China-Indonesia defense cooperation is gaining new momentum amid escalating geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, there are economic benefits, technological modernization, and new opportunities for Jakarta. On the other — risks of strategic dependence on Beijing, which simultaneously asserts claims to Indonesian waters around the Natuna Islands.
How does Indonesia balance the appeal of Chinese weaponry with the desire to maintain autonomy? Can Jakarta stay on its multi-vector course without falling into the trap of technological dependency?
The complex dilemmas of Indonesia’s defense policy — in our article.
In the contemporary international system, Southeast Asia has become one of the main theaters of geopolitical confrontation between major global players. The South China Sea has turned into a symbol of the contradictions between China’s territorial claims, the interests of the United States, its allies, and the coastal states of the region. For Indonesia, this situation holds special significance since, although Jakarta is not formally a party to most territorial disputes, China claims part of its exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands, citing the infamous “nine-dash line.” This creates ongoing tensions between Beijing and Jakarta and forces Indonesia to carefully balance its regional policy.
Indonesia has traditionally adhered to the concept of a “free and active” foreign policy (politik luar negeri bebas aktif), which entails avoiding military alliances and striving to maintain strategic autonomy. However, China’s growing ambitions in the South China Sea, its increasing military power, as well as the heightened activity of the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region are making this course increasingly difficult to maintain. As the largest economy in ASEAN with considerable human and military potential, Indonesia is increasingly forced to prioritize between the economic benefits of cooperation with China and the need to safeguard against its increasingly assertive foreign policy.
At the same time, Indonesia is gaining greater influence within ASEAN itself, positioning itself as a leader capable of preserving the bloc’s unity in an era of growing polarization. Despite its economic integration with China, Jakarta is increasingly participating in regional security initiatives involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, and South Korea, demonstrating its intention to avoid becoming unilaterally dependent on any major player. Meanwhile, the intensification of defense cooperation with China is sparking widespread debate among the country’s analytical circles regarding the potential long-term consequences of such engagement.
The beginning of deepened defense cooperation between China and Indonesia dates back to the early 2010s, when economic integration between the two countries gradually expanded into the security domain. China, which was steadily increasing its military presence in the South China Sea, sought to strengthen bilateral relations with Jakarta not only as an important trade partner but also as a potential security ally. For its part, Indonesia sought to use Chinese defense technologies to modernize its armed forces, given its limited defense budget and a lack of modern weapons systems.
One of the first significant forms of interaction was joint naval exercises held in 2011 under the name “Cooperation 2011”, which focused on combating piracy, illegal migration, and maritime terrorism. In the following years, the scope of the exercises expanded, including the involvement of special forces units. In 2023, China and Indonesia conducted large-scale naval maneuvers in the North Natuna Sea — a move with symbolic significance given the territorial disputes.
Alongside joint exercises, the supply of Chinese weapons to Indonesia also intensified. One of the first major contracts involved the purchase of C-705 anti-ship missiles, part of which were locally produced in Indonesia. In addition, Chinese CH-4 strike drones were actively procured for reconnaissance and maritime patrol missions, including the area around the Natuna Islands. Beijing also proposed expanding cooperation through joint production of certain weapons components on Indonesian territory, aiming to deepen long-term technological integration.
China-Indonesia defense cooperation also includes dialogue at the political level. A key platform for this has been the China-Indonesia High-Level Defense Dialogue mechanism, within which not only training and equipment deliveries are discussed, but also strategic aspects of mutual defense policy, particularly regarding the South China Sea. Furthermore, in 2023, both sides expanded cooperation in the fields of cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats, reflecting new trends in regional security.
Nonetheless, despite the intensified military-technical cooperation, the China-Indonesia partnership remains asymmetrical. China plays the role of senior partner, controlling critical technologies and most of the production chains, while Indonesia remains limited in its capacity to develop its own defense industrial base. This creates potential strategic risks, which are increasingly the subject of internal debate in Indonesia.
Despite the clear benefits of military-technical cooperation with China, Indonesia faces complex strategic dilemmas that are increasingly shaping its foreign policy. The primary risk lies in the gradual dependence on Chinese technologies and weapons systems, which could potentially create political leverage for Beijing in critical security matters. Indonesian analysts emphasize that excessive concentration of arms procurement from a single supplier undermines the principle of defense autonomy — a particularly dangerous prospect amid rising tensions in the South China Sea.
China’s claims to Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands are one of the most sensitive elements of these risks. Although Beijing officially recognizes Indonesia’s sovereignty over the islands themselves, it continues to assert claims to adjacent maritime areas, considering them part of its “historical zone.” Periodic incidents involving Chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships entering these waters repeatedly spark political disputes in Jakarta. This heightens concerns about whether Indonesia can effectively defend its interests in the event of a potential crisis, especially if its armed forces partially depend on Chinese technologies.
Indonesia’s domestic political landscape also reflects ambiguity regarding defense cooperation with China. Certain political circles, particularly within the business elite, support deeper economic and security ties with Beijing, viewing them as a source of investment and access to cheaper technologies. However, nationalist forces — including segments of the military, think tanks, and the opposition — warn of a “quiet strategic capitulation” that could result from becoming too closely aligned with Chinese interests.
One of the most actively discussed scenarios in Indonesia is the so-called “dependency trap,” in which China initially assists in modernizing the country’s defense sector and later gains informal control through logistics, equipment maintenance, access to technological centers, and data. Examples of such dependence, observed in several African and Asian countries in the civilian sector, serve as further arguments in Indonesia’s internal debates.
At the same time, a segment of Indonesian strategists views the current cooperation with China as a tool for tactical maneuvering. By leveraging its partnership with Beijing, Indonesia demonstrates multi-vector diplomacy, reaps short-term benefits, and modernizes its defense capabilities — all while simultaneously expanding ties with the United States, Japan, and other Western allies. This approach allows Jakarta to capitalize on the competitive dynamics between major powers, avoiding open confrontation with any single actor.
Between 2023 and 2025, Indonesia intensified its multi-vector foreign policy by actively strengthening cooperation with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other allies to counterbalance China’s influence. In August 2024, large-scale Super Garuda Shield exercises took place, involving more than 6,900 military personnel from the U.S., Australia, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and New Zealand. In April 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister to discuss defense coordination, the protection of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and trade issues.
In January 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba visited Indonesia, finalizing an agreement to transfer two high-speed patrol vessels to protect key “choke points” along maritime routes, particularly in the area of the planned new capital in Kalimantan. In February 2025, Indonesia’s parliament approved the grant-based transfer of the vessels and the launch of joint frigate development — a vivid example of technological and defense integration. Following that, a contract was signed for the supply of an offshore patrol vessel (OPV) through JICA, with the project set for completion by 2028, enhancing Indonesia’s capacity to respond to threats, including Chinese coast guard activity.
Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom also participated in Super Garuda Shield, enhancing interoperability with several military allies. Indonesia is negotiating with Australia and South Korea on experience-sharing in maritime security and combating illegal activities at sea, often in the form of ship visits and joint patrols. This parallel development of cooperation with Western partners enables Indonesia to maintain flexibility: it does not abandon the benefits of working with China but establishes alternative sources of advanced military technology, capabilities, and strategic support — all contributing to the defense of its sovereignty and the demonstration of foreign policy independence.
The situation in Southeast Asia, especially in the South China Sea, shows a steady increase in competition among global and regional powers. For Indonesia — geographically and politically situated at the heart of this geopolitical tension — the issue of defense cooperation takes on multilayered significance. On the one hand, Jakarta gains substantial benefits from working with China: access to technologies, localized production, relatively inexpensive weaponry, and a demonstration of an independent foreign policy. On the other hand, strategic dependence on Chinese systems amid uncertainty in the South China Sea creates long-term risks, already being debated in the country’s political and expert circles.
The simultaneous intensification of military cooperation with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other Western partners demonstrates Jakarta’s desire to maintain strategic balance. The conduct of multinational exercises, the signing of contracts for the supply of Western weapons systems, the expansion of joint shipbuilding projects, and the development of maritime patrol capabilities all point to the gradual establishment of alternative defense cooperation channels, which may partly offset the potential risks of excessive technological dependence on Beijing.
Several potential scenarios can be outlined for the next 3–5 years. In the event of further escalation of tensions between the U.S. and China, Indonesia will be compelled to balance even more actively, likely expanding military-technical cooperation with Western partners without formally joining military alliances. If, however, relations between major powers remain under control, Jakarta will likely continue its multi-vector course, reaping benefits from all directions. Domestic political changes in Indonesia itself may also affect the priorities of defense policy, particularly in the context of election cycles and shifts in elite structures.
In any case, Indonesia is already demonstrating how a mid-sized regional power can skillfully maneuver within a complex system of international relations, leveraging great-power competition to its own advantage. This does not eliminate threats, but it does allow the country to preserve strategic autonomy in an increasingly turbulent world.
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