Today, we can already say that Russia’s advantage on the Black Sea is coming to an end. What will be the future of this region? One of the possible options is a strategic alliance, which is underestimated by many. The partnership between Ukraine and Turkey is a fundamental factor that can change the balance of power in the Black Sea region, and its potential goes far beyond ad hoc agreements like the “grain corridor”.
So, what are the prospects for cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey, and can a Kyiv-Ankara axis be formed? Read about it in the article.
Discussions about Ukraine’s cooperation with the Black Sea countries often ignore the key state in the region, Turkey. Ankara has the potential to become a dark horse in the region and a valuable ally for Ukraine. And we are talking here not only about Ada-class corvettes and Bayraktars, but also about strategic interests.
At any historical period of its existence, the Russian state realized the importance of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for its influence in the region and constantly sought to expand its influence on them. The realization of “the Straits” dream in Russian geopolitical doctrine would allow the sphere of interest to be extended further south – to the Middle East, North Africa, and the strategic Suez Canal. Such ambitions have repeatedly brought Russia and Turkey into military and diplomatic confrontation. It should not be forgotten that preserving Turkish sovereignty over the Black Sea straits was (and still is) in the interest of European countries, such as the United Kingdom. As the world’s leading maritime power for a long time, Britain is well aware of the importance of controlling sea lanes and repeatedly supported Turkey in curbing Russian expansionist intentions. The current directions of Russian expansion remain unchanged.
After 1991, Ukraine was considered a “third power” in the Black Sea. However, the general atmosphere of deceptive peace and stability in relations with Russia, as well as the lack of awareness of the importance of maritime policy, along with the inability to manage available resources, led to Kyiv’s failure to pursue a systematic Black Sea policy. This topic became relevant only after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but then we already lacked resources and lost our geostrategic advantage. The most acute issue of the Black Sea arose for Ukraine during the full-scale invasion, when our country’s main export corridor turned into a theater of war, which had significant consequences for the Ukrainian economy.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Turkey, using its right under the Montreux Convention, banned the passage of warships of the warring parties. In this way, the Turks tried to use their leverage to reduce the degree of danger at sea. However, this is obviously not enough to assert their dominant position in the Black Sea. Back in 2014, Russia violated the status quo in the region, which directly affected Turkey’s interests. After all, Ankara hardly liked the excessive strengthening of its key competitor in the region.
The “Syrian Express” and Russia’s permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean, in particular in Tartus, Syria, should be considered a continuation of Russia’s expansion southward after 2014. And in 2022, Russia pushed Ukraine out of the Azov coast, turning the Sea of Azov into its internal sea.
One of the consequences of the outbreak of a full-scale war was the cessation of exports of Ukrainian agricultural products through the Black Sea. Turkey, which could not afford to lose its status as a “guarantor” of Black Sea security in the eyes of the world, initiated and lobbied for the Grain Agreement, which was in place for a year. After that, despite Russia’s threats, Ukrainian exports by sea continued, primarily due to the significant losses of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The Turkish state has repeatedly expressed its readiness to mediate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and in 2025 even stated that it would not mind sending its military as peacekeepers to Ukraine.
This initiative can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, Ankara does not want to lose its status as a guarantor of food security in North Africa and the Middle East, and secondly, it does not want Russia to become too powerful a competitor in the region. After all, if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, it may want to return to the Mediterranean and expand its sphere of influence to the Caucasus.
It is also worth noting that Ankara is strengthening its position in the Black Sea by supporting partner countries, in particular Romania. Thus, according to a contract signed last year, Turkish defense company Otokar will produce 1,059 COBRA II armored vehicles for Romanian Armed Forces. The first deliveries of the vehicles have already taken place in early June this year.
Today, Ukrainian and Turkish interests in the Black Sea in particular, and on the geopolitical chessboard in general, are closer than ever. For Ukraine, it is vital to ensure stable exports of its products by sea through the Turkish-controlled straits and to weaken the Russian military presence at sea.
For Turkey, the ideal scenario would be to maintain the pre-war status quo – all countries in the region (including Ukraine and Russia) peacefully cooperating in the Black Sea to ensure stable trade. However, after 2022, it is becoming increasingly clear that Russian expansionism has “crossed the red lines” and directly threatens Turkish interests not only in the Black Sea but also in the Middle East, where Russia seeks to maintain its bases in Syria and is expanding cooperation with Turkey’s rival in the region, Iran. Turkish politicians are used to acting pragmatically, in their own interests, and never “turn the other cheek.” Therefore, it is likely that after twenty years of warming relations with Russia, a prolonged cooling will follow. Which, in retrospect, is the natural state of relations between two influential powers whose interests clash in a number of regions.
In such a situation, cooperation with Ukraine should seem quite attractive to Ankara, because, in addition to common interests, our countries have “nothing to divide.” Let’s just look at the direction of Turkish expansion in recent years – it has consistently remained southern and eastern, in Syria, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Today, both we and the Turks are interested in stability in the Black Sea and in the stability of energy supplies to Europe from the Persian Gulf countries via Syria and Turkey, or from Central Asia via Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Ankara’s displacement of Russian influence in the South Caucasus or Central Asia directly strengthens Kyiv’s position. For example, Azerbaijan’s victory with Turkish support not only changed the balance of power, but also demonstrated technological and doctrinal superiority over Russian systems, undermining Russia’s image as a reliable supplier of military equipment. Moreover, this has pushed Armenia to turn away from Moscow and seek new allies, which is changing the regional balance of power in the Caucasus. This, in turn, forces the Kremlin to spend resources to maintain its position, dispersing efforts that could be concentrated on Ukraine.
There are also a number of other factors that make an alliance between Ukraine and Turkey more attractive. Among them, it is worth mentioning the exchange of military experience, the development of the military-industrial complex and modern military technologies. Cooperation with Turkey in these areas is already quite successful (Ada-class corvette program, Motor Sich engines for Turkish drones, UAVs). Naval cooperation also plays a significant role here. For example, Ukraine has ordered Turkish corvettes for its Navy, and Turkey is actively studying the experience of using maritime drones – UUVs.
In February 2025, the newly elected 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump, made a number of statements and political steps that pointed to the deterioration of US relations with Ukraine and the US administration’s reduced support for the latter, as well as to an attempt to rethink the US role in NATO. For example, Donald Trump said that he was not going to defend the alliance partner countries that spend less than 5% of their annual GDP on defense. And, although Turkey has planned a record increase in defense spending in 2025 to $47 billion, this will still be less than the American “minimum required”. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, in 2023, Turkish spending on security and defense amounted to 1.5% of the country’s GDP, or $15.8 billion, and in 2024 this amount was $40 billion (slightly less than 4%).
This is not the first time that Turkey has run the risk of falling out of favor with the United States, as its history as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance has often been accompanied by strained relations with its partners. In 2019, Ankara began implementing the agreement on the purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems signed in 2017. The total value of the contract reached $2.5 billion for four divisions. In response to this step, the United States imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and excluded Turkey from the F-35 program. At the same time, this decision also hit the aircraft program itself, as Turkey was already integrated into the supply chain of aircraft components. Turkey also faced a blockage of the program to modernize its F-16 aircraft, which form the basis of its fleet, to the Block 70/72 level. Eventually, this issue was unblocked the same day with Turkey’s permission for Sweden to join NATO.
Already at the end of the Biden administration’s term, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland paid a visit to Turkey to establish relations and try to resolve the S-400 and F-35 issues. It was reported that the visit was quite successful and promising for both sides. On the other hand, the sharp change in rhetoric by the next administration does not add to Washington’s (especially Trump’s) image of a reliable ally. It should also be added that Turkey is interested in the stability of the new Syrian government, which Ankara supports, and the restoration of peace and order in the country. And these plans are now being thwarted by a key US ally, Israel, which not only strikes at Syrian government-controlled territory but also advocates the preservation of Russian bases in Tartus and Hmeymim.
All these factors are pushing Ankara to seek allies that would be more compatible with Turkish interests. In turn, a large, modern Turkish army with war experience (albeit not in a high-intensity conflict), and especially the Turkish military-industrial complex, which is developing quite dynamically, can become an indispensable asset in the context of the emerging multipolar world.
The main “beneficiary” of the Turkish army may be a united Europe, which is now gradually moving towards realizing the need to establish itself as a new pole of power without US support. In March 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Ankara is ready to join any new European security system if NATO collapses.
And while Turkey’s involvement in the European security architecture may face significant difficulties (do not forget about the Cyprus issue and periodic aggravation of relations with Greece), nothing prevents Turkey’s cooperation with Ukraine right now.
To fully unleash the potential of Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation, it is important, first of all, to go beyond the already implemented projects and look at new, less obvious dimensions of cooperation.Equally important is the need to move from ad hoc interaction to the formation of a more deeply integrated alliance based on common geo-economic and strategic interests.
The key area of cooperation could be not just arms purchases, but the creation of full-fledged joint defense ecosystems. This implies a shift to joint research and development in areas where both countries have strong competencies: aerospace technology, engine production, and the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, both Ukraine and Turkey have large ground forces that also need to be developed. There are many promising projects in this area: UAV countermeasures, active defense systems, artillery weapons, etc. Such industrial integration will create a solid foundation for the alliance, which will be much harder to destroy by political changes.
No less important is the geo-economic dimension of cooperation. Instead of considering Turkey as a market or transit country for Ukrainian grain, it is worth thinking in terms of creating a new North-South transportation corridor. Integrating Ukraine’s port and rail infrastructure with Turkish logistics hubs could create a powerful route connecting Scandinavia and the Baltic states with the Middle East and North Africa, bypassing Russia and unstable areas. In fact, this project could become a modern analog of the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks”.
So, we can say that today Kyiv has a window of opportunity to gain a strong partner in the region, cooperation with whom can be based on common interests. And the most important thing in this situation is to catch this opportunity and use it successfully, which requires both political will and diplomatic efforts. However, the possible benefits for Ukraine from partnership with Turkey are definitely worth the effort.
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