The takeover of Goma by March 23 Movement fighters in the closing days of January 2025 has once again brought up before international community the issue of permanent anarchy in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has, of course, never been off the global agenda, yet it has been overshadowed by more immediate security issues. But now the rebels, supported by Rwanda, took a large, strategically significant city and were ready to resume the offensive (which they did). Adding to that, some foreign contingents invited to fight the Movement found themselves surrounded. Further escalation could have pushed the region to the brink of a new Congo War, and Rwanda – to the brink of fulfilling irredentist ambitions.
How the attempts to resolve the crisis are going on – further down in the article.
Up until the very end of 2024 there were reasons to be optimistic about the development of proxy-conflict in the eastern provinces of Democratic Republic of Congo between the Congolese government and Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) supported by 4 thousand military personnel from neighbouring Rwanda. On July 30 João Lourenço (the President of Angola) succeeded in setting up a ceasefire agreement between two sides, and in November the ministers of foreign affairs agreed on a “concept of operations”, outlining mechanism and conditions for withdrawing of Rwandan troops. This was supposed to be followed by a personal meeting in Luanda between DRC and Rwanda Presidents – Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame – first time in the preceding one and a half year, that should have eased the tension at the very least, if not become an occasion for signing a full peace deal.
In its stead the dialogue broke down. Both Kinshasa and Kigali announced cancelling meeting at the last moment, finding no common ground regarding negotiating format with M23: Kagame insisted that the government has to talk directly with the rebels, designated as a terrorist organisation by DRC; Tshisekedi in turn argued that negotiating with the Movement constitutes a “red line” he is in no position to cross, and demanded continuing talks with Rwanda without the armed group’s participation.
Still, the real collapse was unfolding not on the diplomatic backstage, and not in public rhetoric, but on the frontline. While DR Congo’s armed forces did well to contain M23 offensive in the direction of the northern city of Lubera, in the south the Movement succeeded in occupying cities Masisi and Minova, reaching the shores of Lake Kivu and surrounding Goma – provincial administrative centre and one of the larger city in the country. In particular, on January 23 M23 forces took Sake city, and on January 25 fighting broke out on the outskirts of Goma, which was completely controlled by them by the end of the month. 3 thousand people were killed in the first days according to the UN, almost as that many injured, and an additional 500 thousand displaced since the year began.
In general, the conflict goes back to Rwandan genocide, disintegration of Congo-Zaïr and Congo Wars in the 90s. M23 declares its raison d’être to be safeguarding interests of local Tutsi – not in the least against the remnants of hutu génocidaires that fled westward across the border. Rwandan involvement, that is for now most likely aimed at maintaining sphere of influence of sorts in bordering areas, is also rooted in those events, as well as the practice of smuggling resources mined there.
It was not for the first time in winter of 2025 that M23 forces had to fight for Goma. Back in 2012, taking its name from an agreement with the government signed on March 23, 2009, the armed groups of Congolese Tutsi revolted in Northern Kivu (blaming the government for failing to comply with said agreement). The movement has quickly expanded its hold over new territories, advancing toward the provincial centre, which it took over in the end of November, but not for long. Pressured by the international community the rebels agreed to start negotiations facilitated by Uganda and leave Goma by December 1.
In no way it meant that then DRC President Joseph Kabila abandoned search for a military solution, which he found in a regional security arrangement – SADC (Southern African Development Community). Kinshasa joined the organisation soon after Mobutu dictatorship was overthrown in 1997, and the controversial intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia under the SADC banner has saved Laurent-Désiré Kabila regime in Second Congo War, repelling Rwandan aerial assault in the west of the country. Now the SADC Summit has answered Kabila Jr.’s request and approved the use of SADCBRIG regional standby force against M23. The initiative was subsequently taken under the wing of the incumbent MONUSCO UN mission in the form of Force Intervention Brigade authorised by the Security Council, becoming the first UN mission with peace enforcement mandate. But the mission retained regional character: armed contingents were provided by SADC countries – South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi. FIB succeeded in defeating M23 decisively after the conflict resumed in May 2013, pushing them into Uganda, where its remnants laid down their arms and signed a peace agreement with the DRC government.
M23 fighters turned back to armed struggle on the Hobbesian scene of eastern Congo in November 2021, in the Rutshuru Territory area to the north of Goma. Once again the Movement spread its control over the province, tripling the occupied area by December 2022, in contrast with the situation in March. Tshisekedi, who took over the presidency after Kabila in 2019, this time appealed to a different coalition. In 2022 DRC joined EAC (East African Community), which agreed to deploy EACRF standby force in July – for the first time in the history of the regional organization.
Attempts to resolve the conflict were moving along two parallel tracks. First one – the so-called Luanda process under the guidance of João Lourenço, was affirmed by the African Union, and covered talks between DRC and Rwanda. The second one was the Nairobi process, incorporated into EAC by June Summit, and headed by then Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who came to be the mediator between Kinshasa and dozens of rebel factions. EACRF mandate consisted in facilitating implementation of recommendations made by both processes, which at the time of deploying authorized contingent of 6-12 thousand in November 2022 included securing the ceasefire agreed in the same month (became effective in April 2023) and overseeing the withdrawal of M23 from occupied territory.
Very soon Kinshasa became disillusioned with EACRF. Tshisekedi insisted that regional forces had to conduct offensive operations against the rebels, while the regional community held onto peacekeeping interpretation of the mandate. Finally, the DRC government just refused to prolong the mission and it has ceased its operations by the end of 2023. Instead, the Congolese leader again sought help from the old allies – SADC. And there he found it: the extraordinary Summit once more approved the deployment of SADCBRIG, with the same trio of contributors as in 2013. SAMIDRC (SADC mission in DR Congo) was authorised in accordance with 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, specifically to assist DRC armed forces in neutralising M23, and became operational in December 2023 as EACRF peacekeepers were withdrawing.
In the first year of being active, as we can now judge, SAMIDRC has not changed the balance of power in favour of the government at all. And when the rebel fighters and Rwandan army took Goma, the intervening forces found themselves surrounded.
With the fall of Goma, the crisis turned from local to a regional one. And as it happens, international organisations urgently started calling meetings on the subject. The Peace and Security Council of African Union met on January 28 demanding the cessation of support to M23 and withdrawal of foreign forces (“all” forces, without explicitly mentioning Rwanda), and from the rebel fighters – immediate and unconditional withdrawal from territories occupied in January and to lay down their arms. But, as one might expect, the continental effort failed to move any further and the next meeting on February 14 concluded without meaningful progress. Yet February 14 was not an unremarkable day for M23: the Movement took Bukavu – another big Congolese city and an administrative centre of South Kivu province.
Regarding wider international reaction, the UN Security Council met twice, on January 26 and 28, voicing unanimous support to Kinshasa, and also demanding from M23 to leave conquered territories, as well as to halt foreign involvement. Those demands were reiterated in Resolution 2773 of February 21, which in addition called to withdraw Rwandan Defence Force specifically from DRC territory.
The situation got especially tense with EU relations. Last year Brussels signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Kigali regarding critical minerals, and now found itself under pressure, including from EU Parliament, urging it to denounce the agreement in response to January events. Ultimately, according to Kaja Kallas, the Union launched a review process in March. That month the EU also introduced measures against some M23 representatives and Rwandan officials, to which Rwanda responded by cutting diplomatic ties with Belgium – its former metropole and the main country advocating for sanctions.
Despite attracting global attention, both the UN and African Union affirmed their support for existing initiatives and so the crisis continued to be handled by the same regional actors. EAC called an Extraordinary Summit dedicated to DRC on January 29, while SADC did so on January 31. Then on February 8 both organizations convened a Joint Summit of Heads of State and Government hosted in Dar-es-Salam, calling for the withdrawal of “uninvited” forces, ceasefire, and also consolidating the Luanda and Nairobi processes. To SADC the situation turned out to be particularly complex: 17 SAMIDRC military servicemen lost their lives in the Battle of Goma, while the rest were left cut of when rebels took local airfield. The organization utilized sharply confrontational rhetoric regarding to the situation, yet no actions followed to support it in February – nor could they be observed on behalf of M23 and Rwandan forces. For some time, the surrounded contingents were left to awkwardly coexist side by side with the rebels. Ultimately on March 13 another SADC Extraordinary Summit terminated SAMIDRC mandate, opening way for evacuating the intervening forces. By the end of the month parties agreed to facilitate the exit of surrounded units, which are currently being transported by a route passing through Rwanda.
Meanwhile SADC and EAC have also agreed upon a roadmap to stabilize political and security situation, and on a second Joint Summit approved a new team of facilitators consisting from former African presidents, which had its first meeting in early April. Lourenço went on to resume facilitating activities, meeting Tshisekedi in February, and attempted to persuade Kinshasa to talk to the rebels directly. On this issue the Angolan President delivered a breakthrough, as the DRC government accepted direct negotiations with the M23 delegates in Luanda. However, in the last moment before the meeting were to take place, the Movement withdrew from the talks, blaming EU sanctions introduced prior for the collapse. On March 24 Lourenço announced stepping down from his position as AU mediator, which was handed over to Faure Gnassingbé of Togo sometime after. But, at this stage both parties have already appealed to other mediators.
Technically, Lourenço explained his departure from the process with the need to dedicate greater attention to his new responsibilities as a Chairman of African Union, but the it’s much more likely that the real reason was a bit more political. While he struggled to reanimate the Luanda process negotiations, Qatar has launched its own campaign of “shuttle diplomacy”. Unexpectedly for Angola and, frankly speaking, for the majority of international observers, it was a success. On March 18 (the day when talks with M23 in Luanda were supposed to open) Kagame and Tshisekedi met in the country’s capital, expressed their conviction that the ceasefire should be reached, and agreed to proceed with further talks. Apart from the very fact of both presidents meeting personally, the summit on its own did not result in any particular solution, but starting from it parties abandoned the declared search for “African solutions for African problems”: prior to that in late January, when M23 rebels were fighting on the outskirts of Goma, an offer to mediate coming from Turkey’s President Erdoğan was rejected by Kinshasa, citing commitment to the existing initiatives.
The next step was to make M23 involved in the process, which Qatar did by inviting the rebel delegates for the second round of talks where the mediating team met them separately. Informally, Congolese representatives begun the dialogue in Doha in early April and officially it was started on April 9. On April 23 both parties finally declared immediate ceasefire and went back to proceed with further discussing potential peace deal. Meanwhile a new actor took over the initiative on DRC-Rwanda track – the United States.
As with Ukraine, the Trump administration became interested in facilitating the resolution through an agreement on critical minerals. As with Ukraine, the idea has not emerged in Washington. Early into the crisis American reaction did not stand out among other Western nations and personal sanctions were introduced against Rwandan officials. An offer to establish partnership in exchange for Congolese minerals was made by Tshisekedi administration in February and has immediately attracted interest on the different side of Atlantic. For now, it is too early to say if American government and capital have preference for any specific resources, be it copper, cobalt, gold, tin, tungsten, or other. But it’s not that hard to guess that Kinshasa would rather direct American attention to coltan ore, from which tantalum is extracted (a metal used in capacitors for electronics production): according to some experts, coltan mines “taxation” in Northern Kivu provided M23 rebels with around 800 thousand USD a month worth of revenue.
Currently the negotiations are still ongoing, but if we were to judge by public comments made by American officials, they are proceeding smoothly. The last couple of months saw greater diplomatic engagement with regional powers: for example, Massad Boulos, Trump’s Senior Advisor on Africa, visited DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya in early April. US came to position itself peacemaker and mediator, starting discussing a mineral deal with Kigali as well, and making efforts to reach a peace agreement. On April 25 both nation’s ministers of foreign affairs met in Washington in the presence of Marco Rubio and signed a Declaration of Principles, which contained among other things recognition of both parties having legitimate security interests and a commitment to refrain from supporting non-state armed groups.
The parties have also agreed to draft a peace deal by May 2, and, according to Boulos, US have already received those drafts for review. Bilateral economic agreements United States expect to be signed following the final version of the treaty. Regarding Rwanda, the Trump administration has an additional interest, contemplating the possibility of moving there deportees under its anti-migration agenda, which it has already started discussing with Rwandan government.
The negotiation process is still going on, so the content of both peace and mineral agreements is subject to speculation. Lately Reurers published an article which suggests, citing diplomatic sources, that American mediating team considers legalizing Rwandan resource extraction in eastern DRC, bringing existing operations out of shadow. Similar agreement was already in place earlier, but in 2022 DRC government suspended it due to Rwandan support for M23.
Obviously, it was the Tshisekedi administration that lost the most in the conflict. The Congolese army was defeated on the ground, the government ceased to control two major population centres, then was forced to yield and begin direct talks with M23. Tshisekedi’s own position on DR Congo’s political landscape waned: The President pursued consultations with other political forces to form the Government of National Unity, while Joseph Kabila, who left the country in 2023 in the wake of anticorruption investigation, declared his intent to participate in peace process and came back to rebel-controlled Goma. Finally, it is the Tshisekedi administration that had to appeal to the new transactional sentiments in the White House, attempting to reproduce a rather unpleasant episode of recent US-Ukrainian relations, and it is yet unknown whether the final document shall be closer to earlier or later versions of Ukrainian case.
One could have argued that the crisis has also done a serious blow to SADC, however on their own institutions of the community do no constitute a separate actor. The organization rather presents a mechanism for collective action regarding security challenges through which states engage with regional politics, but no more: for all 32 years of its existence SADC saw its fair share of resolved, unresolved and ignored issues. So, the failure of DRC mission is unlikely to change anything. This argument is also relevant for the entire African Peace and Security Architecture.
It was not so much SADC that was defeated in the Goma offensive, as the specific intervening nations, and in South Africa the effect of such defeat was most pronounced. Out of 5 thousand authorized personnel 2,9 thousand were supposed to be provided by RSA; out of 500 million USD for the mission it was Pretoria that was to allot 100 million (another 200 million were supposed to be provided by DRC and the matter of other 200 million remained open). Among those fighters who perished in struggle for Goma, 14 were of South African National Defence Force. The shock from their death had immediate political consequences. Cyril Ramaphosa (acting President of RSA) has publicly warned M23 and Rwanda from further skirmishes, stating that hostile action shall be understood as a declaration of war – to which Kagame also responded with confrontational rhetoric. The South African government rejected the option of unilaterally withdrawing the contingent, and sent additional 700-800 personnel as reinforcements.
Tension eased as the bodies of the deceased were returned to their homeland and SADC Mission in DRC terminated, but the issues within the defence force that were revealed could hardly be ignored. In 1988, on the eve of the collapse of the apartheid, the state has spent on defence around 4,6% of its GDP. Since democratic RSA was no longer in state of permanent conflict with its neighbours, the armed forces were reorganized to core capabilities for maintaining self-defence with participating in peacekeeping missions as a secondary function. Military spending, accordingly, decreased consistently and as of 2024 constituted 0,7% of GDP. After the Battle of Goma both defence experts and higher officials designated decline of defence forces as the reason for defeat, and insufficient financing as the reason for the decline. Due to the lack of funding only 1,3 thousand total personnel were deployed under SAMIDRC, which have also struggled with logistics and received no air support. Thus, responding to this the government doubled down on its 2024 decision to increase defence spending up to 1,5% GDP, which it is currently seeking ways for implementing. Such plans are not new, but now, when the RSA’s military fragility became visible, there are real conditions for the reform of South African National Defence Force and for the reversal of tendencies of the past 30 years.
Notwithstanding on what terms the conflict shall be resolved and whether it shall be resolved at all, Rwanda’s standing only got stronger. Kigali maintains one of the most competent and experienced armies in Sub-Saharan Africa and makes use of it abroad not for the first time. Not so long ago it was deployed as a part of bilateral security agreement with Central African Republic and Mozambique. In the latter instance Rwandan Defence Force acted alongside South African: the government appealed for SADC intervention to fight Al-Shabaab islamist movement and at the same time made arrangements with Kagame’s regime. SADC Mission in Mozambique (to which RSA was also the largest contributor) suffered from the same lack of financing and got to perform defensive function, while the Rwandan forces were located in areas with sensitive economic projects and conducted offensive operations. For this reason, Maputo greatly preferred the Rwandan contingent. When Al-Shabaab activities receded, the SADC mission was concluded and withdrawn, while Rwandan presence only increased. Thus, the failure of SAMIDRC did not just demonstrate South African weakness as a security guarantor, but also Rwandan hard power capabilities once again, affirming its status of regional player.
In 2012 M23 held Goma under control only for 10 days. Since taking the city in January 2025 the Movement has been controlling it for 4 months. Despite exiting Walikale (another strategically important city in Northern Kivu) prior to the Qatar talks, this time the rebels express the intent to stay and have already began governing: assigned provincial governors, started creating administrative structures, organize taxation, reanimating banking infrastructure. Such actions caused widespread condemnation from international community as they may potentially signify the intent to annex those territories by Rwanda. Successful territorial conquest would be an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of postcolonial Africa indeed.
To what degree future agreements, if they are concluded, shall benefit the United States is too early to tell – all of that depends on their practical implementation. Apart from direct profits to be gained for American companies, potential investment may be able to compete with Chinese capital, which has been dominating natural resources extraction in DRC for more than a decade now, and may weaken Beijing’s grip over the continent overall.
Eastern Congo is no Eastern Europe. Making Kigali or Kinshasa comply with the agreement to be reached would likely require much less effort from the US compared to fulfilling guaranties to Ukraine – and thus they appear more realistic. For DRC American support is not an existential question and a mineral deal, provided that it wouldn’t be extremely unjust and exploitative, may indeed stabilize the area.
Nevertheless, there is something for Ukrainian state to pay attention to: currently, potential agreements are the closest experience we have of second Trump administration’s resource policy to Ukrainian case. The ways in which American party approaches implementing the agreements one way or another would provide Ukrainian government with deeper understanding of their possible actions in Ukraine, which would allow to adapt Ukrainian cooperation strategy to working in new conditions.
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