5% Defense, 0% Membership: A New NATO Formula for Ukraine?

Valeriia Kyriachok

Last week, the latest NATO summit took place, with The Hague as its host city. On June 25, the annual event concluded with the adoption of a declaration. Five short paragraphs marked the end of the two-day conference, which included a defense forum with industry representatives, political and military leaders, a formal dinner with the King and Queen of the Netherlands, a working dinner of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and other important sideline meetings. So, what can Ukraine take away from the summit?

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Zelenskyy in The Hague: A Gesture of Support or a Gesture of Courtesy?

The turbulence in Ukraine-US bilateral relations since the new administration came to power in the United States has been felt by everyone. And since February — following the stormy meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump at the White House — it has been impossible to stop monitoring the trajectory of these relations. This is especially true in Europe, where leaders are, on the one hand, trying to build their own strategy for relations with the 47th US President, and on the other, seeking to understand how the Russo-Ukrainian war will evolve in the context of American arms supplies — or the lack thereof.

The fact that Trump left the G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, early on June 16 due to the escalating situation in the Middle East did not add optimism to the future of Ukraine-US bilateral relations or the likelihood of a swift resolution to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. In doing so, he canceled a planned bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy. This early departure destroyed any chance of adopting a joint G7 declaration on Ukraine and, given previous US resistance to agreeing on language that directly condemned Russia and contained commitments for long-term military support to Ukraine, it compromised the united position of the West altogether.

Therefore, the invitation for the President of Ukraine to the NATO summit on June 24-25 was a positive message, as it confirmed that Ukraine and the war on its territory remain an important part of Europe’s security architecture, rather than being ignored or silenced. It is also worth noting the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, where long-term cooperation formats were discussed, which once again confirms that Ukraine is not going to be left to fend for itself in this conflict. But can we assert that the NATO summit in The Hague brought more signals than solutions for Ukraine?

A Brief Declaration — Even More Brief Mentions of Ukraine

Let’s examine the final declaration and what it signals, but to do so, we must turn to last year’s documents. The Washington Declaration, adopted on July 10, 2024, had 38 paragraphs, among which one can find 40 mentions of Ukraine. The general rhetoric of last year’s declaration had clear positive messages for Ukraine’s future, as it mentioned Ukraine’s “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership,” and also promised at least €40 billion in military aid over the year, along with the creation of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) center. This last step involved centralized planning and coordination of provisions, as well as a permanent presence of a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, aimed at more deeply institutionalizing the Alliance’s support for Ukraine.

Furthermore, the declaration contained an additional 6 paragraphs on commitments for long-term security assistance to Ukraine. The clarity of figures, conditions, and mechanisms in these paragraphs were undoubtedly the key to long-term support. At the same time, due to the lack of legal guarantees for several years ahead and its dependence on the political course of leading states, this document became more of an effective political tool than an unconditional guarantee.

This year’s Hague Declaration was record-breakingly concise, with only five paragraphs and 2 mentions of Ukraine. And yet, the declaration managed to include a reaffirmation of the unwavering commitment to collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, details of a new commitment for allies to annually invest 5% of GDP in the Alliance’s core defense needs, and even a mention of support for Ukraine. “Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support for Ukraine, whose security contributes to our own, and to this end will take into account direct contributions to Ukraine’s defense and its defense industry when calculating allies’ defense spending,”— this is how the allies, through the declaration, spoke about Ukraine and its priority within NATO. But what can we read between the lines of this brief statement?

We can notice what was not included in the document: namely, any specifics regarding membership, a timeline for integration, or new military aid packages. The Ukrainian issue was not given a separate section or even a paragraph, and the threat from Russia to Euro-Atlantic security is placed on par with the “persistent threat of terrorism,” rather than being singled out as a priority area of focus. Such rhetoric may not only be a diplomatic gesture of caution but also serve as an indicator of a gradual shift in focus at the global level — particularly, a growing attention to both the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, where the Alliance, and especially the United States, increasingly sees new and more pressing threats to its security, related to the rise of China’s influence and its military-technological expansion.

Bilateral Dialogue: Positive, but Without Breakthroughs

Nevertheless, the NATO summit, unlike the G7 summit, allowed the two leaders to finally meet. The meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy took place in a constructive tone: they discussed the supply of additional air defense systems, the development of drone production, and security cooperation. Fortunately for concerned Europeans, the meeting passed without incident and even resulted in positive rhetoric from Donald Trump towards Zelenskyy. The closed-door meeting was “long and meaningful,” and Zelenskyy is a “very pleasant person” who is leading a “brave fight”: this is how the 47th US President described the event.

On the one hand, the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting made it clear to Russia that Ukraine will have NATO’s support, even from leaders who are skeptical of the Ukrainian administration. On the other hand, it gave the Ukrainian side no reason to rejoice, as no change in Trump’s stance on Ukraine’s NATO membership was announced, the provision of air defense systems by the US is not guaranteed since “they are very difficult to get,” and the US President himself still “hopes for changes in Putin’s behavior.” Moreover, US comments within the summit but outside of this meeting focused more on the Israeli-Iranian conflict than the war in Ukraine.

Taken together, such behavior once again indicates that the White House remains oriented not towards containment, but towards attempts to rethink relations with Russia. And, judging by the volume of aid to Israel in recent days, the priority war for the US is not the Russo-Ukrainian one.

Germany: New Chancellor—Old Restraint. France: Strategic Autonomy Instead of a Political Breakthrough

Let’s shift the focus from the US and consider whether the German and French positions align with the American one and what reasons underpin them.

Germany remains one of the largest donors to Ukraine’s defense, yet on a political level, it demonstrates caution regarding Ukraine’s approach to NATO. With the election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in May 2025, it seemed that Germany’s position on Ukraine would become more resolute, especially given his previous criticism of the Scholz government’s caution. However, the NATO summit in The Hague showed that even the new leadership is in no hurry for political breakthroughs. Merz, a representative of the conservative CDU, declared support for Ukraine as a strategic partner but refused to publicly raise the issue of accelerated NATO accession. The reasoning remained similar: preserving the unity of the Alliance, the need to meet all formal membership criteria, and the risk of escalation from Russia. In addition, Germany’s political culture entails caution in military matters, and the electoral demand for “predictability and stability” restrains the government from taking drastic steps. Thus, despite a change of face in Berlin, Germany’s strategic restraint on the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO remains in effect.

France, meanwhile, continues its support for Ukraine, but its main emphasis is on building European strategic autonomy. President Emmanuel Macron in The Hague expressed concern that calls from the US for increased defense spending are being lost amidst trade restrictions, pointing to the primary importance of a “trade peace” among allies. In this context, the most important thing for Paris is not so much Ukraine’s rapid accession to NATO as the development of its own defense industry and coordination through the EU to create a stable security foundation. France also traditionally seeks to maintain the status of a geopolitical arbiter, which implies openness to diplomacy—even with the Kremlin. Therefore, France prefers to support Ukraine through technical assistance, production cooperation, and institutional mechanisms without forcing geopolitical decisions.

Against the backdrop of internal contradictions and geopolitical turbulence, the Alliance’s allies are not ready for new political decisions, as evidenced by the disappearance of the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership from the public agenda. The Hague solidified this status quo. For Ukraine, this means only one thing: it should rely not on expectations, but on institutional engagement.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Ukraine

The NATO summit on June 24-25, 2025, in The Hague concluded with the adoption of a new declaration, in which the main emphasis was placed on strengthening the Alliance’s defense capabilities. The introduction of a 5% defense spending threshold, as well as a series of bilateral meetings — including the important conversation between Trump and Zelenskyy — created a complex but predictable picture for Ukraine: support remains, but without breakthroughs on the issue of membership. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of an increasingly cautious attitude in some Western capitals towards further escalation in relations with Moscow, the very fact of Ukraine’s participation at the highest level had important symbolic significance.

The Hague summit demonstrated that NATO is united in its financial goals but fragmented in its strategic vision. Ukraine remains an ally — but outside the system of guarantees. The Ukrainian issue remains an important, but not a priority, topic for NATO. Support formats are becoming more technical, and political signals — more blurred. In these conditions, Kyiv’s strategy must be based on a clear understanding that a place in the European security architecture is not just something to be defended — it must be constructed daily. Ukraine must move from expectation to action: influence the distribution of resources, initiate multilateral formats of defense integration, and demand transparent accountability mechanisms from its partners. Specific steps that will contribute to this include:

Formalizing agreements on air defense systems: Establishing clear delivery timelines, as well as expanding the list of air defense systems that Ukraine can receive. It is no less important to initiate a European consortium to create a joint air shield over Ukraine (by analogy with the “European Sky Shield”).

Influencing allies’ defense spending planning: The new 5% NATO benchmark is a chance for Kyiv to integrate into the European defense planning system. Ukraine should initiate the development of a roadmap that defines how exactly this figure will be transformed into support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, infrastructure, and the military-industrial complex.

Activating cooperation with the EU defense industry: Focus on creating joint production of drones, artillery shells, and air defense systems, where Ukraine has not only a need but also technological competencies.

In conclusion, The Hague did not bring Ukraine new guarantees, but it clearly outlined the framework: being part of the process does not mean being at the center of decisions. In this reality, Ukraine must not so much seek formal invitations as persistently build its own indispensability to the Alliance. Only through initiative, capability, and clearly articulated demands can symbolic participation in summits be transformed into real agency in the security sphere.

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