In a world marked by uncertain American leadership and a fragile transatlantic partnership, Europe is doing what was unthinkable just a few years ago: preparing for war. As the continent builds its defense capacity, France remains one of its pillars and the European Union’s only nuclear power.
However, the nation’s ability to respond to all contemporary challenges is a matter that can be questioned.
The quiet times for the Old World that preceded the Russian invasion are over. The primary guarantor of world order, the United States, demonstrates diminishing willingness to assume responsibility for global and European security. The August 15 summit in Alaska and its outcomes further confirmed the political divergences on both sides of the Atlantic. With or without NATO, European states are augmenting their own security capabilities.
Among them, France plays a key role. A month before the negotiations in Anchorage, on July 14, Paris unveiled its own National Strategic Review — a foundational document outlining its defense policy until 2030. Simultaneously, France’s Arctic Strategy was also published.
The Review largely unifies French security concerns with those of Europe. The most significant risk to European security is identified directly as Russia, owing to an “unprecedented” long-term threat to the interests of France and its allies, instability in the Euro-Atlantic space, the aggressive war in Ukraine, threats of nuclear weapons use, and regular sabotage in Europe. The potential threat from Moscow is assessed as “generational,” meaning France believes the source of this instability lies in the very nature of the Russian political system.
Other cited threats include China, described simultaneously as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival”; Iran, identified as a “source of destabilization” in the Middle East due given its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and its nuclear program; North Korea due to its enablement of Moscow’s aggressive actions and its nuclear program; as well as organized crime, human trafficking (primarily in overseas territories), jihadism, and cybercrime.
France acknowledges the new realities of its environment. While the army’s expected role previously centered on counter-terrorism operations in Africa, the primary focus of the future strategy is now directed toward Europe. The French military is expected to possess the capability to engage in a high-intensity armed conflict in or near the European region. The probable timeframe for the start of such a conflict is 2027–2030, meaning French defense forces have, at best, no more than 1.5 years for preparation.
The anticipated conflict is, of course, linked to potential Russian aggression against Europe. Beyond the Baltics, scenarios also consider an attack on the Balkans and Moldova. France’s SGDN (Secretariat-General for National Defense) believes the future conflict will be a high-intensity war near or on Europe’s borders, with a level of violence likely to result in significant casualties. Direct military operations will not affect the territory of France itself, but Europeans expect to suffer hybrid attacks in the form of public opinion manipulation, attempts to undermine political processes, kidnappings of European citizens in Russia, cyberattacks, and, naturally, economic pressure.
The threat of strategic isolation in the future is growing. The escalation of U.S.-Chinese contradictions and the White House’s prioritization of the Asian region are reducing U.S. engagement in European affairs, breeding uncertainty regarding the subcontinent’s security. The EU is compelled to plan a strategy for managing conflicts and risks while factoring in significantly less American support. The response proposed by France does not depart from tradition: Paris insists on strengthening strategic autonomy and adopting a more centralized approach to protecting shared European interests, primarily through bolstering the Franco-German partnership.
Although the text emphasizes NATO’s important role, the Review implicitly reveals the understanding that the European portion of the bloc must rely predominantly, if not exclusively, on itself in a future conflict.
The strategic autonomy of Europe implies that the security interests of the subcontinent extend to other regions, making the issue of the Arctic highly relevant. Since the 1990s, an “Arctic exception” has existed in international politics — an informal agreement that, despite possible political conflicts and disagreements, the planet’s far north should remain a region of cooperation between states. While the erosion of this cooperation regime began in the 2010s, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has de facto put an end to it. Now, the degree of confrontation in the Arctic is escalating.
The region’s value is most broadly expressed in two dimensions: resource-related and strategic. The Arctic cover conceals vast reserves of fossil fuels and rare-earth elements, access to which, following the melting of the glaciers, will become a vital question for European energy and resource security, potentially reducing dependence on imported oil and natural gas. The freeing of parts of the Arctic Ocean’s surface from ice will lead to increased trade via the Northern Sea Route, which could significantly cut down the time required for logistics to Asia.
As a result of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, seven out of the eight Arctic states are now members of the Alliance. Given Russia’s militarization of the Arctic, the region’s role in European security will only grow. France’s goal is to maintain stability in the Arctic and build cooperation with allies in the region. In practice, this currently involves the participation of French forces in military exercises and patrols by French submarines in the Arctic Ocean. Future plans include investments in the development of specialized technologies that will allow troops to operate effectively in Arctic conditions, as well as the adaptation of modern systems to the region’s security needs, including the satellite constellation and repeaters in the area. At the same time, Paris does not plan to deploy permanent military bases in the north, leaving this to its allies.
The current capability of the French armed forces is one of the highest on the continent, yet their capacity for the high-intensity conflict anticipated in the Review is insufficient. Active personnel stands at 200,000, with an arsenal including 222 tanks (plus 184 in storage), 207 combat aircraft, approximately 6,000 various types of armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 96 self-propelled howitzers (SPHs). Naval forces consist of 1 aircraft carrier, 3 helicopter carriers, 11 frigates, 11 destroyers, and 9 nuclear submarines.
While such a military is entirely adequate for peacetime and projecting power into other regions, the experience of the Russo-Ukrainian war has demonstrated that a full-scale conventional symmetrical clash requires a significant expenditure of resources and the capacity of the national manufacturer or allies to replenish them quickly. This is the primary weakness of the French forces right now: their ability to participate in a protracted “high-intensity conflict” with potentially high losses is not supported by the numbers.
The scarcity of both artillery assets and tanks is a cause for concern. The army has ordered 109 next-generation CAESAR SPHs. While the manufacturer has managed to cut the production time per unit from 30 to 15 months, increasing the output to six per month, the situation with tanks is different. Paris is betting on quality over quantity: €1 billion has been allocated to modernize Leclerc tanks to the XLR standard, but there are no new production orders for tanks. However, the tank shortage may be compensated to some extent by the large fleet of APCs, which continue to be supplied to the army according to existing orders.
The situation in ground-based air defense is significantly worse. The saturation of infantry with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) is low, with fewer than 200 Mistral complexes in service. This means that even for downing relatively simple targets, the French must rely on higher echelons of air defense (SAMs) or air assets. Furthermore, the ground forces lack radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery as a class. Anti-ballistic missile defense relies on ASTER-30 missiles, stocks of which have been significantly depleted by deliveries to Ukraine, and manufacturing capabilities do not allow for rapid replenishment, especially given Kyiv’s ongoing need for these supplies. Virtually, the air defense mission is primarily laid upon the French Air Force.
The nation’s combat aircraft fleet is at its lowest historical level since the end of World War II. The decommissioning of the Mirage 2000-5F will further reduce this number, thus making the strategic goal — set out in the Military Planning Law — of reaching 225 multirole fighters by 2030 subject to critical scrutiny. This shortage of assets casts doubt on the Air Force’s actual capacity to participate in a high-intensity conflict.
According to NATO consensus, deploying one combat aircraft in action practically requires four additional jets for training, maintenance rotation, and repairs. Consequently, setting aside the needs of the air component of the nuclear triad, French forces would be capable of simultaneously engaging only about 30 Rafale and 10 Mirage 2000D aircraft.
As with tanks, the purchase of new squadrons is not planned. Instead, Paris intends to modernize the Rafale to the F4 standard, and by 2035, to the F5. This forces the acknowledgement that the Air Force, at the time of the anticipated conflict, will have a limited capability for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) against the expected adversary, Russia. This is because the SCALP-EG missiles cannot be reprogrammed in flight, which limits their effectiveness against mobile air defense systems. This characteristic is particularly important given that the foundation of the Russian Armed Forces’ air defense consists of ground-based assets: S-400, S-300, and Pantsir-S SAM systems.
In parallel, France, together with Germany and Spain, is pursuing the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project to develop a sixth-generation fighter. However, recent actions by Dassault Aviation, which demanded an 80% share in the project instead of the previously agreed-upon third — a move that provoked obvious disagreement from Airbus — call its realization into question. If a consensus is not reached, the timelines for the French air force to receive sixth-generation fighters will become completely uncertain, especially considering the nation’s strategic culture, which views the procurement of complex foreign weaponry, and the resulting political dependence, negatively.
The French Military Programming Law mandates spending €413 billion on defense between 2024 and 2030, aiming to allocate 2% of GDP to defense starting in 2025, with further expenditure growth planned. This year, €47.2 billion is earmarked for defense — a 7.4% increase from the previous year. It was initially planned to raise the defense budget to €64 billion by 2030, doubling the 2017 figure. However, President Macron announced an additional €3 billion for defense in 2026 and €3.5 billion in 2027 (on top of the already planned increases), ensuring that the target defense spending level will be reached in 2027.
The planned expenditures cover all spheres of the French defense forces. The cornerstone — the nuclear dyad — will receive modernization for both its components. €5 billion will be allocated to drones, another €5 billion to strengthening air and missile defense (including against hypersonic means); €49 billion will be spent on maintaining existing equipment, €16 billion on procuring ammunition, €5 billion on intelligence, and €10 billion on technology development, with €6 billion dedicated to the space sector and €4 billion to cybersecurity. The defense of overseas territories will cost €13 billion. New contracts for naval vessel supplies are also planned.
This defense spending surge is happening against the backdrop of serious fiscal distress in Paris. As of the first quarter of 2025, the national debt reached 114% of GDP, the third-highest figure in the EU (behind Greece and Italy). EU budget rules are strict regarding deficits: they must not exceed 3% of GDP. Due to the Russian aggression, an “exclusion clause” has been activated, allowing states to spend an additional 1.5% of GDP on defense over the next four years without triggering excessive deficit procedures.
France was not among the nations that requested the activation of this clause. Nevertheless, the projected budget deficit for 2025 stands at 5.4% of GDP — 0.9% higher than the maximum permissible threshold. To achieve even this figure, France was forced to cut social security spending and increase the tax burden. The ambitious goal of reducing the deficit to 3% of GDP by 2029 starkly contrasts with the concurrent defense spending increase. With one of the highest debt ratios in the EU, Paris is compelled to oppose the idea of financing defense expenditures through credit. Notably, France was among the main opponents of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal to raise €150 billion for defense through a package of loans. The indebted Southern European nations see grants funded by European bonds — a mechanism already trialed during the EU’s COVID-19 response — as a better alternative to loans. However, this proposal faces resistance from the fiscally conservative Northern EU states.
The reason for France’s refusal to finance defense through credit is the fear of a credit rating downgrade due to further debt accumulation. A downgrade would negatively affect its ability to raise new borrowing on financial markets and, more importantly, increase the cost of servicing its debt.
Even with the full implementation of planned procurements and expenditures, the capacity of the French armed forces for sustained participation in a full-scale conventional symmetrical war remains uncertain. This is due to several critical factors: the insufficient size of the air fleet, the refusal to expand the fleet in favor of merely modernizing existing aircraft, the structural weakness of ground-based air defense, and the low production rates for anti-ballistic missiles and artillery rounds.
Paris’s state finances are in a precarious position. Defense and foreign policy ambitions demand further expenditure increases, as the currently planned level of €413 billion will likely be insufficient to guarantee the French armed forces’ capability to engage in an anticipated high-intensity symmetric and large-scale conflict. Simultaneously, EU budget rules mandate that the state reduce its budget deficit to 3% of GDP. This is being achieved by cutting social spending and increasing taxes — measures that are both politically toxic and threaten social instability or unrest for President Macron, who is already historically unpopular in his career. High debt burdens restrain the government from taking on new loans, and the EU itself is currently unprepared to further deviate from conservative fiscal policy.
It is reasonable to assume that the European Commission’s position may soften if the threat of Russian aggression increases. Until that time, however, France will be forced to seek a precarious balance between the needs of today and those of tomorrow.
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