5018 days — that is precisely how much time has passed since the start of the civil war in Syria and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Syria’s new government is striving to attract investments and stabilize the state; however, eight months have passed, and the world is once again speaking about hostilities in Syria, which may only be the initial stage of a new confrontation.
What challenges confront the new government in Damascus, and which states are directly interested in the worsening situation — read in our material.
Following the victory over Bashar al-Assad’s regime, who fled to Russia, a coalition of the Syrian opposition, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), gained power over the fractured and war-devastated nation. The new government, headed by HTS leader and new Syrian President during the transitional period, Ahmed al-Sharaa, immediately faced a series of economic, political, and security challenges, with the resolution of some closely intertwined with others. Although the new authorities received significant trust, both domestically and internationally, Syria’s stability remains fragile, and Damascus’s future depends on how regional and ethnic contradictions within its territory are resolved.
Nearly 14 years of war have inflicted devastating damage on the economy. Before the civil war, the nation’s Gross Domestic Product was estimated at $67.5 billion; now it hovers around $20 billion. Today, with a GDP per capita of $830 USD, compared to $2950 in 2011, Syria is the second poorest state in the region. Hostilities halted economic growth, and from 2010 onwards, the cumulative decline in GDP ranged from 54% to 85% — for instance, in 2024, this figure decreased by 1.5%. The World Bank’s forecast for 2025 is also bleak — 1% growth, which de facto signifies continued stagnation. The country’s economic base is destroyed, and foreign investors have long abandoned the state, thus the likelihood of rapid growth in the short to medium term is low.
The humanitarian situation is catastrophic: approximately 90% of the total population of 23.7 million is in poverty, with 14.5 million unable to secure food, water, and essential necessities. Many regions face issues with electricity supply, as over 50% of power grids are out of order, as well as water supply and other services. The return of refugees from abroad could create additional pressure on the weak economy, even as the unemployment rate at the beginning of the year already stood at 25%.
According to UN data, as of November 2024, approximately 4.8 million Syrian refugees were abroad. The lion’s share, 2.9 million and 748 thousand respectively, were in neighboring Turkey and Lebanon. The remainder were in Europe, primarily in Germany, which hosted about 1 million, and Austria, where the number of Syrian refugees reached 95,000. Between December 2024 and March 2025, over 302,000 people returned to Syria, and the process continues, partly due to EU states’ decisions to suspend issuing refugee status to new asylum seekers from Syria and to review their terms of stay in the country.
At the same time, economic devastation of such a scale can trigger social unrest, internal migration, and new cycles of localized violence, as competition for scarce resources intensifies. This also puts immense pressure on the new government, as it is expected to deliver visible improvements, a challenging task given the scale of the crisis.
The population’s lack of savings and a fiscal resource deficit have led to a situation where a significant improvement in the economic situation can only be ensured through an inflow of investment into the state, and Syria’s leadership understands this, so it immediately pursued a course of attracting foreign capital. For instance, back in December 2024, the American company UNIFI Communications announced the launch of Project Alasia, aiming to improve the region’s communication system by laying a fiber optic cable along the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea between Cyprus and the Syrian city of Tartus. The project may be scaled up in the future to other cities in Syria and to other Middle Eastern countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.
Other investors with whom the Syrian side has already concluded agreements include the French logistics corporation CMA CGM, which plans to build a new port in Latakia, investing 230 million euros into Syria’s economy. Investments from regional players will also enter the state — in May 2025, Damascus signed an agreement with the Qatari consortium UCC Holding, which also includes Turkish (Kalyon Holding and Cengiz Holding) and American companies (Power International), for $7 billion USD, which will be directed to the energy sector. On July 24, during an investment forum in Damascus, Saudi Arabia announced its intention to invest in Syria’s reconstruction. The cumulative volume of agreements will total $6.4 billion, with $2.9 billion allocated for infrastructure development. Additionally, further investments from Germany are expected after the creation of the German-Syrian Economic Coordination Council on June 17, and Syrian banks are anticipating the restoration of access to the global payment system after the reconnection to the SWIFT system.
In addition to investments, the Syrian government is also attracting funds in the form of international aid. For instance, in March 2025, the EU allocated $6.5 billion USD to Syria in grants and credits. The decision was made amid discussions and preparations for lifting sanctions on Damascus — an event that occurred two months later, on May 20. Washington began lifting sanctions on June 30.
Despite the entire complexity of the economic situation, the greatest threats to Syria’s stability lie in the political and security dimensions. The problem is that not all actors with military resources agree with the vision for Syria’s future proposed by the current Damascus, i.e., HTS, which has adopted a course towards a highly centralized presidential model of governance, at least until the first elections are held. In practice, this translates into the absence of a state monopoly on violence — militant formations within the state are not ready to trust the center and lay down their arms, as the official authorities demand, because this would mean surrendering the protection of their interests and security into the hands of former jihadists.
Besides HTS itself, other centers of power exist in the state which, even if not aiming to seize power in Damascus, could undermine the center’s position: former Assadists and Alawites, the Syrian Democratic Forces representing the Kurds, and tribes, mainly Bedouins and Druze. Moreover, on the periphery of the political landscape, the Islamic State still exists. Each force controls a part of the state’s territory, and Syria remains deeply fragmented and dangerous. Despite the fall of the Assad dictatorship, outbreaks of violence occur regularly. Only their nature has changed: currently, instead of an open multi-party civil war, violence erupts in the form of local revolts by Assad loyalists, localized clashes between representatives of different forces, and religious terrorism. These signs do not allow the situation to be called a stable peace, despite a significant drop in the intensity of violence. A considerable weakening of the central government, a careless policy, or the intervention of external players could bring down this facade of stabilization, plunging the state into a new full-scale confrontation. The problem is further compounded by the fact that, despite attempts to reach a compromise among different social groups, Syria’s government is not a new, “sterile” player — it is backed by HTS, which has a long history of conflicts and contradictions with other actors.
One of the factors bolstering the stability of the current Damascus government is its religious affiliation. Ahmed al-Sharaa, like most of his cabinet ministers, is a Sunni, as are approximately 70% of the country’s population. The Assad family’s dictatorship, in contrast, relied on the Alawites — representatives of a branch of Shia Islam who constitute over 10% of the state’s residents (while Shias as a whole make up over 13%) and are concentrated in the northwestern regions of Tartus and Latakia.
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the first threat to the HTS and SNA alliance came from the security forces of the former regime, the lion’s share of whom were Alawites. Although some voluntarily laid down their arms, in Tartus and Latakia, Assadists incited the population to resist. From December 2024 onwards, regular clashes occurred in the provinces between what were now the governmental forces of HTS and local militias that some Assadists were attempting to transform into an army.
Beyond a rational fear of ethnic reprisals against Alawites due to their support for the Assad regime, a reason many officials from the old regime’s security bloc are resisting is that they lack the resources to flee and have no means of reconciliation with the new authorities. The latter are not ready and will not pardon, in particular, security service personnel or senior army officers who were complicit in Assad’s crimes. This not only contradicts the declared intent to hold those responsible for the previous regime’s crimes accountable but could also call into question the legitimacy of HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa themselves in the eyes of Sunnis.
The Syrian authorities deployed their forces to the region with the goal of stabilization and preventing any organized resistance. In practice, however, the “Syrian army” is a complex conglomerate of HTS, which is to some extent the most organized and loyal force, SNA forces, which are less disciplined and more affiliated with Turkey, smaller Islamist groups, and foreign jihadist units. Religion plays a significant role in this situation — for the ultra-religious militants, Alawites are not merely another ethnoreligious group but “murtads” (apostates), which incites violence against the civilian population.
The situation peaked in March 2025, when on the 6th, clashes occurred between units of the Syrian People’s Resistance (SNS), an Assadist rebel group, and security forces. The SNS began to take control of several smaller settlements, in response to which Damascus sent additional forces to the region. This allowed the suppression of the rebellion, but during this time, approximately 1,500 Alawites fell victim to indiscriminate violence and targeted killings by Sunni forces.
President al-Sharaa responded with a statement that an investigation has been launched. However, it is appropriate to express doubt about the ability to ensure justice amidst the collective cover-up that is characteristic of the irregular armed formations which were de facto operating in the regions.
Although the violence subsided after March, in April, Syria’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Anas Khattab, announced that a coup attempt organized by officers of the Assad regime had been foiled. The main resistance of the Assadists has been broken, but tensions in the region persist. The Syrian government fears intervention from Iran, for which the fall of Assad means not only the loss of an ally from the “Axis of Resistance” but also complicates support for another partner — Hezbollah. Iran may still have contacts among the Alawites and could attempt to use them for provocations and to undermine state stability; consequently, Damascus will react decisively. It is important to note, however, that similar uncontrolled instances of ethnically or religiously motivated violence will significantly complicate HTS’s efforts to stabilize the situation in the future, not only with the Alawites but also with the Kurds and Druze.
Another military force that is in no hurry to disarm or integrate into the Syrian army is the aforementioned SDF — an alliance formed on the basis of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and local Arab forces. The forces represented in the alliance have controlled northeastern Syria since almost the beginning of the civil war, a region constituting approximately 20% of the state’s territory, including its most fertile lands and 70% of Syrian hydrocarbon fields. The total number of armed forces can reach up to 100,000. At the same time, it should be understood that a portion of these forces are local Arab militias with a low level of organization, meaning the truly combat-ready forces constitute a smaller number.
Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, the SDF was primarily focused on defending occupied territories and fighting ISIS, serving as local allies of the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, situational partners of Israel and Iran. However, over time, after the defeat of the Islamic State, Washington moved away from close cooperation with the Kurds. Another main adversary of the SDF is Turkey — Ankara, defining potential Kurdish separatism as a strategic threat, has an extremely negative view of the Kurdish quasi-state project in Syria.
On December 6, 2024, when the defense of the Syrian Arab Army collapsed and the forces of the opposition alliance launched an offensive from Idlib, the SNA, being a force affiliated with Turkey, attacked not in a southern direction (as HTS did, moving towards Damascus) but eastward — against Kurdish forces. With the support of the Turkish army, it launched Operation “Dawn of Freedom” and displaced the SDF from Tell Rifaat and Manbij, after which the advance stalled. The U.S. intervened and secured a ceasefire agreement between the parties on December 19. However, de facto, clashes continued until the end of winter, including shelling from Turkish territory.
Ankara, the main partner of the Syrian government, opposes any Kurdish autonomy near its borders, viewing such an entity as a natural base for the operations of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is recognized as a terrorist organization in Turkey (and the U.S.). Damascus’s interest is tangential — President al-Sharaa is focused on building a unitary state. In March, the President of Syria and the SDF leader signed an agreement on the integration of the SDF into the state apparatus, which includes incorporating the armed units of the Democratic forces into the Syrian army. Whether this aspiration can be realized, particularly without armed clashes, depends on Damascus’s ability to keep all its forces under control and guarantee law and order. Furthermore, the future status of the territories currently controlled by the SDF has not been definitively determined, and the integration itself is proceeding extremely slowly in practice, thus it is fair to say that a final agreement between the parties has not been reached.
A military scenario is undesirable for both Damascus and the SDF because, regardless of the outcome, it could jeopardize the entire project of restoring the Syrian state, scaring away investors and provoking armed actions in other regions. However, other regional players, Iran and Israel — which is paradoxical given their fierce animosity — share a common, opposing interest. Each, for its own reasons, would prefer to preserve Kurdish autonomy to prevent the strengthening of al-Sharaa’s government. The positive resolution for Damascus regarding the Druze situation offers grounds for cautious optimism. However, the Syrian army’s inability to suppress the rebellion on its own (due to Israeli strikes) might undermine al-Sharaa’s position in future negotiations.
Beyond the external factors mentioned above, the issue of a state monopoly on violence also has a domestic dimension. The coalition of forces that came to power after Assad’s fall is extremely diverse in its orientation, encompassing groups ranging from Islamists, foreign jihadists, and Syrian nationalists to even Turkish nationalists from the “Sultan Murad” division. This unification of forces was a decisive factor that allowed the Idlib coalition to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, but now that yesterday’s rebels are engaged in state-building processes, this factor is proving to be a liability.
As early as mid-December 2024, Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that all rebel groups would be disbanded and integrated into the Syrian army under the Ministry of Defense, which, incidentally, is now headed by a former HTS member. On December 24, the call for unification was repeated, and the Syrian President himself held a series of personal meetings with the leaders of various groups. The culmination of these efforts was the “Victory Conference” held on January 29, 2025, which was attended by senior officials from military groups besides HTS itself, with the exception of the SDF and Druze tribes. Attendees included the SNA, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Army of Islam, the “Sultan Murad,” “Al-Amshat,” “Hamzat” divisions, the “8th Brigade,” as well as a large number of smaller factions. On May 17, Syria’s Ministry of Defense announced the completion of the integration of other factions into a single Syrian army. The statement was clearly intended to demonstrate the unity of government forces and emphasize Damascus’s control over them. In practice, however, the integration process remains incomplete due to a multitude of factors.
The main obstacle is a lack of trust. During the years of the civil war, many of these groups were hostile to each other and had clashes. Although a common enemy in the form of Assad united them, integration into the structure of a single army causes apprehension, especially considering that the highest positions, both in the state as a whole and in the army in particular, are occupied by HTS members. This leads to a dual, conflicting hierarchy, in which a unit formally reports to the Ministry of Defense but de facto primarily follows the orders of its field commanders. Quite often, this is accompanied by a refusal to hand over, for example, heavy weapons or to reform the structure of the unit itself.
A unified army assumes that the armed forces are maintained by the state, which is a significant challenge given the critical lack of funds in the Syrian treasury. Therefore, many units continue to receive primary funding from abroad. This primarily refers to the SNA and the Syrian Turkmen divisions “Sultan Murad,” “Al-Amshat,” and “Hamzat,” which are financially and materially supported by Turkey. Despite the support that President Erdoğan provides to Damascus, Ankara is holding back the integration of its affiliated forces into the Syrian army, primarily wishing to maintain the means to deter the SDF until the latter are disbanded or stripped of their agency. On the other hand, Turkey’s position, in turn, complicates the potential integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army. In addition to foreign support, many groups have developed their own funding sources during the years of war, which often consist of levies on the local population, collection of “tolls,” etc., and the funds received often go into the pockets of their leaders. Integration means the loss of these incomes, which is an additional reason for the military reform’s stagnation.
A less noticeable, yet potentially even more destructive, factor is the possible factionalism within HTS itself. This could be provoked by Ahmed al-Sharaa’s shift towards a more moderate, unifying stance, which may incite resistance from more radical elements, especially if the current government faces a serious setback or moves too close to the U.S.. American officials consider foreign Islamists within HTS to be the biggest threat. U.S. Special Representative for Syria Thomas Barrack has noted that the Syrian President could be killed by disgruntled radicals and has called on the American authorities to make efforts to protect him. However, it should be noted that the number of foreign volunteers within the governmental forces is not very large, amounting to up to 5,000 individuals. Among them are about 3,500 from the Turkistan Islamic Party, a few hundred militants from the post-Soviet space, primarily from Chechnya, within “Liwa al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar,” and up to 300 individuals in the “Balkan Battalion”. Nevertheless, these fears have not yet materialized, and Ahmed al-Sharaa himself had previously refused Western pressure to extradite or deport these volunteers.
Currently, the unity of the Syrian army rests on informal foundations: loyalty to a leader or an organization, but not to a formal state institution. The army is not a unified organism and suffers from strong factionalism. However, over the past 8 months, there has been no serious uprising on its part against Damascus’s course or against Ahmed al-Sharaa himself. As long as the Syrian government can maintain this consensus, the path to the army’s real integration, as the state’s capabilities are rebuilt, remains open.
Syria’s geography places it at the intersection of the interests of three regional centers of power: Turkey, Israel, and Iran. Bashar al-Assad’s regime was propped up by Iranian and Russian bayonets; yet, his relations with official Tel Aviv were characterized by exceptional pragmatism, despite public anti-Israel rhetoric. Assad was convenient for the Jewish State because he preferred not to raise the issue of the Golan, and Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory, most often targeting Iranian forces and proxies, did not provoke serious discontent from the international community given Syria’s status as a pariah state. After Bashar al-Assad’s flight, the situation has changed.
Israel and Syria have technically been in a state of war since 1948, the time of Israel’s War of Independence. Tel Aviv captured the Golan Heights in 1967 and annexed them in 1981. After Assad’s overthrow in December 2024, Israel occupied new territories in southern Syria and launched hundreds of airstrikes on military targets, primarily destroying air defense systems. Israel claimed that these actions were defensive, aimed at protecting itself from hostile forces that were exploiting the power vacuum, as well as maintaining the demilitarization of the border zone and protecting the Druze community.
The first attempts by Damascus to establish a dialogue with Tel Aviv via neutral Switzerland took place in April, but the Israeli side ignored them. Thus, communication was only truly established when the U.S. became involved after a meeting between Donald Trump and Ahmed al-Sharaa in May. Despite the initial optimism from the American side, negotiations proceeded at a restrained pace. At the current stage, Damascus’s interest lies in the realm of practically achievable goals: a ceasefire and the recognition of the new Syrian government by Israel. The reason is that for the Damascus government itself, a potential peace with the Jewish State is media-wise and politically toxic due to Israel’s campaign in Gaza, where the number of Palestinian casualties from indiscriminate violence by the IDF has already exceeded 50,000.
Under these circumstances, a peace treaty and joining the Abraham Accords, which the White House had hoped for, would not only alienate influential Middle Eastern states, primarily Saudi Arabia, from the new government but could also provoke a split within HTS and its allied forces.
Consequently, the issue of the Golan Heights was not publicly discussed. However, according to insider information, the Syrian government considered two options for a peace treaty: under the first, Tel Aviv would retain one-third of the Golan’s territory and lease another third from Syria for 25 years; under the second, Israel would keep two-thirds of the Golan, but Damascus would receive Lebanon’s Tripoli as compensation. The mechanism for transferring part of Lebanon to Syrian control, however, is not specified.
Even if the proposals were indeed made, the likelihood of the Netanyahu government’s agreement should be considered low. The current Israeli government views Syria as a dangerous Turkish proxy, which is not unfounded given Ankara’s substantial support. It calls al-Sharaa himself a terrorist, and representatives of the Israeli government have already issued calls for the assassination of the Syrian President. Israel sees the guarantee of its own security in transforming Syria into a failed, federalized state, where a weak center would be balanced by Kurdish, Druze, and possibly Alawite autonomies. Such a vision leaves little room for compromise. The last attempt to find a common position, likely, occurred during the Syrian leader’s working visit to Azerbaijan on July 12, but it was unsuccessful.
Tel Aviv also advocates for the preservation of its partner’s military bases in Syria: the Khmeimim airbase and the naval base in Latakia. The goal is the same — to weaken HTS’s power through the presence of Russian troops, in whom the Israeli side sees a counterbalance to Turkish influence in Syria. For Moscow, the preservation of the bases is a matter of both prestige and pragmatism. Although the Kremlin promised to assist in the restoration of the Syrian state, the Russian Federation’s finances are in an extremely difficult state, and it lacks the capacity to invest billions in Syria or to influence events there. For example, during the previously mentioned revolts in the Alawite regions, the Russian side limited its actions to taking in civilians who were seeking refuge at its bases, but no assistance was provided to the former Assadists.
Syria’s new government holds a negative view of Moscow due to its support for the Assad regime and for sheltering the dictator himself in Russia. In early 2025, Damascus terminated a contract with the Russian company Stroytransgaz for the management of the port of Tartus. The fate of the trade agreement and the bases is uncertain — Russia’s presence in Syria creates security risks that could hinder the attraction of investments. At the same time, Damascus will not demand the liquidation of the bases without guarantees of support from Ankara, which, in turn, may view these bases as a tool of pressure on Russia, as they would become one of the first targets in the event of a confrontation between Russia and Turkey.
The practical value of the bases for the Kremlin is ambivalent — on one hand, the Russian Armed Forces are unable to secure their outposts, as supplies are conducted by air via the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Iraq. On the other hand, Russia conducts its operations in Africa precisely through the Khmeimim base, which serves as a transit point for mercenaries or cargo that Russia sends to the continent. Its loss would harm the infrastructure of Russian influence in Africa, though it would not lead to its complete elimination.
Consequently, for the Russian Federation, the military bases in Syria are a necessary foreign policy asset that, however, makes Russia vulnerable to potential pressure from Turkey and Syria. The future of the bases depends on whether the Kremlin can offer Damascus sufficient compensation for their preservation. At the same time, Moscow’s strategic culture makes the handover of Assad impossible, and Putin’s money is significantly less than it used to be.
Besides the Kurds and Alawites, the official Damascus government also has a complicated relationship with Syria’s third-largest minority, the Druze. 700,000 of them live in the southeastern part of the country, while up to 150,000 reside in Israel and the occupied Golan Heights. Like the Kurds, the Druze formed their own militia during the war, but its level of organization and combat readiness is significantly lower than that of the SDF, as the Druze societal structure is tribal. Furthermore, there is no unity among the minority regarding their attitude toward the new government, with different Druze representatives advocating for both cooperation and integration as well as expanded self-governance.
In terms of religious orientation, Druzeism is an offshoot of Shia Ismailism, which gives Sunni forces a basis for viewing representatives of the minority as “murtads” (apostates). The situation is also exacerbated by Israel’s public positioning as the protector of the Druze and its political instrumentalization of this issue to exert pressure on Damascus. Isolated outbreaks of violence between Arab forces and the Druze militia occurred regularly. De facto, negotiations between Damascus and the Druze made little progress, as their fate largely depended on a possible agreement with Tel Aviv.
The large-scale July crisis began with localized violence. On July 11, a group of Bedouins (Arab tribes) kidnapped a Druze merchant from the Damascus-Suwayda highway, after which he was tortured and threatened. The situation became public, and on July 13, large-scale armed clashes erupted between the Druze militia and the Bedouin tribes, with the number of those killed reaching 30. Damascus responded by sending in troops to suppress the unrest, and on July 14, the Syrian army began combat operations against the Druze militia, which had seized control of the city of Suwayda. During the hostilities, the number of Druze killed reached 300. The militia received serious support from Israel, which launched airstrikes against the Syrian army’s forces. Besides stabilizing the region, the Syrian government might have also pursued an additional goal — to coordinate the forces of the new army — however, there is, of course, no official confirmation of such actions.
On July 15, the Syrian government announced a ceasefire agreement with the leaders of the Druze community. However, the next day, one of the three spiritual leaders of the Druze, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, whose forces were most actively involved in the clashes, rejected all agreements and called on all Druze to continue the fight. Meanwhile, Israel struck the Syrian Ministry of Defense building, demanding the withdrawal of government troops, which occurred on the night of July 16-17. Although the troop withdrawal was officially presented as the implementation of previously reached agreements, in practice it was a defeat for Damascus, which lacked the military means to resist Israeli aggression and was therefore forced to concede and resort to diplomatic methods, whose effectiveness is not always sufficient.
Tel Aviv’s victory, however, did not improve the security situation. The withdrawal of government forces led to a resumption of hostilities between the Druze and Bedouins. Furthermore, tribes from across Syria began to arrive to assist the Bedouins after representatives of the Council of tribes declared a mobilization. The Bedouins displaced the Druze forces, and their columns moved towards Suwayda, which would have resulted in a new explosion of ethnic violence. Representatives of the tribes rejected any interaction with the Syrian authorities, but it is reasonable to assume that some cooperation may have taken place, as the Bedouins’ actions forced Israel to change its position. On the evening of July 18, Tel Aviv and Damascus, with U.S. assistance, agreed to a ceasefire, and government forces were once again dispatched to Suwayda.
It is now evident that the crisis in Suwayda is not over. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s tactical victory, nevertheless, has confirmed a disturbing pattern in the Syrian army, already seen in Latakia and Tartus: the actions of government forces in non-Sunni regions are accompanied by numerous instances of violence against civilians, which diminishes the positive effect of stabilization efforts and encourages resistance. Even after the truce between Damascus and Israel was reached, militias affiliated with the pro-Israeli Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri continue to engage in fighting with government forces, and the Sheikh himself continues to call for resistance. Concurrently, the forces of the Bedouin tribal council have now withdrawn from As-Suwayda, ceding their place to government forces, which can be seen as further confirmation of cooperation between them. Although the political issue of Druze autonomy has disappeared from the agenda, clashes between the Druze, Bedouins, and government forces have already resulted in a minimum of 600 deaths, and another 145,000 residents of the region have been forced to abandon their homes. A split has occurred within Druze society: while one of the sheikhs has sided with Israel, two others, Yusuf Jarbu and Hammoud al-Hinnawi, as well as the governor of Suwayda, have supported the Syrian government, condemning Tel Aviv’s statements regarding the “protection” of the Druze community.
Israeli forces, for their part, have violated the truce and continue to provide military support to their proxy, further undermining the fragile stability in Syria. Tel Aviv’s actions are perceived as destructive by both the region and Washington. Several anonymous sources from the Trump administration have indicated the U.S. President’s serious annoyance with the Israeli Prime Minister’s actions, which are subverting American efforts to stabilize the Middle East. On July 24, a trilateral meeting of representatives from the U.S., Syria, and Israel took place. While the specific results are unknown, it is likely that America is pressuring its ally to back down. Amidst these negotiations, al-Sharaa’s government withdrew some of its troops, however, the crisis is escalating — in response to a request from Damascus, Ankara has agreed to provide support in the fight against terrorists, including, but not limited to, the Islamic State. Support from this ally could be a decisive factor in breaking Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s resistance, but the key weakness of HTS forces against the Israeli army — the absence of air defense — is unlikely to be resolved.
The situation with the SDF remains moderately dangerous with a tendency to worsen amidst the crisis. Damascus and Ankara fear the threat of possible destabilization in the Kurdish regions by the Jewish State, even though the integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian army has been more of a facade. The SDF refuses to fully merge into the Ministry of Defense’s structure and prefers to retain control and its armaments. The March agreements between Damascus and the Kurds have de facto stalled. The reaction from Turkey and the U.S. was a de facto 30-day ultimatum issued on July 21, during which the SDF must fully integrate into the new Syrian state structure. No direct threats were issued, but Turkey indicated that in case of non-compliance, “alternative solutions” are possible. Amidst rising tensions with Israel, France expressed its support for al-Sharaa on both the Kurdish issue and the crisis in As-Suwayda.
Today’s Syria is at a historical point of bifurcation. The war-torn state lacks its own resources for reconstruction and for resolving the complex humanitarian situation. The state is in acute need of international aid and the arrival of foreign investors, which has already begun.
The key condition for recovery remains stability, and the prerequisite for stability is a lasting inter-confessional peace. Currently, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government aims to achieve peace through unitarization and the establishment of a state monopoly on violence. However, it is facing obstacles in the form of a lack of trust at all levels: among coalition allies, a lack of trust from Kurdish and Druze forces, and direct hostile activity from Tel Aviv.
The de facto integration of militant groups into a single army structure under Damascus’s command remains critically important. Also vital is the real inclusion of the Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and Christian minorities in the state governance process to avoid the marginalization and radicalization of these groups. The new government’s ability to guarantee peace will determine how it is perceived by the world, particularly Europe and the U.S., who could act as providers of resources for Syria’s reconstruction.
The main short-term challenge is to resolve the crisis in Suwayda in the shortest possible time to minimize casualties, and to build a new governance vertical in the region in cooperation with the forces of the two other Druze sheikhs, whose authority will help stabilize public sentiment.
The most important mid-term challenge is the peaceful integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the restoration of control over the country’s northeast. The successful implementation of this step would pave the way for the further integration of the already pro-Turkish groups into a single command structure. In its foreign policy, Syria’s leadership should continue to adhere to a pragmatic course and also build close relations with other Sunni Arab states in the region.
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