law and for two years thereafter (as of May 2024). Information regarding the enterprise’s activities during the war remains undisclosed.
Even so, AutoKrAZ has accumulated over UAH 12 billion in total debt, making a positive future highly improbable without significant debt restructuring. In such a scenario, the plant could become a supplier (or one of them) of chassis for the 2S22 system, specifically the KrAZ-63221. Although this chassis has faced criticism, its use in the context of a full-scale war would allow for both a reduction in system cost and simplification of SPH production. Ultimately, this would enable the UDF to acquire a larger quantity of artillery. Despite limited resources and extremely extensive needs, it is advisable for the state to utilize both foreign and domestic chassis options. Such a diversified approach minimizes risks, especially considering the shelling of Ukrainian enterprises during the war.
Currently, Ukraine boasts some of the highest SPH production rates globally, and the highest within Europe. For instance, in late 2023, President Zelenskyy stated that production had reached a mark of 6 2S22 units per month, a volume comparable to that of Germany’s PzH 2000. By April 2024, the reported figure had climbed to 10 units, surpassing the output of France’s CAESAR. By October of the same year, production rates were announced to be 18-20 units per month. These figures were reconfirmed in March 2025 by Ihor Fedirko, Director of the Ukrainian Gunmakers Association (UGA), who also mentioned an agreement with a European manufacturer for the delivery of 115 chassis over three years. The President also affirmed that 154 artillery systems were manufactured throughout 2024.
The estimated production capacity for Ukraine’s “Bohdana” SPH is projected to be 40-60 units per month for 2025, representing a colossal increase. However, current production rates do not yet match these declared capabilities. Evidently, complex technological military production within a warring state will inevitably encounter challenges at various stages. Nevertheless, two key limiting factors currently stand out: chassis availability and financing.
As previously mentioned, the 2S22 “Bohdana” has utilized four different chassis types throughout its development, yet currently, only one of these — the Tatra Phoenix 8×8 — is available for procurement. Furthermore, no public information exists regarding a specific agreement for the production of this particular chassis for Ukraine’s needs. The MAN 6×6 has also been repeatedly cited as a potential foreign chassis option. The German concern Rheinmetall, a co-owner of RMMV (Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles), has announced plans to expand production in Ukraine, including military trucks. Theoretically, this could encompass both direct deliveries and even joint production of chassis for Ukrainian requirements, including those for the “Bohdana” SPH. However, specific details regarding contracts for MAN chassis intended for Ukraine’s domestic SPH remain unavailable.
Consequently, delays in chassis deliveries are hindering production. Even if additional agreements for chassis procurement are concluded, the pace of military truck manufacturing, at least in its initial stages, is unlikely to keep up with the capabilities of Ukrainian production lines.
The financial aspect of this endeavor is less frequently discussed; however, we believe it warrants consideration to fully grasp the potential challenges in scaling up production. According to publicly available information, the cost of one 2S22 “Bohdana” SPH is approximately $2.5 million, which is significantly cheaper than available modern Western counterparts. Furthermore, the high degree of localization in its production ensures that these funds remain within the national economy, with a portion subsequently returning as taxes.
For 2025, Ukraine’s defense budget stands at UAH 2.23 trillion, or 26.3% of its GDP, representing the highest relative defense spending globally. Approximately 20% of this sum is allocated for arms procurement, amounting to about $10.5 billion USD. Taking the lower bound of the stated domestic 2S22 production potential — 40 units per month — and assuming production will not exceed this, the monthly cost would be $100 million, or $1.2 billion USD annually. Given the UDF’s extensive needs across a diverse range of other weaponry and ammunition, we question the Ukrainian government’s capacity to allocate such a substantial sum solely for “Bohdana” SPH procurement. Therefore, the Ukrainian government should continue exploring opportunities to finance production following the Danish model.
Both challenges described above are currently impacting Ukrainian MIC’s operations, leading to the development of compensatory mechanisms. One such mechanism is the creation of a towed artillery system based on the 2S22’s gun, a development that became known in late 2023. Aside from specific battlefield scenarios where towed artillery may be more effective than self-propelled systems, the primary advantages of towed howitzers are their lower cost and simpler maintenance and repair (compared to SPHs). Self-propelled systems, however, are a more desirable option for the military due to their reduced deployment and redeployment times, significantly higher mobility, and enhanced crew protection and comfort.
Ultimately, the goal of procurement is not merely to accumulate artillery platforms, but to establish and sustain the necessary level of firepower capability. Thus, true military utility and effectiveness are realized not by the mere possession of a platform, but by its functional purpose — its ability to deliver effective fire and achieve tactical and operational advantages. Therefore, a towed artillery system represents a necessary compromise given the insufficient availability of chassis. An additional advantage, it should be noted, is its cost, estimated at approximately $1.5 million USD, which is 40% less than the self-propelled variant. It is important to note that these figures must be assessed with the understanding that lower mobility may lead to higher attrition rates for artillery systems, thus a lower price does not guarantee efficient resource utilization.
The first prototypes were unveiled in late 2024, but the Ukrainian army received the towed “Bohdana” only in the first quarter of 2025. The 47th Separate Artillery Brigade provided the first confirmation of its use, having received an undisclosed number of 2G22 “Bohdana-BG” systems, which utilize the carriage of the Soviet 2A36 “Giatsint-B” system. Currently, the towed “Bohdana” utilizes carriages from Soviet-era artillery pieces available in army stockpiles. However, by the end of the year, a version with a Ukrainian-made carriage, the 2P22 “Bohdana-B,” is expected to be unveiled.
Precise production figures for the towed version have not been disclosed. However, considering the SPH production rates of 40 units per month, with a prospect of growth to 60, and given that the chassis remains the production bottleneck, we can, assuming no other unknown limiting factors exist, estimate a monthly output of approximately 20 “Bohdana-B” units, also with growth potential.
Ultimately, the goal of procurement is not merely to accumulate artillery platforms, but to establish and sustain the necessary level of firepower capability. Thus, true military utility and effectiveness are realized not by the mere possession of a platform, but by its functional purpose — its ability to deliver effective fire and achieve tactical and operational advantages. Therefore, a towed artillery system represents a necessary compromise given the insufficient availability of chassis. An additional advantage, it should be noted, is its cost, estimated at approximately $1.5 million USD, which is 40% less than the self-propelled variant. It is important to note that these figures must be assessed with the understanding that lower mobility may lead to higher attrition rates for artillery systems, thus a lower price does not guarantee efficient resource utilization.
The first prototypes were unveiled in late 2024, but the Ukrainian army received the towed “Bohdana” only in the first quarter of 2025. The 47th Separate Artillery Brigade provided the first confirmation of its use, having received an undisclosed number of 2G22 “Bohdana-BG” systems, which utilize the carriage of the Soviet 2A36 “Giatsint-B” system. Currently, the towed “Bohdana” utilizes carriages from Soviet-era artillery pieces available in army stockpiles. However, by the end of the year, a version with a Ukrainian-made carriage, the 2P22 “Bohdana-B,” is expected to be unveiled.
Precise production figures for the towed version have not been disclosed. However, considering the SPH production rates of 40 units per month, with a prospect of growth to 60, and given that the chassis remains the production bottleneck, we can, assuming no other unknown limiting factors exist, estimate a monthly output of approximately 20 “Bohdana-B” units, also with growth potential.
The production of mortars and mortar rounds has emerged as one of the most prominent development areas for Ukraine’s MIC during the full-scale war. Serial production and delivery of Ukrainian-made mortars to the troops began as early as the Anti-Terrorist Operation/Joint Forces Operation (ATO/JFO) period. Following Russia’s direct invasion, existing capacities were scaled up. Although precise figures are not publicly disclosed, monthly production is estimated to be in the hundreds, encompassing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars. The main producers are the state-owned JSC “Ukrainian Defense Industry” (UDI) and the private company LLC “Ukrainska Bronetekhnika.”
Ukraine does not manufacture Soviet-standard artillery systems, as a decision was previously made to transition to Western calibers. However, Ukraine possesses the industrial infrastructure necessary to maintain existing Soviet-era systems. Specifically, the State Enterprise “Shepetivka Repair Plant” is capable of restoring and repairing 2S1 “Akatsiya” and 2S3 “Gvozdika” SPHs. Furthermore, PJSC “Starokramatorsk Machine Building Plant” had mastered the production of 122mm and 152mm barrels even before the invasion, significantly extending the lifespan of these artillery systems. KZVV is also presumed to possess the necessary means for producing these barrels; however, there is no confirmation whether the plant is currently manufacturing them. The only system for which Ukraine is unable to manufacture barrels is the 2S7 “Pion”, 203mm.
While Ukraine has engaged in extensive international cooperation with multiple European nations for artillery ammunition production, the state leadership has clearly pursued a course of maximum possible localization for tube artillery manufacturing. With the exception of the critical foreign chassis factor, significant success has been achieved in this regard. Despite apparent technological and political advantages, joint production carries the risk of increased final product cost if cooperation involves more expensive European labor. It also entails political risks and potential data leakage. An exception in this context could be the British defense corporation BAE Systems, which in November 2024 announced plans to launch M777 howitzer production in Ukraine. However, the current stage of project implementation remains unknown.
The form of cooperation that has proven most effective to date in Ukraine’s MIC for tube artillery production is the so-called “Danish model.” Under this model, partner states finance and order military products from Ukrainian manufacturers specifically for Ukraine. For instance, in 2024, Denmark financed the production of 18 “Bohdana” SPHs as part of a package order totaling 180 million euros. Overall, this model successfully attracted over $1 billion USD in 2024 from EU member states, Britain, and Norway. However, there is no data indicating whether any of these funds were specifically allocated for additional 2S22 orders.
Another avenue of international cooperation that Ukraine should consider, at least in the long term, is the licensed production of Western equipment within Ukraine itself, particularly chassis for SPHs. Certainly, if information is confirmed that the Rheinmetall plant in Ukraine will also produce artillery chassis, the need for this might diminish. However, no such confirmation has been provided to date.
However, while international cooperation is currently limited in tube artillery production, it is actively developing in the adjacent field of repair and maintenance for Western equipment supplied to Ukraine. This will significantly reduce logistical and time costs for repairing this equipment, as it previously had to be sent to Europe for such services.
For instance, KNDS UKRAINE LLC, a subsidiary of the Franco-German holding KNDS established in July 2024, plans to service PzH 2000 and CAESAR SPHs, Leopard 1 and 2 tanks, Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and AMX-10 RC armored vehicles. In April 2024, BAE Systems signed an agreement with the Ukrainian government to organize the repair and maintenance of its own equipment within Ukraine. This primarily includes 105mm L119 howitzers, with plans to expand the nomenclature to theoretically encompass Bradley and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, M109 SPHs, Archer SPHs, Challenger tanks, and AS-90 SPHs.
Another, less systemic cooperation format has evolved with Poland’s PGZ (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa). Unlike the previously mentioned companies, PGZ did not establish separate production facilities in Ukraine but instead deployed teams of its specialists to Ukraine for the repair and maintenance of its equipment, notably Krab SPHs. This cooperation format is also militarily advantageous but will not directly contribute to the development of Ukraine’s MIC.
Cooperation in mortar production is also limited, likely due to its relative simplicity compared to other military assets. However, it is known that one of the enterprises within UDI (presumably DAHK “Artem,” as it manufactures mortars) has entered into a partnership agreement with Spain’s Escribano for the production of military assets, including mortars, though specific details remain undisclosed.
Ukraine’s military-industrial complex possesses extensive production capacities for tube artillery and mortars, with its output volumes among the highest globally. Amidst the ongoing war, serial production of the “Bohdana” SPH has been successfully launched, and mortar output has been significantly ramped up. Despite these achievements, the defense industry in this sector still holds substantial growth potential. Concurrently, a network of joint or Western-owned enterprises is being established within Ukraine to service Western equipment supplied to the UDF. It is in Ukraine’s interest to facilitate the expansion of the range of equipment that can undergo maintenance and repair within the country.
Expansion prospects hinge on attracting external financing through the Danish model, as well as investments or orders should arms exports be permitted. Currently, the Ukrainian government is the primary source of funding for this branch of the MIC. However, its capabilities are significantly constrained by the UDF’s extensive needs, and a substantial further increase in the military budget is unlikely. Therefore, attracting foreign capital into the production of tube artillery must be a priority for this sub-sector. The same applies to mortar production, where manufacturing capacities are not operating at 100% due to the state’s insufficient funds for orders.
For convenience, a comparative table of Ukrainian 155mm artillery with Western counterparts is provided below.
| Artillery System | Chassis Type | Manufacturer | Origin | Production Rate (units/month) | Cost (million USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
“Bohdana” SPH |
Wheeled |
KZVV |
Ukraine
|
Estimated from 40 |
2,5 |
|
“Bohdana-B” |
Towed |
KZVV |
Ukraine |
Estimated from 20 |
Estimated 1,5 |
|
PzH 2000 |
Tracked |
KNDS Deutschland |
Germany |
6-7 |
19,3 |
|
CAESAR |
Wheeled |
KNDS Franc |
France |
8-12 |
4,26 |
|
AHS Krab |
Tracked |
Huta Stalowa Wola |
Poland |
2-3 |
11,46 |
|
M777 |
Towed |
BAE Systems |
United Kingdom |
4-8 |
3,7-3,9 |
|
Zuzana |
Wheeled |
ZTS Special |
Slovakia |
6-12 |
6,45 |
|
M109 |
Tracked |
BAE Systems |
USA |
4-6 |
17,8 |
|
RCH 155 |
Wheeled |
KNDS Deutschland |
Germany |
1-2 |
12,5 |
|
Archer |
Wheeled |
BAE Systems AB |
Sweden |
1-2 |
10,4 |
Limiting factors, besides financial constraints, include the lack of stable chassis supplies (and, indeed, concrete agreements for such deliveries) for the 2S22. As time is a critical factor in wartime, the state should prioritize foreign manufacturers, specifically European ones, when selecting chassis.
Ukraine already possesses the capacity for self-sufficiency in artillery production. However, attracting external investment is critically important for the further development of this industry. Moreover, the relatively low cost of the artillery system for the industry, combined with high production rates, positions the tube artillery sector as a competitive niche for export once the war concludes. Amidst Europe’s rearmament in the face of a potential Russian threat and the shifting focus of the primary security guarantor — the United States — towards the Pacific region, the ability to sufficiently supply European forces with artillery will play a crucial role. Ukrainian capacities can currently achieve this not only rapidly but also at a significantly lower cost.
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