The article explores the evolution of American foreign policy from the primacy of soft power – influence through culture, values and diplomacy, embodied in Marshall Plan and the activities of USAID, – to the increasing emphasis on hard power, which is based on military strength and economic coercion, particularly against the backdrop of contemporary challenges, such as the rise of China and Russian revisionism; this global trend, which marks dispelling of illusions about the “end of history” after collapse of the USSR, challenges notions about the US as an unwavering global stability guarantor and forces the world to adapt to the new reality of uncertainty.
Have you considered how many things in the world we take for granted? Have you ever noticed yourself thinking that the world isn’t static, but rather extremely dynamic?
In retrospect humanity never stood still: the turbulent period of European wars in the XIX century, two World Wars, birth of the nuclear weapons age, Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union, global War on Terror, numerous conflicts in Africa and Asia, Russian aggression against Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, the war in Syria – all this is just a fraction of events the world lived through in the past two hundred years.
Nevertheless, political thought during the collapse of Communist empire in the beginning of the 1990s tended to see the international situation of that time as the “end of history”, since the world’s main antagonist – USSR – ceased to exist. At the centre of that world stood America – the very unreachable dream that fluttered on the horizon of other’s hopes for stable and just global order. Democratic values, freedom, liberalism – these were the pivots which were the moving force for many transformations not just in Eastern Europe but in many others corners of the Earth’s sphere.
We grew accustomed to viewing United States unequivocally as a source of those very values the world was lacking then. Back in the second half of the XX century America itself came to understand that relations with other states could be built not just with the power of strong hand. This way a unique tendency emerged on the international stage, which with each passing decade was gaining more and more momentum – soft power.
Yet today the image of United States as a beacon of soft power and public diplomacy is crumbling. The world is entering new era of uncertainty while America makes it clear to its allies that it won’t be the same as before.
In this article we discuss in more detail what part soft and hard power play in American foreign policy, and how it shall define it in the future.
Soft power can be defined as ability of the state to influence others by non-coercive means. This power is derived from three sources – culture (which must be attractive), political values (such as democracy and human rights) and policy (which affirms country’s legitimacy). Which policy direction the state pursues domestically (for example, by safeguarding freedom of speech and media, as well as the right to dissent) or internationally (extensive cooperation with states, civil society institutions, and international organizations), promotion its values by building sustainable foundation for their development abroad – these all constitute soft power.
One of the past century’s most grandiose embodiments of soft power was foreign policy of Harry Truman administration in the form of Marshall Plan, which was a brainchild of then US Secretary of State George Marshall. American approach to conducting diplomacy at that moment became something unique: instead of relying solely on military power or traditional economic ties, the United States was forming new international political space with their own values and ideals. Thus, since 1948 American foreign policy was a tandem of military strength and soft power.
It is important not to confuse soft power and philanthropy: the United States helped Europe not on account of good intentions alone, but from the perspective of building up an alternative to communism, the expansion of which America considered major threat in the XX century. Apart from forming homogenous political space in war-torn Europe this was also a way for avoiding increase in revisionism due to post-war devastation. The bitter experience of Versailles Treaty after the First World War has shown that reliable peace is based on politico-economic integration on regional level, which made Marshall Plan one of the impetus for the formation of European Union in the future.
Motives for creating USAID in the XX century were the same as behind Marshall Plan. Though organization was not founded until 1961 during JF Kennedy presidency, Harry Truman presented in his inaugural speech a plan, which came to be informally known as “point four”. The idea was clear: The United States would be sharing know-how with poorer nations and pouring money into their economy. Again, it wasn’t about philanthropy, but about soft power which should have prevented the spreading of communism by economically integrating countries in capitalist economy to counter Soviet Union.
In this way the United States Agency for International Development remained one of the largest contributors of foreign aid up until March 10, 2025, when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced terminating 83% of USAID contracts against the backdrop of second Trump administration implementing America First policy. Such radical narrowing of United States’ priorities, as well as JD Vance’s Munich speech, place America’s new approach to conducting foreign policy on the agenda.
Generally hard power can be defined as ability of the state to influence others behaviour through coercion, usually military or economic. The concept of hard power is inextricably linked to realist thinking in international relations, which sees power and national interests as motive force behind global politics. Following such logic states have to rely on military-economic capabilities for securing their interests. The instruments for exercising hard power are numerous: from demonstratively locating armed forces and intentionally violating airspace to economic sanctions and tariffs. The spectrum of applying hard power is perfectly described with so-called “escalation ladder” concept, according to which the state, depending on its capabilities, possesses an extensive arsenal of military-economic influence tools for achieving its foreign policy objectives. Moreover, those instruments may be applied in any combination and mostly do not result in conventional warfighting.
Hard power has always played a significant part in American foreign policy. In spite of China’s increasingly substantial military modernization, no country in the world can compare to the United States in terms of military potential. Military infrastructure, industry, innovations, intelligence capabilities, nuclear triad, naval, air, and ground forces – all those elements permit America to project power in any corner of the globe. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence, expanding military potential, and direct armed intervention were the foundations of American foreign policy, that focused on countering communist bloc. Following the collapse of USSR those priorities were not altered – the United States resumed enhancing their armed forces and applying them where it was deemed necessary for protecting America’s national interests.
Presently, a separate question is being raised over the commitment of the United States to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding mutual defence of NATO members, as representatives of new American administration of different rank, including Donald Trump himself, repeatedly doubted the willingness of the US to protect Alliance members failing to reach 2% GDP defence spending threshold. Adding to that, JD Vance’s Munich speech started discussion about the new balance of the European security architecture due to desire of the United States to bring the majority of its armed forces back home. In view of those factors, despite America’s obvious military advantage, the change in its foreign policy priorities shows a tangible perspective of applying armed forces not in Europe, but the Indo-Pacific region as a part of a potential conflict with China.
If the United States’ hard power projection is partially successful, despite the infamous wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the use of tariffs as means of pressuring Canada and Mexico brought the US mixed successes, as weakening of trade with key partners unavoidably impacted American economy through inflation at the very least. At the same time in short-term perspective this leverage has brought Trump domestically a public win in form of Mexico and Canada complying with demands regarding preventing illegal immigration and combating drug smuggling (it should be recalled that those were one of the main campaign promises made by the new administration). The same, however, could not be said about short-termed but painful for global economy introduction of tariffs from the United States to almost every country, including China, causing record stock market crash and raising doubts about the US being reliable trade partner, which was further indicated by rapid sell-off of Treasury bonds around the world.
The beginning of the XXI century and 2025 are absolutely different worlds. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US virtually became an international hegemon: Russia was going through internal turbulence and was yet to chart a new foreign policy course, while China was not powerful enough economically to compete with the United States. Due to objective absence of necessity in any meaningful hard power projection, besides the US interventions in the Middle East, American policy directed attention to enhancing its influence by means of soft power. This was absolutely appropriate back then, but present challenges demand from the US altogether different policy.
What do we have right now? Military-economic rise of China and its strengthening not just within the bounds of Indo-Pacific, but around the whole world, accompanied by open territorial claims over Taiwan and South China Sea; Russian revisionism, which aspires to restore its former power and to assert sphere of interest in Eastern Europe; emergence and expansion of BRICS as counter to G7; North Korea modernizing its nuclear program; Iran’s proximity to creating nuclear weapons, as well as permanent instability in the Middle East. Amidst those tendencies the primacy of soft power appears to incumbent administration irrational and at times counterproductive, yet soft power can be a relevant instrument for achieving specific foreign policy objectives, such as for homogenizing political space to maintain other states in its orbit. The United States is no longer the political power center of the late XX century, and their global influence is waning. Considering the desire to reinforce Monroe Doctrine in Western hemisphere in order to eliminate Chinese influence and securitize their geographic periphery America puts hard power at the epicenter of foreign policy, oscillating between support of its own military capabilities and shifting main security burden to other Alliance members. Thought this trend creates the challenges elaborated above in form of reevaluating alliance system and European desire to overcome the dependence on the US, it is irreversible.
History will show how successful it is. But Ukraine already has to keep balance on this uncertain backdrop of cold international political calculations. One thing is clear: the world will never be the same as before.
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