The 2025 German federal election opened a new page in the country’s political way. Friedrich Merz, the new Federal Chancellor, is determined to assert Germany’s leadership in EU foreign policy and restore economic growth. The success of his term will determine Germany’s future development as it stands at a political crossroads, the effectiveness of its support for Ukraine in repelling Russian armed aggression, and further economic cooperation with Kyiv.
On May 6, 2025, Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), assumed the office of Federal Chancellor of Germany following his party’s victory in the February Bundestag elections. In addition to the CDU/CSU, Merz’s candidacy was supported by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), that joined the government coalition. The alliance of these political forces is not unprecedented in modern German history; however, for the first time since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, their combined electoral result fell below 45% of the vote. Moreover, the SPD’s performance was its worst since World War I. The current ruling coalition holds only a narrow majority over the opposition parties — officially 328 out of 630 seats in parliament — which led to the failure of the first vote on Merz’s appointment.
The downward trend in support for the CDU/CSU and SPD — parties whose representatives alternately held the office of Federal Chancellor since the founding of the Federal Republic — has persisted since the 2017 parliamentary elections. This process is a direct consequence of decisions made by Angela Merkel’s government between 2005 and 2021 (particularly in the areas of migration and economic policy), the economic and social challenges stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Germany’s abandonment of Russian energy, as well as a broader public demand for renewal of the political landscape. During this period, the center-right Christian Democrats and the center-left Social Democrats effectively implemented a joint development agenda for Germany, blurring their party identities and creating a perception of monotony and lack of alternatives.
Political forces once considered alternatives to the two main parties disappointed their voters during their participation in Olaf Scholz’s coalition government from 2021 to 2024. The Greens and the Free Democrats, due to their completely opposing views on numerous economic issues, were forced to make countless compromises. As a result, the Free Democrats suffered the most, ultimately failing to pass the electoral threshold and being left out of the federal parliament after losing more than 7 percentage points in support.
Consequently, radical right-wing (AfD) and left-wing parties (Die Linke, BSW) promoting previously marginal anti-European and pro-Russian narratives are gaining increasing popularity. These parties primarily appeal to residents of the eastern part of the country — which was under communist rule until 1990 — and to younger voters. Although the radical right and radical left are staunchly hostile toward each other, they often target the same voter base with similar demands. These include ending or reducing payments to migrants and refugees — or even deporting some of them (except among Die Linke voters, who tend to be more socially liberal), increasing social benefits for German citizens, raising the minimum wage, pension reform, resumption of Russian gas imports, lifting of sanctions, reconciliation with Russia and an end to aid for Ukraine, and even exiting the EU.
The growing popularity of radical right- and left-wing parties, whose platforms converge in many aspects (a peculiar confirmation of the horseshoe theory) — and who together secured over 34% of the vote in this year’s elections, reflects deep societal dissatisfaction and polarization in Germany. Should the Merz government fail to address at least some of the urgent issues concerning the public, Germany may face a significant political crisis in the next electoral cycle, potentially resulting in the rise to power of radical populists. This would have severe negative consequences for Germany, Ukraine, and Europe as a whole.
In the February 2025 Bundestag elections, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured over 20% of the vote, placing second overall. Currently, this nationalist, populist, and increasingly radical party holds a strong lead in the regions of the former East Germany (GDR) and may harbor ambitions to form a government in the next election cycle. The AfD takes a hardline stance against immigration from Muslim countries, demanding hard restrictions, deportations, and the “protection of German culture.” The party also claims that the EU is overly centralized and poses a threat to Germany’s national sovereignty, advocating either for Germany’s withdrawal or a radical restructuring of the Union. Exploiting rhetoric about the “national interests” of Germans, the party primarily appeals to lower-income groups with a low level of political culture, who are dissatisfied with current social policies and believe that Germany bears the financial burden of a united Europe without receiving anything in return. While formally participating in democratic processes, the AfD increasingly disregards democratic principles, leans toward economic and political cooperation with Russia, and strongly opposes support for Ukraine at any level.
In response, on May 2, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified the AfD as a right-wing extremist party at the federal level, stating that “the party’s prevailing ethnically and ancestrally defined understanding of the people is incompatible with the fundamental liberal democratic order.” This status allows the current government to apply various surveillance measures against the AfD, such as recruiting informants and intercepting communications. However, it is important to understand that potential sanctions of any kind against the party are unlikely to significantly reduce its support base and may, instead, deepen societal polarization and lead to further radicalization among parts of the population. The government of Friedrich Merz must first and foremost prevent this by addressing the country’s economic and social problems — thereby restoring public confidence in the political effectiveness of the traditional parties.
The issue of energy supply remains undoubtedly the most pressing challenge for the German economy. Following Russia’s gas blackmail in 2021, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the sharp reduction in Russian gas imports, the wholesale price of electricity skyrocketed from €30–50 per MWh in 2020 to €235 per MWh in 2022–23, and in 2025 still exceeds €120 per MWh. This has hit both industry and consumers’ wallets hard. The crisis has been further deepened by the previous governments’ focus on developing green energy (which accounted for 59% of total electricity generation in 2024), a source that remains highly unreliable. Shortages of wind and sunny days have caused blackouts, during which prices sometimes spiked above €900 per MWh, as seen in December 2024. Moreover, over 95% of Germany’s fuel needs must be imported (primarily from Russia before 2022), leaving the country vulnerable to any price increases. Although some of this supply has now been replaced with liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States, the volume is insufficient to cost-effectively meet the demands of the German economy.
To address the situation, the Merz government aims to launch the construction of new gas-fired power plants by 2030, secure additional LNG imports from the USA and other sources, and reduce electricity costs for businesses through tax and tariff relief. Merz acknowledges that renewable generation is necessary but cannot provide grid stability on its own and must become more efficient. Therefore, reforms to the renewable energy support market are planned, including auctions for energy storage and a focus on integrating solar and wind power into the market system. Additionally, the chancellor supports the development of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and further research in nuclear fusion. At the same time, the current coalition categorically rules out the restoration of Russian gas supplies via the Nord Stream pipelines, reflecting a principled stance of solidarity with Ukraine.
Germany has for many years faced increasing irregular migration and mounting pressure on its borders, raising public concern over financial and social burdens as well as public safety. The country spends significant amounts on Bürgergeld (social assistance), the receipt of which does not facilitate employment or integration of migrants into German society. In 2023, foreigners received approximately €15.4 billion in Bürgergeld payments — more than double the amount from 2010 (€6.9 billion). Merz, however, has declared that new asylum seekers will no longer be eligible for Bürgergeld, but will instead receive separate benefits designed exclusively for them.
The current German government now appears to be pursuing a much stricter policy on illegal migration, including tightening border controls. Entry without documentation is effectively banned, and violators are detained and subject to deportation. Family reunification for migrants with subsidiary protection status has been suspended for two years, and there are plans to reintroduce the minimum five-year residency requirement for obtaining German citizenship. Despite criticism from courts and some EU member states, Chancellor Merz and Interior Minister Dobrindt emphasize that such measures are necessary to protect public order in the country.
For Chancellor Merz’s government, reinforcing Germany’s military capacity in light of the Russian threat is one of its top priorities — a clear contrast with the policy of the Scholz administration. Merz has announced a reform of the Bundeswehr aimed at transforming it into the strongest land army in Europe, with defense expenditures above 1% of GDP being exempted from the “debt brake.” This has allowed for significant investments in national security and support for Ukraine. By 2029–2030, defense spending is projected to reach 3.5% of GDP, including military infrastructure.
Part of this new policy includes a declaration of potential EU involvement in peacekeeping operations in Ukraine, supported by the United States, following the establishment of a ceasefire regime. While the prospect of even a temporary truce in the Russia-Ukraine war currently seems remote, such rhetoric nonetheless represents significant progress.
Merz seeks close cooperation with the United States to ensure a stable transatlantic front in support of Ukraine. In his first days in office, he called for efforts to “prevent the West from dividing” and pledged to do everything possible to ensure Europe and the U.S. act jointly in backing Ukraine. His first official visit to Paris was dedicated to reviving Franco-German coordination — establishing a joint defense council, developing a unified strategic policy line, and intensifying military and economic pressure on Russia.
According to Merz’s plan, practical support for Ukraine will involve providing financial resources necessary to sustain Ukraine while simultaneously making major investments in defense through the European Defence Fund. Another key step is the signing of a memorandum on joint production of missiles and drones in Ukraine “without range limitations,” signaling that allies will no longer restrict Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Germany’s own arms deliveries to Ukraine have recently become classified, a prudent move to safeguard military secrecy. It was speculated that this would finally allow Germany to supply Taurus missiles to Ukraine, but during a visit to Kyiv, Defense Minister Pistorius dismissed that possibility.
Crucially, it is not only the actions Merz will take as Federal Chancellor that matter, but also the public’s understanding of the objective necessity for strong European nations to stand against Russia’s aggression.
Germany’s moderate parties currently rely on the success of the Merz government and the CDU/CSU to maintain their position. Should they fail, Germany may face the rise to power of populist forces comparable to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary. It is therefore essential to demonstrate the effectiveness of the current course and the country’s capacity for sustainable economic development in the long term, maintaining its leadership status in the European region without relying on cheap Russian gas, while revitalizing its industrial and defense capacities.
Since the beginning of his term, Friedrich Merz has shown himself to be a friend of Ukraine, which is why deepening cooperation with Germany should be a priority for our government. Further collaboration is already possible in the defense-industrial sector (joint production of drones, missiles, and armored vehicles with German companies; integration into Franco-German defense initiatives), as well as in economic partnerships (German companies’ involvement in reconstruction efforts via insurance schemes, governmental support, and private initiatives; export of green energy: solar, wind, and hydrogen to Germany, which is already part of some projects).
Importantly for Ukraine, Merz is a proponent of accelerated integration into the EU, especially in economic and energy frameworks, and of Ukraine’s involvement in the “Weimar+” security initiative (currently including Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the UK) with voting rights. Such developments reflect Germany’s perception of Ukraine not as a periphery of the EU, but as an active partner in the emerging European security architecture and as a prospective energy hub.
Amid the growing popularity of radical populist movements in Germany, Ukraine must present itself to the German public and political establishment not merely as a recipient of economic, military-technical, and humanitarian assistance, but as a promising economic partner — one Berlin is investing in. A potential step in transforming this relationship could be the creation of a joint investment fund — similar to one with the USA — but aimed at developing high-tech industry rather than resource extraction.
No posts found!
© 2025 ALL RIGHTS ARE RESERVED
