Ramzan Kadyrov has headed the Chechen Republic since 2007. He established absolute control over power structures, cash flows, and society, effectively turning Chechnya into a feudal patrimony where most key positions are held by Kadyrov’s family or close associates from his tribal organization – the teip. Political opponents of the regime in Chechnya, and even independent journalists or human rights activists, are either killed with impunity or forced abroad. This medieval “monarchy” is maintained not only by force but also by significant federal subsidies that Russia pays to the region after the Second Chechen War. The political system of Chechnya is entirely tied to the personality of Ramzan Kadyrov, so increasingly frequent reports of health problems of the Chechen ruler force us to think about the further development of events.
What impact will Kadyrov’s departure have on Chechnya, the North Caucasus, Russia as a whole, and its international policy?
The first reports of the possible illness of the Chechen leader appeared in 2019 when he first began to disappear from public space and appoint temporary acting heads of the region. In September 2023, Kadyrov was hospitalized in a Moscow hospital due to a serious deterioration in his condition. The Chechen leader’s entourage claimed that he was only visiting his uncle, who was undergoing treatment.
In April 2024, “Novaya Gazeta Europe” stated that Kadyrov had pancreatic necrosis for over five years, while other sources reported severe liver failure. Throughout 2024, the seriously ill Chechen leader tried to follow doctors’ recommendations, and his condition stabilized somewhat. Kadyrov denied serious health problems all this time, filming videos of himself exercising and assuring everyone that he was in full order.
To refute information about Kadyrov’s serious illness, a powerful PR campaign was launched, involving Russian politicians, including the Russian president himself, who met with the Chechen leader or his eldest son four times last year on absolutely non-essential pretexts. However, after a series of publications in the media about his stable disappearances from the public, Kadyrov admitted that every three months he undergoes “major overhaul,” and every six months – “major repairs” (apparently referring to certain medical procedures).
In 2025, Kadyrov’s health deteriorated, judging by videos of his public appearances, which show general weakness in the body, trembling hands, shortness of breath, weakening voice, and vision problems. The time intervals between the Chechen leader’s public appearances are also increasing. Often, official regional media publish videos with Kadyrov, in which he is shown for only a few seconds. The image of the Chechen leader’s political activity now mainly comes down to social media posts managed by his press service, and a significant part of the actual work was delegated to the head of the regional government, Magomed Daudov.
On July 24, Turkish media Milliyet and GZT reported that Kadyrov fainted and almost drowned while on vacation on the Aegean coast. After the incident he was taken to a private clinic. The Chechen leader’s next public appearance occurred only on August 5 at a meeting regarding the socio-economic situation in the region. Kadyrov’s striking weight loss was noticeable, however he stated that he was healthy and did not hold meetings every day because “the work is well-organized and successful in all areas.”
In early May 2025, Ramzan Kadyrov asked to be relieved of his post as head of the Chechen Republic. This is the fifth such case. The head of Chechnya stated that he does not decide whether to remain in office. “Such a decision is made by only one person – our supreme commander-in-chief, Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin,” he wrote on his Telegram channel. This is a kind of ritual to once again hear a confirmation from Putin that he needs Ramzan.
Kadyrov’s special status, his role as “guarantor of peace” in the region, makes him indispensable for the Kremlin in the current configuration. The Chechen leader has a unique resource that other regional authorities do not – direct access to Putin. Many agreements in the region, and in Russia as a whole, are tied to the guarantees of “dear brother Ramzan,” so there is a significant dependence of stability in Chechnya on Kadyrov and high risks of destabilization in the event of his departure.
In addition, the Chechen leader has significant influence and a network of contacts in the Middle East, which Moscow uses. According to sources of “Novaya Gazeta Europe,” in the summer of 2022, Kadyrov and his Middle East advisor Turko Daudov played a key role in negotiations between the UAE and Russia, opening a diplomatic channel through which the “arms baron” Viktor Bout was exchanged for American basketball player Brittney Griner, and later, negotiations with Ukraine on the exchange of prisoners of war took place. The UAE also actively invested in Chechnya before the full-scale invasion.
In April 2025, Kadyrov took part in the negotiations between Vladimir Putin and the sheikh of Qatar, where the fate of Russian military bases in Syria, which Russia is trying to retain at all costs, was likely discussed. Qatar has probably even more influence on the new Syrian government than Turkey. Given the involvement of Russian troops in Damascus in patrolling the country’s northeast, Russia managed to achieve intermediate goals. In August, Ramzan Kadyrov, along with his 17-year-old son Adam Kadyrov (secretary of the Security Council of Chechnya), participated in negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
A sign that Ramzan Kadyrov’s family and entourage are preparing for turbulence is the urgent re-registration of their business assets from nominal owners directly to members of the Chechen leader’s family. Simultaneously, there is an increase in the concentration of power in the hands of Kadyrov’s relatives (67 relatives in high positions in Chechen administrative and security structures as of April 2025, according to data from Kavkaz.Realii). This includes only the closest circle of Ramzan Kadyrov’s and his wife Medni’s brothers, sisters and cousins.
The resignation of eldest daughter Aishat Kadyrova from the post of deputy prime minister, simultaneously with the departure of two other Kadyrov daughters – Khutmat and Khadizhat – from public service, is also related to the desire to directly control family companies. Since the head of Chechnya himself and his adult children are officials, they do not have the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity, according to the law on public service.
The Kadyrov family also seized and forcibly promoted a business that allows for quick cash accumulation – pharmaceuticals. In March, Aishat Kadyrova was registered as the owner of “Chechen Mineral Waters,” Medni Kadyrova – as the owner of the “Aimed” clinic, and Kadyrov’s second wife, Fatima Khazueva, registered the company “Darbapharma.” At the same time, Aishat Kadyrova has flown to the UAE several times and considered options for investing family money in that country. Ramzan’s nephew, Khamzat Kadyrov, is in the UAE, where he is obtaining citizenship. It is likely that other members of Kadyrov’s family will follow suit and obtain citizenship of a Middle Eastern country.
In addition to securing financial flows and business assets, the Chechen leader is trying to keep security resources, which have always been personally controlled by him and allowed to confidently and firmly maintain power in the region, under his family’s control. And perhaps most importantly – to obtain security guarantees for the Kadyrov family from Putin. All relatively adult sons of Ramzan have met with the Russian president at least once.
If the Chechen leader succeeds in his plan, it will be difficult for Moscow to appoint someone not from Kadyrov’s family or trusted circle as the new head of the region, as the Kremlin will find itself in a situation with parallel centers of power in Chechnya. Ramzan also relies on allied Chechen teips, whose loyalty is ensured, in particular, by family ties.
Kadyrov managed to marry his sons Eli and Adam to the granddaughter of State Duma deputy from Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov and the daughter of Chechen senator Suleyman Geremeev, respectively. The Delimkhanovs and Geremeevs, together, can rival the Kadyrov family in terms of their influence and security resources. Kadyrov’s eldest daughters, according to data from “Novaya Gazeta Europe,” were married to men from the most loyal families – Matsuevs, Alkhanovs, and Vismuradovs. Kadyrov apparently hopes that they will protect his children in the worst-case scenario.
The Chechen leader places great hopes on his sons and promotes their careers at seemingly unrealistic rates. 17-year-old Adam Kadyrov is already the Secretary of the Security Council of Chechnya, his father’s head of security, “curator” of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs, the “Russian University of Special Forces,” where mercenaries for the war against Ukraine are trained, and of a number of Chechen battalions. 19-year-old Akhmat is the Minister of Sports of Chechnya, and 18-year-old Eli is the President of the Chechen Boxing Federation and the “Akhmat” sports club.
It is obvious that Kadyrov sees his third son, Adam, as his successor, ever since Adam turned 15 and was appointed to head his father’s security service. Adam Kadyrov is already, in fact, the second most important person in Chechnya. This is well visible from external signs, which have always been given great importance in Chechnya. In particular, Adam has the same size motorcade and security as his father. Ramzan also passed on the call sign DUSTUM to his son. However, the real concentration of power resources, including control over official structures, on Adam is much more important. Also, as “Novaya Gazeta” claims, Kadyrov’s favorite son received control over his father’s shadow business, which was previously handled by Adam Delimkhanov – raiding, racketeering, and “business moderation” at the federal level.
At the same time, it is not obvious whether Moscow will agree to Adam Kadyrov as the successor to the Chechen leader. It is likely that for now, he is considered only as the future head of the clan. The most important thing for Moscow is to maintain stability in the region, but the choice of who will guarantee and maintain this stability is an open question. Adam Kadyrov is not yet a figure of his father’s scale and is unlikely to be able to fully perform all his functions, which is understood both in the Kremlin and in Chechnya.
Moscow has not yet given any signals regarding the recognition of anyone as Kadyrov’s likely successor. It is probable that the Kremlin is waiting for the contenders and their resources and capabilities to become clearly defined, while agreeing to the status quo for now.
Among other likely successors, journalists and analysts name State Duma deputy from Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov and Chechen parliament speaker Magomed Daudov. Both are key associates of Kadyrov almost from the very beginning of his rule. Formally, their spheres of influence differ, but Delimkhanov has much more resources than Daudov.
Magomed Daudov is actually responsible for most formal administrative processes, from controlling the social sphere – education, medicine, pensions, salaries of civil servants – to organizing mobilization for the war against Ukraine. However, he is not an independent center of power, does not have his own relatives or loyal people in key positions, and does not possess significant personal security and financial resources.
The Delimkhanovs and their relatives Geremeevs are the second most powerful Chechen clan, both in terms of security resources and financial ones. Adam Delimkhanov controls the Chechen diaspora in Russia, manages Kadyrov’s illegal business at the federal level. He also has enormous influence in Central Asian and Caucasian countries, significant influence in Middle Eastern countries, organizes the killings of opposition-minded Chechens in emigration in Europe and the USA, using significant ties with Russian and international criminal groups and his own agents.
Another likely successor to Kadyrov is Apti Alaudinov – commander of the “Akhmat” special forces unit and deputy commander of the 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Armed Forces. The first sign that Alaudinov has supporters in Moscow was the 21st Congress of “United Russia” party in December 2023, where the “Akhmat” commander became one of the central speakers. Already in January 2024, Alaudinov became Putin’s confidant in the presidential elections. In March 2024, he successfully negotiated the transfer of the backbone of the Wagner PMC (about 3,000 fighters) to the “Akhmat” special forces. In December 2024, Putin awarded Apti Alaudinov the rank of Lieutenant General.
At the same time, the relations between the “Akhmat” commander and Kadyrov are, to put it mildly, tense. He was sent to the war against Ukraine for “atonement for sins.” In 2019, according to data from a number of journalists, Alaudinov was preparing a conspiracy against Kadyrov. Another reason cited is that, while intoxicated, he joked about the head of Chechnya. Alaudinov was dismissed from public service, and his family’s business and part of their property were seized. Kadyrov, if he could, would probably not have allowed Apti Alaudinov’s rapid career growth in the Russian Armed Forces. The “Akhmat” commander is favored in Moscow, but for now, he is more likely used as a counterbalance to Kadyrov.
A system that has been managed by one person for almost two decades can crack significantly after that person’s death. And the absence of a clearly defined successor can lead to a situation where contenders will try to achieve leadership by any means. In Chechnya, such issues are often resolved very brutally. The history of the Kadyrovs’ rise to power in the 2000s, when their own clan was not yet too strong, is telling. They partially relied on the Yamadayev brothers, who controlled Gudermes and belonged to the largest Benoy teip, like the Kadyrovs. However, later, perceiving the Yamadayevs as a threat to their power, the Kadyrovs destroyed this powerful family with Moscow’s tacit consent. There is a high probability of significant bloodshed during a new transition of power in Chechnya.
Another potential source of instability could be inter-ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasus. In 2019, a minor border conflict occurred between Chechnya and Dagestan, which, however, demonstrated the weakening of Kadyrov’s seemingly comprehensive influence in the region. In 2024, a new stage of the conflict occurred – the struggle for Russia’s largest marketplace, Wildberries. The divorce of the business owners – Vyacheslav Bakalchuk and Tatyana Kim – led to a struggle between the former spouses for control of the company. Tatyana Kim decided to merge with another company, and the beneficiary of the deal was billionaire and Dagestani senator Suleyman Kerimov. Bakalchuk, in turn, sought help from Ramzan Kadyrov, who promised to “go to the end” in defending Bakalchuk’s interests and “return the woman to the family.”
Ultimately, it ended in a shootout near the company’s office in central Moscow between Chechen “athletes” and Ingush and Dagestani guards. Two marketplace guards died, and several dozen Chechens were arrested. Kadyrov issued threats of “blood revenge” against State Duma deputy from Ingushetia Bekhan Barakhoyev, State Duma deputy from Dagestan Rizvan Kurbanov, and Senator Kerimov. The Kremlin publicly did not react to this situation, but unofficially, the Chechen leader was most likely told to back down. After Kadyrov’s death, leaders of neighboring republics will likely want to take control of part of the Chechen leader’s shadow business, or even “correct” borders, which could lead to large-scale bloodshed.
Kadyrov’s death could also play a significant role in the balance of power between the so-called “Kremlin towers.” The Chechen leader has tense relations with the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Alexander Bastrykin, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, due to “migration policy” – illegal detentions and beatings of labor migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Kadyrov also has difficult relations with the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Security Service, including former FSB director and now presidential aide Nikolai Patrushev, due to the absolutely autonomous behavior of the Chechen leader and Chechen security forces regarding both military operations and maintaining law and order in the region, as well as regarding spheres of influence in legal and illegal business.
At the same time, the Chechen leader has close relations with the director of the Russian National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, in whose structure most of Kadyrov’s fighters de jure are. The issue of control over two dozen combat units currently under the command of the Chechen leader, whose total number is estimated from 25 to 45 thousand people, will be important for all groups in the security sphere of the Russian Federation. Heads of Russian security agencies gritted their teeth for years watching the creation of Kadyrov’s “feudal” army. For them, the death of the Chechen leader is a chance to return the region under federal control and, no less importantly, to take over the colossal financial flows that went to Grozny for years.
Since Ramzan Kadyrov came to power, the Kremlin has concluded an unspoken contract that looked like this: Moscow pays Chechnya generous “tribute” and does not interfere in internal processes in the region, while Kadyrov, with an iron fist, controls the situation and guarantees the absence of headaches in the capital regarding the republic. There is a high probability that with Kadyrov’s death, this contract will be annulled, and debts accumulated over two decades will be presented: tribal, ethnic, political, business, and criminal. And the methods of settling such debts in the Caucasus rarely remain within the legal framework.
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