Karol Nawrocki’s victory in the Polish presidential elections marks not just a change in the country’s leadership, but also the beginning of an unpredictable period in both domestic and foreign policy.
Domestically, a right-wing conservative president will face a coalition of centrists and left-wing parties. Externally, his election, underpinned by Eurosceptic and right-wing populist sentiments, promises a challenging period for relations with Kyiv, Berlin, and Brussels.
Will Nawrocki become a new Orbán? Can Ukraine find common ground with a difficult neighbor who expresses negative views on “Bandera ideology,” “Ukrainization,” and Ukrainians’ “historical guilt”? We delve into the complex landscape of Polish politics, where historical grievances intertwine with economic interests, creating an explosive cocktail that could transform Ukrainian-Polish relations.
This analysis by the Kyiv Institute for National Interest explores the challenges Ukraine may face following Karol Nawrocki’s victory.
Karol Nawrocki’s victory in the Polish presidential elections not only signals a potential resurgence of Eurosceptic forces but also opens a new, considerably more complex chapter in Warsaw’s relations with Brussels, Berlin, and, particularly crucial for Ukraine, with Kyiv. At the same time, while Poland is becoming the third neighboring state where a political leader whose rhetoric does not sound friendly to Ukraine comes to power, it would be a premature and inappropriate generalization to draw an an absolute equivalence between Nawrocki, on one hand, and Viktor Orbán or Robert Fico, on the other.
The election results, which brought to the presidential office a candidate backed by the opposition right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, herald a period of challenges. In the first round, candidates from right-wing and ultra-right Eurosceptic forces collectively garnered over 51% of the votes. Such a political alignment in Poland, close to a 50/50 split between conservative and liberal forces, has been characteristic since 2005, a period during which no winner secured more than 55% of the vote. However, these elections proved unique, as candidates from ultra-right parties—Sławomir Mentzen, Grzegorz Braun, and Marek Jakubiak—collectively garnered as much as 22% of the vote. It was Sławomir Mentzen who, as a result of the first round, obtained the “golden share.” Both candidates who advanced to the second round—Karol Nawrocki and Rafał Trzaskowski—effectively “paid homage” to him, publicly agreeing to his political demands on Mentzen’s YouTube channel in exchange for support in the runoff.
The election results in Poland align with a broader trend across EU member states: a rising demand among voters for right-wing populists, as exemplified by Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Czechia. These political forces position themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and historical heritage, which often generates political conflicts with neighboring states.
Poland’s domestic political situation is guaranteed to be tense following these elections. The President and Prime Minister represent competing political camps — Nawrocki from PiS and Donald Tusk from Civic Platform — laying the groundwork for permanent confrontation. The rhetoric of the PiS candidate this time was notably more radical than in previous elections, particularly concerning Ukraine. This can be attributed not only to a desire to win over ultra-right votes but also to an aim to more clearly differentiate himself from Tusk, who is accused of failing to resolve economic issues.
The experience of previous years, when President Andrzej Duda, also a PiS nominee, regularly vetoed the Tusk government’s initiatives, indicates a high probability of this scenario recurring. For Ukraine, it is critically important how the interaction between the president and parliament will unfold. Newly elected President Nawrocki may either continue a line of “quiet” confrontation or opt for escalation, potentially provoking the dissolution of the Sejm and the holding of snap parliamentary elections.
Such a turn of events, especially if it leads to the formation of a PiS coalition with more radical right-wing forces, such as “Konfederacja”, could fundamentally alter Warsaw’s political course. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that parliament would consider a vote of confidence in his government on June 11 and stated his readiness to cooperate with the presidential election winner. Thus, the ball is now in the court of PiS and Karol Nawrocki.
The consequences of such a political reversal, should a PiS-Konfederacja coalition come to power, could be highly complex for Ukraine. While Nawrocki has stated that “Poland’s strategic interest is to push the threat of neo-imperial, post-communist Russia as far away from Poles as possible” and that “peace in Ukraine must be lasting and just,” his other statements and political actions raise serious concerns. Specifically, his agreement to sign a declaration with the demands of Konfederacja leader Sławomir Mentzen, which includes commitments to block Ukraine’s NATO membership and refuse to send Polish troops to Ukraine, is an alarming signal. Furthermore, in a letter to Grzegorz Braun, a representative of the ultra-right “Konfederacja Korony Polskiej” (Confederation of the Polish Crown), Nawrocki, while omitting the most controversial points such as blocking military aid, promised to fight “Bandera ideology” and the “Ukrainization of Poland”.
These statements, aimed at mobilizing the nationalist-leaning electorate, indicate the new president’s readiness to actively leverage historical themes for political purposes. Speculations on the Volyn issue during the election campaign could be seen as a tactic designed to mobilize voters of the “Konfederacja,” and this likely had a significant impact on the outcome in Nawrocki’s favor.
However, the topic of the Volyn tragedy, which Nawrocki — a historian by profession and former head of the Institute of National Remembrance — considers fundamental to him, appears set to remain on the agenda. The new Polish president, responding to Zelenskyy’s congratulations on his victory, while assuring the continuation of partnership between both countries, particularly in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War, twice mentioned “resolving pressing historical issues” and “settling the unresolved past.” This year, Ukraine allowed the resumption of search works on its territory, which Nawrocki may attribute to his own achievements in the domestic political arena.
The new president will likely intensify pressure on Kyiv regarding exhumation issues. While this is unlikely to meet significant resistance from Ukrainian authorities, he might also expect other concessions in the sphere of memorialization. Concurrently, during his tenure as head of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, Nawrocki was strongly opposed to studying Polish crimes against Ukrainians during World War II. Such instrumentalization of history, particularly amidst a potential domestic political conflict in Poland, will create an unfavorable backdrop for bilateral relations between Kyiv and Warsaw.
At the same time, it is crucial to understand that issues in relations with Poland may arise not only in the historical dimension but also in the economic sphere. Warsaw expresses concerns about potential economic losses from the Ukrainian economy joining the EU single market, as well as a possible reduction in subsidies from the European Union budget, given that a portion of these funds would be redirected to Ukraine’s needs. These economic concerns represent a more pragmatic factor restraining Polish support for Ukraine’s EU integration.
It is this economic factor, rather than the Volyn tragedy, that will likely have a greater long-term impact on Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. Poland is primarily hesitant to allow Ukrainian goods into the European market and to compete with Ukraine for subsidies. It is no coincidence that Nawrocki speaks of readiness to send “Polish businessmen” to Ukraine after the war, likely signaling the need for prolonged negotiations in the economic sphere.
Despite Nawrocki’s harsh rhetoric, it is important to note that, based on current political configurations, his victory does not necessarily imply a drastic shift in Poland’s policy regarding military support for Ukraine. On this matter, a certain bipartisan consensus exists in Poland, and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who currently retains his position, is unlikely to alter this approach. However, even if military support continues, political dialogue and the prospects for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration could be significantly complicated by Nawrocki’s official stance on blocking Ukraine’s NATO membership.
The situation is further complicated by the foreign policy context, where Nawrocki enjoys support from right-wing political circles in the U.S. and Europe, who view his victory as part of a broader ideological shift. For instance, attention from figures like Donald Trump, who received him at the White House even before the election results, and Kristi Noem, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, who openly campaigned for him, suggests attempts to form a certain right-wing Eurosceptic International. Nawrocki, for his part, while condemning the halt of American aid to Ukraine, asserted that Zelenskyy and his “ingratitude” were to blame for the incident. He also notably mentioned that Ukrainians were not sufficiently grateful to Poles for their assistance.
There is a significant likelihood of complications in Poland’s relations with the EU, as Law and Justice and the president it supported will certainly continue disputes with Brussels over issues such as abortion, freedom of speech, LGBT rights, migrants, and the primacy of European law. Nawrocki also stated his intention to reinstate the issue of reparations from Germany for losses inflicted on Poland during World War II. In the mid-term, such behavior from Poland could create an opportunity for Ukraine to attract EU investments and projects, presenting itself to Brussels as a more predictable and constructive partner.
It is critically important for Ukraine to develop a flexible and pragmatic strategy for interaction with Poland, shifting the agenda away from national memory issues and proposing mutually beneficial cooperation in areas of shared interest for both states: economy, the military-industrial complex, and energy. Karol Nawrocki’s victory is not a catastrophe, but it signals a challenging period. He should not be automatically equated with more odious European leaders; however, his rhetoric and commitments will demand maximum diplomatic dexterity from Kyiv. Ukraine will need to seek common ground, minimize risks, and maximize opportunities that may arise even under these difficult circumstances, bearing in mind the deep polarization of Polish society and the paramount importance of economic interests for Warsaw in the long-term perspective of relations with Ukraine.
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