On July 1, the Pentagon suspended military aid deliveries to Kyiv, but just two weeks later, Ukraine anticipates an increase in supplies.
The current U.S. administration’s foreign policy towards the Ukrainian State is undergoing changes amidst the failure of peace initiatives.
Our article explores the reasons behind these shifts.
The issue of armaments is crucial for any nation. For a nation at war, it is exceptionally so. For a nation engaged in asymmetrical warfare, it represents a tightrope walk between defeat and survival. The capabilities of Ukraine’s defense forces hinge on supplies of a broad range of armaments from European and American partners. Currently, amidst the enemy’s rapid build-up of aerial strike capabilities, air defense is paramount. In this regard, the most critical concern is the MIM-104 Patriot air defense system with PAC-3 interceptor missiles, which are capable of shooting down ballistic missiles — the only type of armament against which Ukrainian MIC currently has no solution.
Furthermore, the scope of aid is far broader, encompassing supplies of artillery shells and equipment, MANPADS, ATGMs, mines, aviation missiles, GMLRS, small arms, ammunition, and more. Our needs are categorically unmatched by our capabilities; partners help compensate for this difference.
What is wrong with this scheme? Dependence. Contemporary geostrategic challenges demand the United States to respond to an ever-expanding list of flashpoints and threats. Ukraine cannot be certain it holds the highest priority on this list, despite the catastrophic global consequences of Kyiv’s hypothetical defeat. On July 1, Washington made another attempt to cut expenditures by freezing an aid package, and on July 11, it officially announced the resumption of aid.
Donald Trump attempted to end the war in the shortest possible time, and he failed. Donald Trump sought an armistice — and he failed. Despite what was, in some ways, a catastrophic beginning of relations with the new administration for Kyiv, the U.S. President’s rhetoric has become more favorable towards Ukraine in recent months, given how Putin ignored the White House’s peace proposals. These proposals, it should be noted, were quite generous for the Kremlin: a frontline freeze, partial sanctions relief, recognition of control over Crimea; and beyond that, Trump was ready to discuss NATO’s non-expansion eastward and guarantee that Ukraine would not join the Alliance. De facto, this would have meant a strategic defeat for the Ukrainian State, as Kyiv’s main goal in the war — a guarantee of future security — would have been ignored.
The U.S. President’s modus operandi relied on apparent facts: Russia has already lost more from this war than it can gain; the Russian economy is approaching a recession; and the human and material resources of the RF Armed Forces are depleted by losses, with the latter being impossible to restore even in the medium term. The synthesis of these facts led to the assumption that the Kremlin would gladly agree to a war freeze with its gains cemented. Well, this did not happen, and at least two factors contributed to it.
The first factor is objective. Washington underestimated the degree of Russia’s dependence on China. Over the years of the war, the Russian regime, after being cut off from Western markets, banned from importing technology, and isolated from the financial system, has increasingly relied on Beijing’s support. China currently purchases about 40% of all Russian fossil fuel exports, having almost doubled its share during the war; it supplies goods and means necessary for Russia’s MIC, and has publicly stated that it cannot accept Russia’s defeat in the war. Why does Beijing need the Russian-Ukrainian war? On one hand, China undermines American influence and the security architecture in Europe through Russia, diverting U.S. attention. On the other hand, the continuation of the war guarantees Russia’s further isolation, which means the ability to import Russian energy carriers, ores, timber, and agricultural products at a significant discount, to displace Russian influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and to gain access to previously unavailable Russian MIC technologies.
The theses presented above might give the impression that the war is not beneficial for Russia. From a rational perspective, this is true — the Russian state’s losses are enormous, often irrecoverable, and China’s support has led to the establishment of unequal, client-like relations with Beijing. Consequently, the next reason why the war continues is the second factor — Vladimir Putin. The Russian autocrat has an irrational desire to continue the war, guided primarily by his own perceptions of the realities of both military operations and the state of the Russian nation. Russia’s leader regularly states that Moscow is not deviating from its primary goals, speaks of the war’s benefits, and the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Russian economy, at the very same time as leaders of the “economic” bloc of the Russian government publicly discuss recession.
It can be stated that Russia’s policy is entirely personalized in the figure of its president. Rational state interests of Russia are ignored, as the desires of the autocrat, which often do not align with the state’s needs, take precedence. Thus, Russia’s strategic situation involves a choice between a freeze, an offensive, and capitulation. The Putin factor and the current government reject the third option, while the China factor rejects the first. When the U.S. states that Putin does not want peace, this should be understood as Russia’s unwillingness to sever its vassal relations with China, thereby ignoring American interests. Ultimately, Washington had to acknowledge Putin’s inability to negotiate and, consequently, the failure of the peace plan. It would not be amiss to assume that communications with NATO partners, who consistently convinced Donald Trump that Russia was sabotaging negotiations, also pushed the U.S. President towards this conclusion.
Against this backdrop, the decision to suspend military aid appears to be a final attempt to secure adequate negotiations from Russia. Even if Pete Hestet unilaterally decided to freeze deliveries, the White House could well have seen an opportunity in this. The Russian Federation has repeatedly stated that one of its conditions for a ceasefire is the cessation of Western arms supplies to Ukraine. Consequently, two days after the Pentagon’s decision, Donald Trump telephoned the head of the Russian Federation. The details of the conversation are obviously unknown, but the result was the American president’s disappointment. Despite the public halt in deliveries, a peace agreement did not become any closer.
On the other hand, the Pentagon’s actions provoked a negative reaction both within and outside the United States. The cumulative effect of actions by Europe and Russia soon led to the initial cancellation of the aid freeze. Subsequently, after consultations with allies, Donald Trump presented a new format for arms deliveries to Ukraine: NATO will purchase weapons from the U.S. and transfer them to Ukraine. The details of this process are yet to be finalized, but certain results are already evident. Specifically, Germany has already agreed to fund two Patriot systems, and Norway has agreed to fund one.
At the same time, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee supported increasing the budget for annual security assistance to Ukraine from $300 million to $500 million. The budget project itself still needs to pass further approval stages in Congress, but this indicates a qualitative shift in favor of Kyiv.
It has also come to light that the White House plans to send a new aid package to Ukraine, the decision for which will be made by Donald Trump under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), not Congress. Insider data suggests the aid volume will amount to $300 million, though an official list is currently unavailable. Such a decision, if approved, should be considered significant, as the 47th U.S. President has not previously taken such a step; prior aid tranches from Washington were allocated based on decisions made by President Biden.
The main U.S. interest is to end the war with results acceptable to the Euro-Atlantic security system. Without forgetting Donald Trump’s voluntaristic diplomatic methods, it can nevertheless be stated that Washington links this interest with supporting Ukraine, as evidenced by the U.S. President’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. The statements made at the subsequent briefing can be assessed rather positively.
In addition to important statements that Trump is disappointed with Putin and deceived by him, and that “talks are not working,” the American administration’s further steps aimed at supporting Ukraine and a new format of cooperation with Europe were announced. Among these, firstly, is the transfer of “17 Patriot systems,” which an “unnamed country” agreed to provide. It is reasonable to assume that this refers to 17 launchers rather than full systems; however, even with such an interpretation, this is a significant number, especially if a sufficient volume of ammunition is transferred along with them. Another signal of a shift in U.S. policy was the mention of a multi-billion dollar defense order (Axios reports $10 billion) that America will provide at NATO’s (effectively, Europe’s) expense for Ukraine.
On the other hand, Washington does not rule out the principal possibility of reaching an agreement with the Kremlin. The United States has once again issued an ultimatum to Moscow, demanding principal agreement to a deal with Kyiv within 50 days. The alternative includes secondary sanctions and 100% tariffs for states that are trade partners of the Russian Federation. This, incidentally, contradicts the administration’s previous stance, voiced by Rubio, that threats of sanctions would only harm a possible agreement. This is less than the previously mentioned 500% tariffs. Moreover, the specific criteria for states whose products would be subject to such restrictions remain unstated, yet such a level of tariffs could become an extremely painful blow to the Kremlin’s trade if Russia’s partners take this threat seriously.
Summer events in international politics give us grounds for cautious optimism. The U.S. leader appears to be increasingly disappointed in the President of the Russian Federation. The Hague NATO summit, where Donald Trump was dubbed the Alliance’s “daddy,” demonstrated America’s commitment to Article 5 of the NATO statute and collective defense. Meanwhile, European states agreed to increase military expenditures to the 5% of GDP level desired by Washington. The freeze on arms supplies to Kyiv from the new administration has thawed. At the same time, it should be understood that a final judgment should only be made based on actions, and time will tell how strong the new consensus regarding Ukraine proves to be, and whether the U.S. leader will implement his ultimatum.
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