The attempt by the United States to coerce Russia into peace negotiations will culminate in a summit on August 15 in Alaska. White House representatives are displaying optimism, while the Kremlin remains unyielding in the demands it set forth at the beginning of the invasion.
Do chances for peace truly exist, and what should Ukraine and the rest of the world expect from this meeting?
A month ago, on July 14, Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Russia: it must conclude peace with Ukraine within 50 days, or else Russia’s energy trading partners, notably India and China, would become targets of secondary American sanctions in the form of increased tariffs. Initially, insiders cited 500% tariffs, though Trump later clarified the figure to be 100%.
However, just two weeks later, the U.S. President shortened this deadline to 10–12 days, citing a complete lack of peace initiatives from the Russian Federation, ultimately setting the final date as August 8. The first secondary sanctions were imposed soon after — an additional 25% duty on Indian goods — due to New Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil.
Although Moscow had previously demonstrated no readiness to make concessions, the sanctions against its trading partners were perceived as a more painful measure, forcing the Kremlin to initiate dialogue with the White House. Special Representative Steven Witkoff arrived in Russia, and subsequently, news emerged of the planned August 15 summit between Trump and Putin in Anchorage, Alaska. This sharp shift in the dynamic of the negotiation process surrounding Russia’s war against Ukraine might appear to offer hope for an imminent peace; however, a more detailed examination of the parties’ positions compels us to discard such optimism.
The state of the frontline and the occupied territories plays a major role in shaping the picture of a possible peace. While the issue of liberation or control over lands is one of the most vital and, undoubtedly, the most emotionally challenging for both sides in terms of concessions, the war is being waged not so much for the territories themselves as for the right to determine Ukraine’s future in general, and, through it, to influence the future of Europe.
The initial impression following Witkoff’s visit to the Russian Federation created an image of a more flexible Russian position. However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin’s demands for halting the conflict have not changed. Moscow demands the following be enshrined: Kyiv’s abandonment of its path toward NATO membership through the proclamation of Ukraine’s non-aligned, neutral status; a reduction in size and imposition of limits on the Ukrainian Defence Forces, particularly regarding Western supplies. Such provisions must be accompanied by the country’s federalization and the establishment of the Russian language as the second official state language. Additionally, while not directly stated in the context of the summit, it is highly probable that substantial changes to national identity policy and history revision are also sought. Territorially, Putin primarily seeks to solidify the Russian Federation’s military gains in one form or another. Furthermore, consent to a treaty is conditional on the partial or full lifting of anti-Russian sanctions.
The synthesis of these demands leads to the understanding that Russia seeks a substantial limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty and the undermining of the Ukrainian state’s capacity to ensure its own defense in the long term. This fundamentally increases Moscow’s chances of winning a potential future conflict a few years down the line. The summit itself is not a means to end the conflict, but rather an attempt by the Kremlin to delay the imposition of new sanctions, as well as a brazen gambit aimed at winning the war through a favorable agreement with Donald Trump.
The policy of the current U.S. President’s administration regarding Ukraine can accurately be described as chaotic attempts to conclude the war in the shortest possible timeframe by compelling both sides toward peace. Following the announcement of the summit, there was a prolonged lack of clarity regarding the specific proposal Washington was preparing to offer. While Steven Witkoff initially described the deal as a cessation of hostilities along the line of contact without territorial exchanges or politically restrictive commitments for Ukraine, it quickly became evident that Moscow itself had not given prior consent to such a proposition. We can therefore state that Donald Trump’s tactic relies on direct conversation with Putin, during which he hopes to convince the Russian leader that the war is not beneficial to Russia.
We must express doubt about the Russian side’s readiness to accept such a vision, as the American proposal is not a strategic solution but a simple cessation of hostilities without securing any of the Russian Federation’s gains or demands in the international legal framework.
It is important to note that Washington’s position was initially more flexible, with President Trump himself stating that both sides would have to make territorial concessions they would not like.
This formulation provoked sharp disagreement from Ukraine and apprehension among European leaders, resulting in an online meeting between representatives from Ukraine, the U.S., the EU, and Great Britain on August 13. At this meeting, Donald Trump assured partners that he would not sign a deal with Putin in Alaska, stating that Moscow and Kyiv have to do so, adding that Russia would face “severe consequences” should it refuse. Subsequently, information also emerged that the U.S. was ready to provide Ukraine with security guarantees in the event of peace, although these implications have not yet received official confirmation.
If Russia views the summit as a path to achieving its goals non-militarily, the U.S. sees it rather as a principled start to the peace process at the highest level. Trump himself has discussed the possibility of a subsequent trilateral meeting with Zelenskyy and Putin after the Alaska summit. Evidently, sanction pressure is forcing the Kremlin to follow Washington’s requirements, but significant divergences in the parties’ positions are already obvious, making consensus highly unlikely, especially in the context of Ukraine’s refusal to meet Russia’s prerequisite for starting negotiations — the withdrawal of troops from the Donetsk region.
Just as Russia is unwilling to abandon its demands, the fulfillment of any of the Kremlin’s current conditions is unacceptable for Ukraine from both a political and strategic standpoint. The Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration remains the largest defensive hub for Ukraine’s Defence Forces in Donbas, an assault on which would require a colossal exertion of resources from the Russian Armed Forces (RAF). The withdrawal of troops would mean not only the loss of significant territory but also a considerable simplification of Russia’s subsequent offensive, this time deeper into the Dnipropetrovsk region. The same holds true for the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions — the voluntary handover of any territories would merely allow the RAF to resume an advance into Ukraine from more advantageous lines.
Kyiv’s position affords no flexibility: Ukraine’s long-term survival is intrinsically linked to its continued integration into the Western security and economic space. Abandoning this course would be the main indicator of defeat in the war.
From a broader perspective, the defensive capability of the Ukrainian state largely determines the security of the European Union, whose fate may also be determined in Alaska. European states view support for Kyiv as an investment in their own security and, therefore, will not endorse any limitations on Ukraine’s defense capabilities, as the probability of a new conflict in Europe would only increase in such a scenario. It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will halt its military machine now, especially considering the slow pace and complexity of Europe’s rearmament process, leaving Russia with a window of opportunity for further expansion.
This primarily concerns the Baltic states and Finland, which are experiencing increasingly frequent acts of sabotage and diversion from Russia, and are observing a direct build-up of military formations near their borders, including the deployment of a new army corps near the Finnish border and a several-fold increase in the strength of the Leningrad Military District. A factual freezing of hostilities in no way guarantees they will not resume in the coming years — rather the opposite; it grants Moscow the necessary time to recover and consolidate its forces.
Despite all the hype surrounding the Anchorage summit, there are currently no grounds to expect a peace treaty. The Russian Federation feels strong enough to continue hostilities; its troops receive stable personnel replenishment, and its economy, despite a significant decline in several sectors, is capable of maintaining the current level of defense spending — primarily through the emission of federal loan bonds — for at least another year or two without collapse. Russia’s geostrategic objective in its entire campaign against the West is to push back NATO borders and, to some extent, restore the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe that it lost since the Cold War.
The Russian Federation’s ultimate goal in the war with Ukraine is to establish political control, which can be achieved through the instrument of federalization and neutralization. Moscow’s positions are so far removed from any possible concessions that the U.S. or EU might make that the prospects for peace are chimerical.
At the same time, Vladimir Putin might agree to a freezing of hostilities or the previously proposed “air truce,” under which the parties would commit not to conduct missile and drone strikes deep inside the enemy’s territory.
It is important to understand that neither of these actions would be a harbinger of the end of the war, but merely a temporary or partial respite. Furthermore, there is another party that has not yet been mentioned in the article, but whose foreign policy ambitions require the continuation of hostilities in Europe: China.
The People’s Republic of China is Putin’s most crucial partner in the war. Without Chinese electronics, drones, trade, and its willingness to deepen the DPRK’s cooperation with the Russian Federation, the latter’s ability to wage war would likely have already been exhausted. Beijing is the main beneficiary of the war: isolation pushes Moscow toward ever closer cooperation, which, in practice, represents resource exploitation rather than the allied relationship Russia craved. The war in Europe diverts the U.S.’s focus and resources away from the Pacific region, while the costs of supporting the war are no burden for the PRC, allowing it, instead, to test the products of its own military-industrial complex. The PRC is preparing for war, the goal of which is obvious — Taiwan — and today there is no possibility of pointing to any realistic concessions or coercive measures that could force China to deviate from its adopted political course or release Russia from its orbit.
The United States can exert pressure in negotiations, yet the range of possible proposals from its side that would not be condemned by Europe and rejected by Ukraine is exceedingly narrow. A sustainable peace is impossible under the current configuration of international politics because the main conflict has not even begun. Furthermore, a ceasefire (or “freeze”) in the future threatens an attack by the Russian Federation on NATO states — an undesirable scenario for the U.S., where it would be forced to either sacrifice the unity of the alliance (a geopolitical catastrophe) or divert even more resources from the Pacific region to Europe. Therefore, America’s state interests are aligned with achieving a lasting peace on the European subcontinent. The realization of this interest is connected to another U.S. strategic goal in Russia’s war against Ukraine: dismantling the Russian-Chinese alliance, though this remains an unlikely development due to a lack of means and Russia’s intransigence.
Recognizing the complexity of the negotiation process, Washington is attempting to find ways to exert additional influence on Moscow through economic means. Although a complete lifting of sanctions is not currently on the table, Donald Trump is reportedly ready to offer the Russian Federation joint extraction of rare-earth resources in Alaska and the occupied territories of Ukraine, while simultaneously lifting sanctions on the Russian aviation industry. This proposal is difficult to perceive as anything other than a bribe to Moscow. However, even in such a role, the U.S. would not be able to replace China for Russia. Moreover, they do not seek to; the European market presents a better, though currently unavailable, alternative to the Chinese market for Moscow. The EU, however, has taken a firm stance on sanctions and is unwilling to ease pressure until the implementation of sustainable peace is evident in practice. Of course, such developments are, for now, mere fantasy.
Few indicators suggest the functional success of the Anchorage negotiations. The positions of Russia and the United States diverge on more than one fundamental point, and the readiness of the Russian Federation to cease hostilities on terms that are not its own remains low. Even if Donald Trump subsequently organizes a trilateral meeting between the leaders of the U.S., the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, it is unlikely that translating diplomacy into such a personalistic format will circumvent the fundamental contradictions between the Ukrainian and Russian stances. Ultimately, Washington and Europe will have no choice but to continue applying pressure on the Kremlin.
For Kyiv, the Anchorage summit, while representing an opportunity to further influence the White House’s position by emphasizing the Russian inability to compromise and the need for increased sanctions pressure, does not portend structural changes in the international political situation. The fate of Ukraine is still primarily being decided by its Defence Forces on the battlefield.
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