The Digital Noose: How Russia is Quietly Rolling Out its Mobilization Machine

Oleksandr Bazar

Throughout July, Russian regional media have been reporting on mass notifications being sent to individuals liable for military service about their inclusion in a unified electronic register. Such information has come from the Samara, Tula, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Yaroslavl, and Magadan regions, as well as from Tatarstan, Mordovia, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and Sakhalin.

For now, these notifications primarily serve an informational function, but they indicate preparations for the mass distribution of electronic summonses. During the past spring draft, conscripts from Moscow and the Moscow region had already received such electronic summonses. Additionally, Russian media report that draft commissions in the Russian capital are continuing to operate despite the scheduled end of the conscription period on July 15. Young men aged 18-30 are receiving summonses for medical commissions in July and August. Periodically, young men are brought to draft centers accompanied by police officers, as the city conducts raids on draft dodgers. Moscow often serves as an experimental ground where practices are tested before being launched at the federal level, so this can also be seen as a test of year-round conscription.

The Russian government established the legislative basis for electronic summonses back in 2023, when the State Duma passed Law 127-FZ “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.” At the same time, Russia began testing the electronic summons system. From January 1, 2024, the State Duma raised the conscription age to 30. In September 2024, the unified register of electronic summonses began to be implemented in three regions: the Mari El Republic, and the Ryazan and Sakhalin regions. In May 2025, the system of electronic summonses and the unified register (effectively a database covering all citizens of the Russian Federation liable for military service) became operational nationwide.

In the Russian Federation, electronic summonses are considered served from the moment they appear in the individual’s electronic account on the “Gosuslugi” (State Services) portal. If the recipient is not registered there, the summons is considered served within seven days of its appearance in the unified register. Immediately upon such delivery, the conscript is banned from leaving Russia. In case of failure to appear at the military enlistment office within 20 days, restrictive measures are imposed, including a ban on driving vehicles, entering into contracts and registering real estate, registering as a sole proprietor, and taking out loans or credits. Failure to appear at the enlistment office within the specified time is punishable by a fine of 10,000 to 30,000 rubles, while a repeat offense can lead to a fine of up to 200,000 rubles, and malicious evasion can result in imprisonment for up to 2 years.

Data on individuals liable for military service is provided to the enlistment offices by the Federal Tax Service, investigative bodies, courts, medical institutions, the Pension and Social Insurance Fund, federal and local authorities, and higher education institutions.

There are also reports in the Russian media that Russian border guards have gained access to the unified register of persons liable for military service and will now check individuals of conscription age for summonses at airports and border checkpoints, and will detain them.

On July 22 of this year, a bill was introduced in the State Duma for year-round military conscription, which is intended to replace the spring and autumn drafts. If passed, the law will take effect on January 1, 2026. Such a decision would allow for an even distribution of the workload on draft centers, strengthen their infrastructure, increase the total number of conscripts, and make it more difficult to evade military service. The spring 2025 draft was the largest since 2011, with 160,000 people drafted into the Russian army.

In a situation where the Russian Armed Forces lose as much personnel in assault operations in a month as they recruit for contract service, Russia is forced to seek ways to increase its forces in Ukraine to be able to continue offensive operations. Given the exhaustion of the mobilization resource in Russian prisons and the inability to further inflate state budget expenditures to increase one-time payments to contract soldiers to boost recruitment from poor segments of the population, a further increase in conscription is the obvious step.

At the same time, strengthening the infrastructure, resources, and capabilities of military enlistment offices will, if such a decision is made, allow for the rapid organization of a mass mobilization. The creation of a unified register of persons liable for military service, the introduction of electronic summonses, and the restriction of travel abroad only confirm the growing likelihood of such a step. Another indicator is the creation of a unified draft center in Moscow, alongside the de facto testing of year-round conscription, which frees up the resources of local enlistment offices. It is very likely that they will not remain idle for long.

The likelihood of mobilization is also indicated by Putin’s directive to the Russian government to develop measures by September 1 to restrict the use of foreign software in the Russian Federation, including messengers like WhatsApp and Telegram (despite the latter’s Russian origin). Citizens are literally being required to switch to the “Max” messenger from VK—a new element of the centralized digital surveillance system. According to the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, the application has full access to the microphone, camera, contacts, geolocation, and files, cannot be disabled by standard means, uses root access, and system jar files. The data is automatically transmitted to servers controlled by Russian special services. The Russian authorities were displeased with the amount of resistance the partial mobilization in 2022 generated, so now the Kremlin seeks to completely control the information space and do everything quietly.

According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Oleh Ivashchenko, the enemy’s mobilization resource consists of 3 to 5 million people who have undergone military service or training, and the total resource is 20 to 25 million people.

And the Kremlin, it seems, is convinced that the Russian Armed Forces are capable of increasing their grouping on the territory of Ukraine, continuing offensive operations, and gradually capturing new Ukrainian territories, and therefore they see no reason to stop or make significant concessions.

Therefore, Ukraine and our partners need a holistic vision of how to stop Russia’s “war machine,” which, without slowing down, continues to grow in size.