On the night of June 22, the U.S. launched a missile and bomb strike against three of the most crucial facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program: the uranium enrichment plants in Fordow and Natanz, and the research center in Isfahan. President Trump immediately described the attack as a “stunning success,” asserting that “all facilities have been completely and definitively destroyed.” The President also added that the U.S. acted in cooperation with Israel and called on Iran for immediate peace.
What are the results of the “12-day war”? We explore this in our article.
Despite campaign promises not to involve the U.S. in new conflicts, President Trump supported Tel Aviv’s actions from the moment Israel’s operation against Tehran began. This was preceded by several months of fruitless negotiations regarding a nuclear deal with Iran in Oman. However, from the outset of Israel’s operation, doubts were voiced regarding its ability to inflict serious damage on Iran’s nuclear program, as key facilities are located deep underground, beyond the reach of Tel Aviv’s existing conventional weaponry. Only the U.S. possesses the means capable of striking a reinforced facility of such depth: GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs.
The strike was preceded by several days of demonstrative redeployment of U.S. air and naval assets closer to Iran. Observers lacked certainty that Washington would risk conducting an attack. Donald Trump’s reputation also played a role; since the beginning of his second term, he had repeatedly initiated various “grand gestures” whose implementation was never fully seen through. However, the strike was ultimately delivered.
It remains unknown whether Iran was truly “weeks away from creating a nuclear weapon,” as claimed by Netanyahu and Trump. Nevertheless, the U.S. evidently concluded that diplomacy was incapable of halting Iran’s nuclear progress, especially after Tehran refused to comply with the demand for a complete cessation of uranium enrichment on its territory. An additional factor favoring the operation was the significant reduction (if not outright destruction) of Iran’s air defense capabilities resulting from Israeli operations. This considerably lowered the risk of losing valuable B-2 strategic bombers, which would have been an image catastrophe for Trump himself, whose approval ratings had primarily shown a negative trend in recent months.
The lack of sufficient satellite imagery and information from Iran, partly due to the recent internet blockade, prevents a clear assessment of the attack’s consequences. Washington asserts that the facilities were destroyed, while the Iranian side claims that the installations and scientists were evacuated beforehand. Mehdi Mohammadi, a senior advisor to the parliamentary speaker, added that “it is impossible to bomb knowledge.” The evacuation claim is supported by satellite images taken two days prior to the strike, which show a convoy of trucks, notably near Fordow. Furthermore, initial satellite images of Fordow do not allow for the identification of serious destruction to the facility. But, this fact does not necessarily indicate a failed attack, as the GBU-57 detonates not immediately upon impact with the surface, but after penetration, at depth, thus complicating external identification of consequences. The IAEA provided the most restrained assessment, stating that it did not detect an increase in radiation levels near the attacked sites.
Subsequently, American intelligence stated that the strikes did not lead to the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program or the attacked facilities. They assessed that Tehran’s nuclear program was, at best, set back by two years. This assessment aligns with Israel’s evaluation of the strike’s consequences, with the caveat that a two-year recovery period assumes ideal conditions and no new strikes, which Israel will endeavor to prevent. Such assessments met with sharp rebuttal from President Trump, who insists that the facilities were completely and definitively destroyed, and that Iran’s nuclear program no longer exists. For our part, we note that this claim requires significantly more evidence than currently available, especially in light of the fact that the nuclear facility in Natanz, also underground, was attacked by “Tomahawk” cruise missiles, not bunker-buster bombs. Consequently, the destruction primarily affected the surface infrastructure. The IAEA has already stated that it is unaware of the whereabouts of Iran’s enriched uranium.
One of the primary sources of legitimacy for authoritarian rule is force. Only the perception of this force can be more crucial than its actual existence. Thus, the Ayatollahs’ regime is compelled to demonstrate resilience and steadfastness, lest any sign of weakness jeopardize its own stability or regional influence infrastructure. Even though Washington contacted Tehran prior to the attack, assuring that the strikes were not aimed at regime change in Iran, the latter could not leave the attack unanswered. Within hours, 20 missiles had already been launched towards Israel. Mehdi Mohammadi, already mentioned, termed this “the beginning of Israel’s destruction, which will be the first response to the U.S. attack.” Tehran deployed some of its most modern ballistic missiles, notably the Khorramshahr-4, boasting a range of 2000 km and a warhead capacity of up to 1500 kg. Additionally, Yemen’s Houthis have already declared war on America and advised them to “stay away from their territorial waters.”
At the same time, the Islamic Republic’s capability for prolonged shelling should reasonably be called into question. Israeli airstrikes have disabled a significant portion of its missile launchers, and the lion’s share of the surviving ones have been relocated to eastern regions. Consequently, Tehran can only launch strikes using its longest-range, and therefore most expensive and complex, missiles within its arsenal.
The main question lingering in the air was whether Iran would attack U.S. military bases in the region. Over the past few years, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly carried out shelling of these bases. However, it always informed the Americans of the impending strike some time beforehand, ensuring that the actual damage from the shelling was far from critical, including avoiding the most sensitive type of loss for the American side — human casualties. And although there were expectations that a response to a direct attack on nuclear facilities inside Iran might provoke a sharper reaction, the scenario described above repeated itself. On the evening of June 23, Tehran, after prior warning to Washington about the attack, launched 14 missiles at the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which had been evacuated in advance. The response was rather symbolic and primarily aimed at a domestic audience. This allowed the Islamic Republic’s authorities to at least partially “save face” without inflicting damage on the Americans that would make ignoring the strikes politically unacceptable.
President Trump thanked Iran for the prior warning about the attack, described it as very weak, and stated that America would not retaliate. On June 23, information from the White House indicated that both Israel and Iran had requested a truce. Despite such statements from the U.S. President, the exchange of missile and air strikes between the two aforementioned states did not cease. As of now, the shelling has stopped, and both sides have preliminarily agreed to a ceasefire.
Neither side needs the conflict to deepen. For the Ayatollahs, this poses a direct threat to regime stability, while the White House, under no circumstances, seeks to embroil the U.S. in another “endless” war. This is not only due to the risks of losing strategic maneuverability and diverting focus from the crucial East Asian region but also because of the strong public aversion to new military campaigns or direct military intervention after the painful experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both Israel and Iran have significantly depleted their stockpiles of anti-missiles and missiles, respectively.
Thus, despite the considerable noise surrounding the strikes, the potential for a real large-scale conflict was inherently low, as it serves neither Iran’s nor Washington’s interests. The U.S. prefers to use force to compel Tehran to compromise and resolve one of the most significant security challenges in the Middle East. Success would allow Donald Trump to demonstrate to the public his victory over America’s long-standing adversary — a victory that would not cost a single American life — thereby strengthening Republican positions ahead of the 2026 congressional midterm elections. Currently, we observe the White House striving to politically capitalize on the recent events in the Middle East.
Other significant regional states reacted negatively to U.S. actions. Saudi Arabia condemned the attack and called on all parties for an immediate political resolution instead of military action, placing its armed forces on the highest state of alert. Despite traditionally cold relations with the Shia Republic, recent years have shown a gradual normalization of contacts between Riyadh and Tehran. The Kingdom does not need a regional war that would jeopardize its ambitious economic transformation plans.
Turkey, represented by its Foreign Minister, spoke out against the attack, emphasizing that Ankara has no interest in escalating the conflict or the emergence of a new source of instability in the region. This is indeed accurate — weakened by inflation rates that are the highest among G20 economies after Argentina’s, the Turkish economy would only suffer further from an energy market crisis, which is highly probable if an escalation spiral is triggered.
Iran’s eastern neighbor, Pakistan, similarly condemned the attack on the nuclear facilities. Islamabad’s primary fear is the destabilization of Iran resulting from the collapse of the Islamic Republic’s regime, which would trigger the spillover of instability to Pakistan’s western borders and could exacerbate Baloch separatism.
The main and sole party that could potentially benefit from a deepening and expansion of the U.S.-Iran conflict is Israel. While Tel Aviv and Washington acted in cooperation, their objectives are not identical. The Jewish State seeks the downfall of the Ayatollahs’ regime, as Prime Minister Netanyahu himself has stated, while America focuses on eliminating Tehran’s nuclear program. Although these goals may be similar, they are not identical. The Donald Trump administration’s readiness to “pull chestnuts out of the fire” using the Israeli government and capitalize on the moment to achieve its own goals does not translate into a similar willingness for prolonged direct involvement in the confrontation.
The reaction from Moscow and Beijing can be described as predictable. Although both nations are strategic partners of Tehran, neither is interested in Iran acquiring nuclear status. Both states, naturally, condemned the attack on Iran. China further asserted that the blame for the escalation lies squarely with Israel and the U.S. However, no concrete actions to assist the Islamic Republic have followed.
Moreover, to a certain extent, this conflict benefited Russia: instability in the Middle East traditionally drives energy prices upward, global attention shifts from the Russian-Ukrainian War to a new confrontation, and the U.S. might redirect weaponry contracted for Ukraine to another region, citing its own military needs. As anticipated, the Kremlin had previously offered itself as a mediator for negotiations with Tehran, evidently attempting to extract maximum advantage from the situation. However, the White House rejected the offer. On June 23, a meeting between Iranian and Russian representatives took place “for consultations,” yet the actual support from the Kremlin remained merely symbolic.
Beijing, also interested in de-escalation and energy market stability, called on all parties for peace, but similarly provided no substantial support.
Indirectly, the entire world has currently felt the repercussions of the confrontation. Iran, as predicted, did not blockade the Strait of Hormuz, so oil prices experienced only a brief surge. The market’s reaction to the Iranian shelling of the American military base was a sharp decline in price to pre-war levels, below $70 per barrel, as the attack proved significantly weaker than anticipated. Among the reasons why Tehran, despite a parliamentary decision to close the strait, did not proceed with a blockade, we can highlight, firstly, the Islamic Republic’s own economic reliance on oil export revenues, which would have sharply decreased. Secondly, the security and political situation in the region is highly unfavorable for Iran, and a blockade would only worsen it.
Iran’s nuclear program has not been definitively destroyed; its production and scientific potential remain intact, and the regime has withstood the pressure, albeit losing a significant portion of its leadership. Nevertheless, it has received a clear signal from America that Washington is not interested in its downfall. At the same time, the Islamic Republic will be compelled to undertake a serious review of its foreign policy. Its strategy of safeguarding Iran by creating a buffer of IRGC-affiliated military groups has failed. Hamas and Hezbollah have been decimated by Israel, the Assad regime has fallen, and Syria’s new government is hostile towards Tehran. This will further complicate the restoration of combat readiness for these organizations, should Iran decide to pursue it. Iran’s influence in the region is at an extremely low level. De facto, of the entire “Axis of Resistance” that Tehran was building, only Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen’s Houthis remain at full strength. However, the former do not wield significant regional influence, and the latter primarily serve as a means of pressure on Saudi Arabia and shipping in the Gulf of Aden, rather than on Israel, despite their participation in recent attacks against it.
We can state that the balance of power in the Middle East has significantly shifted over the past two years. The Islamic Republic’s positions have substantially weakened, while its rivals have strengthened. This primarily includes Israel, which has debilitated the Islamist groups Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Turkey, with which Syria’s new government is to some extent aligned.
The key question remains whether Tehran will decide to resume its nuclear program, and more importantly, whether its political leadership will give principled consent to the creation of nuclear weapons, something it has not done to date. Donald Trump has stated that in such a scenario, the strikes would be repeated. It is evident that Iran, having lost the lion’s share of its air defense due to sabotage and Israeli air strikes, possesses no means of defending against them. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic has already ceased its cooperation with the IAEA, which means monitoring the status of its nuclear program will now become significantly more challenging.
U.S. involvement in the Middle East conflict is antithetical to Ukraine’s national interests. This would mean less attention to countering Russian aggression, fewer weapons for the UDF, and an improved economic situation for Russia. For instance, the European Union has already abandoned its previous plans to lower the price cap on Russian oil from $60 per barrel to $45. The reason was the rise in oil prices in the market, triggered by the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Currently, there is hope for renewed discussions, but their effectiveness remains questionable, as approximately 90% of Russian oil trades above the $60 price cap.
Consequently, it is in Ukraine’s interest to see the quickest possible, implicit or official, compromise between Washington and Tehran, as well as a fading of the confrontation between the latter and the Jewish State. Recent events offer grounds for cautious optimism, yet long-term stability in the region remains uncertain.
A positive signal for Ukraine is information published by Reuters regarding Iran’s dissatisfaction with the Kremlin’s weak support. However, it is unlikely that this will have significant consequences, particularly for arms deliveries to Russia. Despite the outward pomp of shared resistance against the U.S., Iranian-Russian relations are founded on pragmatism: both countries utilize each other as a source of military technology, with Russians interested in UAVs and Iranians in aviation and air defense. Against this backdrop, trade continues: the Kremlin receives the means necessary for war, while Tehran gains profits to support its economy. Therefore, we assume that, despite a potential cooling of relations, cooperation will persist.
Another important conclusion from the June confrontation in the Middle East is that Donald Trump is capable of making decisive decisions quickly if he perceives an opponent’s weakness and believes he can achieve his goals through force. The question remains when he will grasp the full fragility of modern Russia.
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